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Abstract 
Particularism challenges the accepted idea of normative moral theory that morality can be 
reduced to a finite set of fundamental principles; it sees morality as quite capable of getting on 
without such principles. This thesis is concerned with asking what, if any, changes would be 
required in the practice of medical ethics if this is correct. 
It is proposed that current guidelines for professional clinicians and medical scientists constitute 
a “fleshed out” normative system which provides pro tanto rules for ethical practice. To 
investigate the implications of this in a particularist world, the idea of thin and thick moral 
concepts is extended to cover moral principles so that generalist professional guidance is seen as 
constituted of thick principles. This guidance aims to provide the required confidence for the 
doctor-patient relationship and in particular for the trust required between doctor and patient.  
Examples of the development of protocols for early phase clinical trials in cancer, and of 
resource allocation in a resource limited system are used to investigate the difference in decision 
making, and thus in the decisions themselves, between generalist and particularist professionals. 
In a generalist world trust is placed in the systems of trustworthiness (practice guidelines etc) and 
thus in the developers of such systems; in a particularist world moral decisions are made by the 
clinician and so trust is placed much more directly in that clinician.  
The implications of this analysis are that under particularism medical ethical training (initial and 
continuing) would focus more on the development of moral character of the various 
professionals and less of following guidelines. The complexity of modern medicine implies that 
such guidelines would still be required, but they would no longer represent pro tanto duties, but 
rather ceteris paribus advice. 
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1 Introduction 
“Those are my principles, and if you don’t like them… well, I have others” Groucho Marx 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is submitted in the field of Medical Ethics; in it I have tried to answer the questions, 
“If moral particularism is true, are there any implications for how clinical and non-clinical 
professionals in medicine should conduct their practice?”, and, “If so, what are they?” 
I will assume that the reader has a reasonable level of knowledge in ethics and will not try to 
mount a defence of any particular theory either of medical ethics or of either side in the 
particularism/generalism debate. 
“Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct”, 
so says James Feiser in “Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics” (Fieser 2000 p139). 
Normative ethics is the study of general theories of what one ought (in a moral sense) to do. In 
this sense it is concerned with elucidating the general principles under which we make moral 
decisions. In §1.2 I will briefly discuss the three current main families of normative theories to 
indicate what aspects of them I will focus on in the main thesis. Theories about normative 
theories are the realm of meta theories1and it is here that particularism is found. Particularism 
can be seen as a claim that much of normative theory is at best redundant, “A particularist 
conception is one which sees little if any role for moral principles. Particularists think that moral 
judgement can get along perfectly well without any appeal to principles” (Dancy 2004 p1), I will 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to one of my examiners for the suggestion that it is not obvious that the particularist/generalist 
debate is a metaethical one. “Meta-noramative-ethical” was suggested as better describing the ground on which the 
debate takes place. I will use the shorter “meta-normative” in this thesis. 
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briefly introduce this in §1.3. On what might be thought of as the opposite side of normative 
theory is the realm of practical ethics within which is medical ethics. Medical ethics looks at how 
ethically correct decisions are made in medical practice, and at how professionals within 
medicine can make such decisions.  
1.2 Three normative theories
Much modern moral philosophy can be seen as an exploration of, and a debate about, three 
major theories. A full history and exploration of these is not appropriate in this thesis but some 
scene setting will be useful as a preamble to the main topics. 
1.2.1 Deontology 
Deontology (the study of duty from the Greek deon (duty) and logos (science or study)) is 
generally seen as dating back to the mid 18th Century and the work of Kant (specifically the 
Critique of Practical Reason (Kant 1788) and The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
(Kant 1785a)). The on-line Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy says: 
In contemporary moral philosophy, deontology is one of those kinds of normative 
theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden, or permitted. In 
other words, deontology falls within the domain of moral theories that guide and 
assess our choices of what we ought to do (deontic theories). 
Alexander and Moore.M 2012 
The basis for Kant’s moral theory is to be found in the Categorical Imperative; although Kant 
gives several formulations of this, I will use the first (the Formula of the Universal Law of 
Nature) for this introduction. This formulation states that I ought never to act except in such a 
way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Thus if I am 
contemplating making a lying promise for some personal gain, I should consider what would 
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happen if it became a universal law that people made lying promises, whenever they could, for 
personal gain. In the world so conceived there would be no possibility of a system of trust, so 
this is a world where no promise for personal gain is possible and at the same time a world 
where everyone makes lying promises for personal gain. The inherent contradiction in this world 
implies that it could not exist and it is thus not rational to will that making lying promises for 
personal gain should become a universal law. I am thus forbidden from undertaking such an act.  
One of the major influences in deontology in the 20th Century was W.D. Ross whose views are 
set out in “The Right and the Good” (Ross 1930). Ross’s major contribution was the 
proposition that moral obligations are (in his terms) prima facie, so that where obligations conflict 
a balance of prima facie rightness can be struck: 
Right acts can be distinguished from wrong acts only as being those which, of all those 
possible for the agent in the circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie 
rightness, in those respects in which they are prima facie right, over their prima facie 
wrongness, in those respects in which they are  prima facie wrong. 
Ross op cit p41 
I will return to Ross in §2.4. One important reason for highlighting his work here is the fact that 
it is a major target for Dancy when setting particularism against generalism.  
Deontology is often described as “act based”, in that the moral value of an act lies in the act 
itself. 
1.2.2 Consequentialism 
For consequentialists the normative properties of an act depend on its consequences. 
Utilitarianism is the generally cited example of classic consequentialism. Jeremy Bentham 
published “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation” in 1789 in which he 
proposed the principle of utility: 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
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By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of 
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to 
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what 
is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. 
Bentham 1789 p3 
The theory of utility was further developed by Mill (Mill 1863) who introduced the idea that the 
“higher” pleasures (intellectual and moral pleasures) were superior to the “lower” (more 
physical) pleasures to avoid the notion that “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal 
value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry” (Bentham 1811 bk3 ch1). 
This promotion of happiness as the only factor in defining the right (the approved) action has 
led to this form of utilitarianism being cast as “hedonistic consequentialism” in more recent 
times where various versions of consequentialism have been proposed (see, for example, 
preference fulfilment consequentialism expounded by Singer (Singer 1979)). 
The moral value of an act here lies in the consequences. Of special interest for the debate about 
particularism is the claim of consequentialists that there is one and only one rule, “maximise the 
good”, which always indicates the correct action. 
1.2.3 Virtue Ethics 
The latter half of the Twentieth Century has seen the rise of virtue ethics. This rise is generally 
seen as starting with a paper presented in 1958 by G.E.M. Anscombe (Anscombe 1958). 
Anscombe refers back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and virtue ethics in general is sometimes 
seen as a reworking of Aristotelian ethics in a modern context.  
Anyone who has read Aristotle's Ethics and has also read modern moral philosophy 
must have been struck by the great contrasts between them. The concepts which are 
prominent among the moderns seem to be lacking, or at any rate buried or far in the 
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background, in Aristotle. Most noticeably, the term "moral" itself, which we have by 
direct inheritance from Aristotle, just doesn't seem to fit, in its modern sense, into an 
account of Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle distinguishes virtues as moral and intellectual. 
Anscombe op cit p1 
In virtue ethics the moral value lies in the agent, not the act or its consequences. It is often 
characterised by the phrase “The right action is the one which a virtuous agent would typically 
do in the situation”. 
The reference to the virtuous agent above indicates the wider aspect of virtue ethics. Being a 
virtuous agent is concerned with how an agent lives his or her life: 
Philosophers and theologians have recognized that being virtuous is more than having a 
particular habit of acting, e.g. generosity. Rather, it means having a fundamental set 
of related virtues that enable a person to live and act morally well. The cardinal 
virtues have the task of making a person sufficiently rightly ordered to perform 
morally right action. 
Keenan 1995 p714 
1.3 Particularism 
1.3.1 There is no need for ethical principles 
Particularists deny the need for general principles in the study and practice of ethical behaviour. 
Much of the theory of moral particularism is due to Jonathan Dancy; he describes his “Ethics 
Without Principles” (Dancy 2004) as “the culmination of twenty-five years’ work” (p vii). I will 
present the theory in more depth later in the thesis but briefly Dancy describes particularists as 
believing all reasons are sensitive to context, which he terms “holism in the theory of reasons”. 
He says: 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
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the main aim of my particularist position is to break the stranglehold of a certain 
conception of how moral reasons function – the generalist conception under which 
what is a moral reason in one context is necessarily the same reason wherever it 
occurs. ... if [generalism] is false as a general account of such reasons, rational 
constraint on moral thought and action – in particular, accounts of what consistency 
requires in these areas – must not themselves be based on generalist assumptions. 
(original italics) Dancy 2000 p131 
1.3.2 Particularism and generalism 
There has been much debate in the ethics literature about particularism and its counter, 
generalism. For the purpose here I will outline these arguments in order to highlight the 
differences between the two camps which I believe to be relevant to medical professionals 
aiming to conduct their practice in an ethically correct manner. 
It is not my aim to further the generalist/particularist debate or to promote one side over the 
other. The aim is rather to understand where the positions differ in respect of how decisions are 
made in a medical or clinical environment. Particularism is a relatively new proposal in ethics and 
medical ethics has developed in a generalist ethical environment not least because this was the 
understood role of normative ethics. 
1.4 Medical ethics 
Medical professionals going about their everyday business generally prefer to do the “right 
thing” or, at least not to commit ethical mistakes. They are not, however, generally desirous of 
studying normative ethical theory, let alone meta-normative theory. I will not be concerned in 
this thesis with those who do not hold to this desire, only with those (the vast majority) who do 
hold it but wish to follow it without being unnecessarily distracted from their proper business of 
aiding the sick and helping the healthy to remain so. 
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I will also be concerned with the perception of the patient who, through the doctor patient 
relationship, places his or her trust in the doctor to behave properly. There are considerable 
inequalities in the doctor-patient relationship; inequality of knowledge, inequality of skill and 
inequality of need, all influence this relationship. In order to allow the patient to have control of 
his or her own life, the doctor must impart sufficient knowledge for the patient to make an 
informed decision when alternative courses of action are possible. In the “consent based” 
medical system trust plays a major role; trust, then, holds a special status in this relationship. 
I will aim to show that one of the main sources of guidance for medical professionals is the 
collection of guidelines produced by a variety of bodies such as the Department of Health, NHS 
Trusts, professional bodies and governmental and non-governmental agencies. 
1.5 The role of guidelines 
The complexity of both diagnostic tools and therapeutic interventions available to clinicians has 
increased with progress in medical research over the second half of the 20th Century and the start 
of the 21st. It is increasingly difficult for any one doctor to maintain a full overview of what can 
be offered to the patient in the consulting room. As well as technical complexity there is an 
increase in ethical complexity; it is now possible to undertake procedures unthought-of a few 
years ago, but technical and pharmaceutical developments often leave open the question, “just 
because we can, doesn’t mean we should”. Both the Department of Health (DoH) and 
professional bodies publish guidelines of which can be general (such as “Good Medical Practice” 
GMC 2012c) or specific (e.g. guidelines on patient’s consent to treatment (DoH 2009) or 
guidance when it is right to use a particular drug (e.g. NICE 2002)). 
The UK’s General Medical Council (GMC) maintains a website which includes a section on 
ethical guidance, it says, “The GMC has a statutory role to provide guidance to doctors on 
medical ethics” (GMC 2012b). A section of this web site contains this paragraph: 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
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2. Whatever the context in which medical decisions are made, you must work in 
partnership with your patients to ensure good care. In so doing, you must:  
a. listen to patients and respect their views about their health 
b. discuss with patients what their diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and care involve 
c. share with patients the information they want or need in order to make decisions 
d. maximise patients’ opportunities, and their ability, to make decisions for 
themselves 
e. respect patients’ decisions. 
GMC 2012a, para 2. 
 Other professions within medicine have similar guidance; the Health and Care Professions 
Council regulates a wide range of non-clinical medical professions from art therapists to 
radiographers, it publishes a document called “Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics” 
which “sets out the standards of conduct, performance and ethics we expect from the 
professionals we regulate. The standards also apply to people who are applying to become 
registered.” (HCPC 2008). An example of the content of this is: 
You must always provide adequate information to a service user in order for them to 
provide informed consent. This is particularly important where any intervention may 
cause pain or distress. Every effort should be made to ensure that the service user 
understands the nature, purpose and likely effect of the intervention before it is 
undertaken. 
College of Occupational Therapists 2010 para.2.2.4 
This example can be seen as refining general moral duties, such as “respect the autonomy of 
others”, “do not cause net harm”, within the realm of (in this instance) professional occupational 
therapists. Such codes of conduct can be seen in many professions defining the interpretation of 
ethical and moral principles for the specifics of the profession. As was said by the politician 
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Michael Portillo on an edition of the BBC Radio 4 programme The Moral Maze BBC 2012, 
codes of conduct depend on an underlying moral code. 
Professional guidelines then often encompass a set of ethical rules of conduct for members of 
the profession. Guidelines are written by a variety of bodies and it is not guaranteed that they 
will not contain conflicting guidance. Where guidance conflicts there may be a simple way of 
resolving the matter (more specific guidance for dealing with Jehovah’s Witnesses will overrule 
general rules on giving blood to unconscious patients in an emergency situation) or there may be 
a more difficult decision to be made (such as when NICE guidelines conflict with the best 
interests of an individual patient (see §5.4.3)).  
Central to the arguments in this thesis is the idea that these systems are the practical and 
professional ethics counterpart to deontological theory at the normative ethics level. Professional 
guidelines within medical professions are built on one or more normative systems and relate 
specifically to medical practice and subsets thereof. They can contain conflicting guidance which 
is subject to Rossian style balancing of prima facie rightness. In Chapter 2 I introduce an extension 
of the terms “thin” and “thick” as applied to moral concepts to apply to moral principles and 
argue that in this context, thinness/thickness is not a binary function but a continuous one and 
develop the idea that professional guidance constitutes (in part) a deontological system extended 
(“thickened”) to the degree necessary to give ethical action guidance to practicing professionals. 
For clarity in later chapters I will assume this argument has been made. 
1.6 Generalism and particularism in practice 
I will argue that in difficult situations generalists and particularists have different decision making 
processes; the generalist will be more inclined to seek and follow general normative guidelines 
whereas the particularist is not bound to believe that that the guidelines apply in all cases. 
Patients of generalist doctors are putting more trust in guidelines (and thus, in those who write 
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those guidelines) whereas patients of particularist doctors are putting more trust in the doctor 
him- or her-self. 
In turn the doctor must have confidence that s/he is not making an ethical error when acting in 
a professional capacity. The same distinction is seen as above. Under a generalist system the 
doctor must have confidence that the guidelines will guide her or him to ethically correct 
decisions and actions, whereas under a particularist system the doctor must have confidence in 
her or his own ethical decision making ability. One important distinction between the systems is 
how medical professionals in training and early in their careers gain the confidence required to 
believe they are acting ethically. 
1.7 Principlism 
One of the main texts used by trainee doctors is The Principles of Medical Ethics by Beauchamp and 
Childress (Beauchamp and Childress 2001); this work is used as the basis for “Principlism” 
which regards the four principles discussed in Beauchamp and Childress as a complete 
deontological system in itself, see for example the work of Gillon (Gillon 1985;Gillon 2003). 
It is hypothesised and argued that "the four principles of medical ethics" can explain 
and justify, alone or in combination, all the substantive and universalisable claims of 
medical ethics and probably of ethics more generally. ... This approach is argued to be 
compatible with a wide variety of moral theories that are often themselves mutually 
incompatible. It affords a way forward in the context of intercultural ethics, that 
treads the delicate path between moral relativism and moral imperialism. 
Gillon 2003 
In discussing Beauchamp and Childress I will generally follow this interpretation of their work 
(the “four principles” approach) as this is how it is often perceived within the medical 
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profession. I accept that this does not do justice to the views expressed in Part Three of their 
work: 
Often, we have more reason to trust our responses to specific cases and the 
characteristic responses of moral persons than a theory, principle, or rule. We also 
have reason to trust principles in the common morality then theories. In our model no 
level or type of moral reasoning – comprehensive theories, principles, rules, or case 
judgements – has priority or serves as the groundwork of the other levels. Moral 
justification proceeds from an expansive coherentist framework of “norms” that 
originate at all “levels”. These norms can emerge from institutions, individuals, and 
cultures, and no norm is immune to revision. 
Beauchamp and Childress 2001 p408 
1.8 Hypothesis 
Particularism implies that normative ethics is not necessary for ethical decision 
making. 
Particularists think that the accepted link between normative theory and ethical 
action is incorrect and should be abandoned. 
Current guidance in medical ethics is based on normative theories. 
If particularists are correct, a new understanding of the basis for medical ethics is 
needed. 
To investigate this hypothesis it is necessary to understand what particularists mean when they 
say that normative ethics are not necessary for ethical decision making, 
If particularism is correct, how can practical ethical decisions be reached? How is the busy 
clinician to know that she is not being unethical?  
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1.9 Roadmap 
In Chapter 2 I discuss the theory of particularism with reference to the nature of moral 
principles and action guidance. Particularism is largely concerned with rejection of “generalism”, 
so §2.4  discusses generalism with reference to the arguments later in the thesis. 
§2.6 is concerned with extending the notion of thinness and thickness to moral principles and 
arguing that it is a continuous function. 
Supervenience of the moral on the non moral is sometimes seen as a problem for particularism; 
this is discussed in §2.7.   
§2.8 is a slight diversion from the main theme and is an attempt to clarify the discussion of 
supervenience and thickening to enable me to use these in later chapters more straightforwardly. 
In §2.9 I look at some arguments against particularism and conclude in §2.10 that the question is 
still open. 
Chapter 3 is a discussion of medical ethics in terms of the theme of this thesis. 
§3.2 introduces the need for guidelines in practice. 
§3.3 is a discussion of one of the central themes on medical ethics and of this thesis, namely 
trust. 
§3.4 looks at the breakdown of trust in society and the perceived need for systems to ensure 
trustworthiness. 
The role of codes of practice and their role in action guidance is discussed on §3.4.2 and the 
various types of guidance documents are introduces in §3.6. 
In §3.7 I argue for the need for thickness in guidance documents. 
Chapter 4 is an exploration of how action guidance would work for a naive agent. 
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§4.2 and §4.3 look at the relationship of naivety and experience and at the thickness of guidance 
required by the naive and the experienced agent. 
Chapter 5 looks at the effect particularism would have, given the understanding of how medical 
ethics works under generalism discussed in earlier. 
§5.4 introduces two real examples from my practice as a medical physicist in early phase clinical 
trials in patients with cancer. The ethical issues raised by these are discussed in §5.5. §5.6 then 
looks at how particularist and generalist scientists and clinicians (as classified by me from their 
arguments during discussions of trial protocols) approach these ethical issues. 
§5.8 revisits the question of trust with reference to the particularist/generalist debate. 
Chapter 6 looks more deeply at decision making and the question of trust in particularist and 
generalist medical ethical systems. 
§6.3 looks at the implications of this for initial and continuing ethical training for the medical 
professions. 
The final chapter 7 revisits the hypothesis given above and draws on the arguments made 
throughout the thesis to see to what extent it has been verified. 
 
  
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
23 
 
2 Particularism 
“All universal moral principles are idle fancies”. Marquis de Sade 
2.1 Introduction 
The debate between moral particularists2 and moral generalists is a debate over the status of 
moral or ethical principles. Particularists can be defined by Dancy’s statement in the opening of 
Ethics without Principles by: 
A particularist conception is one which sees little if any role for moral principles. 
Particularists think that moral judgement can get along perfectly well without any 
appeal to principles, indeed that there is no essential link between being a full moral 
agent and having principles. 
Dancy 2004 p1 
Generalists, on the other hand, maintain that principles (or, at least, a principle) lie(s) at the heart 
of moral philosophy and the role of normative theory has been to elucidate these principles. In 
Principled Ethics McKeever and Ridge state:   
Modern moral philosophy is often understood as a debate between utilitarians like 
John Stuart Mill and deontologists like Immanuel Kant. Crucially, both sides of this 
modern debate are committed to the generalist idea that morality can be reduced to a 
fundamental principle. 
McKeever and Ridge 2006 p4 
To engage in this debate, it is first necessary to say what is meant by “principles”. I will begin 
this chapter with a look at what I will mean by “principles”. 
                                                 
2 I will assume the use of “particularist” and “generalist” to mean “moral particularist” and “moral generalist” 
throughout this thesis. 
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2.2 Principles 
In “The Language of Morals” R. M. Hare says 
If we were to ask of a person “What are his moral principles?” the way we could be 
most sure of a true answer would be by studying what he did... The reason why actions 
are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the function of moral 
principles is to guide conduct. 
Hare 1952 (original italics) p1 
I will take guiding conduct in the moral sense as being equivalent to indicating a moral value for 
an action, or a moral valence for a feature of an action.3 Principles provide a link between the 
moral value (at least as perceived by the subject of the above observation) of a feature of an 
action (this action is just, that action is telling a lie) and the situation in which the action takes 
place. This is not simply a link between narration of an action and a moral value; if P says he 
does not know where the thief is when, in fact, he knows the thief is hiding under his bed, then 
Q might say P’s action was wrong. This, on its own, does not mean Q knows, and knows how to 
apply, a principle. It is only when Q identifies several other similar actions as wrong that we can 
tentatively surmise that Q understands the concept of lying and knows the principle that lying is 
wrong. Hare draws an analogy between learning moral principles and learning the principles of 
driving: 
                                                 
3 McNaughton & Rawling draw a partial analogy with the chemical term “valence” “we have the following pair of 
principles: justice has a universally positive valance; whereas the betrayal of innocent friends has a universally 
negative valance.” (McNaughton and Rawling 2000 p257). 
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[I]n learning to drive, [we] learn, not to change gear now, but to change gear when 
the engine makes a certain kind of noise. If this were not so... an instructor would 
have to sit beside us for the rest of our lives in order to tell us just when, on each 
occasion, to change gear. 
 ibid p60 
Moral principles are general statements that actions of type X have a set moral value. For an 
agent who wishes to act morally, negative moral value is a reason to refrain from an action and 
positive value a reason to perform an action. Dancy says,  
moral principles ... seem all to be in the business of specifying general reasons. The 
principle that it is wrong to lie, for instance, presumably claims that mendacity ... 
always makes the same negative contribution [to reasons for choosing a course of 
action]. 
Dancy 2004 p76 
P’s action of making the utterance, “I do not know where the thief is.” is not, of itself, right or 
wrong. Q judges P’s act in the light of certain facts about the situation (the facts that P knows 
where T is and that P knows that T is the thief); Q knows P’s action is a lie and understands the 
principle that the feature of a statement “that it is a lie” carries negative valence: the fact that act 
is an example of telling a lie counts towards the act having negative moral value. In the absence 
of any other facts which might invoke other principles (see the discussion of pro tanto (prima facie) 
principles below) Q believes the act to be wrong. Using a principle then starts with examining 
the facts of a situation and deciding which (if any) moral principles apply.  
In general terms, a situation S is defined by a set of features4 FS = {F1… Fn}; action guidance (of 
a moral sort) in a situation S is the determination of the moral value of an action X in S. A 
                                                 
4 I will use “features” in a loose way to mean physical and mental facts of all sorts: it was a Tuesday; the statement 
was a lie; A believed D would die unless someone came to his rescue. 
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principle P indicates a moral value (VP) for an action XP given a set (possibly having only one 
member) of features FP = {Fa... Fz}. P indicates that action XP has value VP in situation S if all 
the facts required to invoke P are contained in FS (FP is a subset of FS (FP ⊆ FS)). 
2.3 Action Guidance 
In the following I intend to look at whether principles can be action guiding. Before entering this 
argument it is necessary to say something about action guidance; I will return to this in Chapter 
3. In the following discussion I will assume a high level of moral naivety so that a naive agent 
told the general principle “do not lie” will understand that to mean that lying is a feature which 
always carries a negative valence. This is equivalent to the naive driver being told that when the 
engine noise reaches that pitch she should change up a gear. In Chapter 4 I will look at the role 
of moral experience and how this relates to the generalism/particularism divide. 
The general principle “do the right thing” provides action guidance iff I know from other 
experience what the right thing is in the current situation. To see how this could be action 
guiding we might consider an experienced5 agent who can discern the right thing but has 
forgotten that the right thing is the thing that should be done. In order to do this the agent 
would be capable of attaching a label “right thing” to an action, but would not understand the 
meaning of “right thing” as the thing to do.  In this sense it could be argued that “do the right 
thing” provides action guidance but in another sense it is simply a definition of what we mean 
when we describe something as the right thing. This principle, however, is of no use to the naive 
agent who cannot discern the right action, for this agent action guidance needs to go deeper into 
the features of the situation. It is this naive agent who is most likely to ask what s/he should do 
                                                 
5 Experienced in the sense in which the action is right. An experienced financial advisor will perceive the best course 
of action to achieve the best financial outcome for his employer, the experienced demolition expert will perceive the 
best placement for the explosives to bring down a building safely, etc. 
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when faced with a particular situation. For the time being I will consider action guidance to be 
the guidance needed by a naive agent, with little or no moral experience to draw on, when 
deciding between possible actions. 
2.4 Generalism 
As McKeever and Ridge say in the quotation above, both Mill and Kant (and modern 
consequentialism and deontology) assume generalism.  
In Utilitarianism6 Mill asserts that  
to support [a moral theory] there ought either to be one fundamental principle or law, 
at the root of all morality, or if there be several, there should be a determinate order 
of precedence among them; and the one principle, or the rule for deciding between 
the various principles when they conflict, ought to be self evident. 
Mill 1861 p253 
and later 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote 
happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. 
Ibid p257 
The Categorical Imperative devised by Immanuel Kant (Kant 1785a;Kant 1788) is an example of 
the basis for deontological duty: 
                                                 
6 I refer to the page numbers in Warnock’s collection of essays by Mill, Bentham and Austin. 
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 Act only on that maxim through whereby you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law 
Kant 1785b p262 
These philosophers refer to universal or fundamental laws which they saw as analogous to the 
laws of natural science. The idea of such universal laws is a priori generalist. 
So, if P is a general principle it holds that the action XP will invariably have the value VP when FP 
are true; this formulation can accept that  FP might contain negative facts such as “the pleasure is 
not sadistic”. 
A problem which arises out of such principles is the possibility of conflict between different 
principles invoked by different features of a situation or by different interpretations of the 
application of the universal law; although Mill tries to sidestep this objection he does not give a 
“self evident” rule for deciding. It may be unreasonable to expect such a rule from Mill since, for 
him, Utility is a single principle; it is arguable that under a Utilitarian system, if the calculation of 
the consequences of an action is performed to a sufficient fineness there will be no conflict and 
thus no need of a rule, or from a different perspective, Utility is just that self-evident rule. The 
fact that later consequentialist systems have different single rules (for example the preference 
satisfaction of Singer’s preference utilitarianism (Singer 1979 p94)) indicates that such rules are 
not universally self-evident. We might question Mill’s assertion that a deciding rule must be self-
evident, but if a generalist system is to provide a means of deciding which of a set of possible 
actions is morally best, then rules for resolving conflicts must either be further rules within the 
system or be self-evident, or we will be unable to resolve the conflict.7  
                                                 
7 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the possibility of a normative system in which conflicts can be 
necessarily excluded a priori. I will simply state that I find the notion that principles can be defined in such a way that 
they cannot conflict, to be implausible. 
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Consider A intends to X, he believes that Xing is required by a general principle; he then finds 
that Xing necessarily involves not Ying, however Ying is required by another general principle; 
Xing is then both prescribed and proscribed. To flesh this out consider A has promised to return 
a book to B; A later discovers that B is not the rightful owner of the book, B has indeed stolen 
the book from C. The general principle that we should keep our promises is now dictating one 
action which would make it impossible to carry out the action required by the principle that we 
should return objects to their rightful owners. 
To overcome this problem W. D. Ross introduces the concept of “prima facie duty” 8 which he 
contrasts with “duty proper” (moral obligation). An act is a pro tanto duty in a given situation in 
virtue of the situation having certain features; this duty would be a duty proper if the situation 
did not have certain other features which indicate a different pro tanto duty. To arrive at the duty 
proper in a situation one must weigh up the various pro tanto duties; these duties work in a 
generalist way: they are always present when the given features are present, and they always act 
with the same valence.  
To see an example more relevant to medical ethics: Beauchamp and Childress’s (Beauchamp and 
Childress 2001) beneficence might indicate that a doctor should prescribe a particular course of 
medication as the best treatment for a patient; however, if the patient wishes to try “alternative 
medicine” before taking a course of drugs, the principle of respect for autonomy might indicate 
that the prescription would not be appropriate. Rossian generalism stops short of indicating how 
such conflicts should be resolved; Beauchamp and Childress however are in the business of 
offering practical advice to working medical professionals and they introduce the process of 
specification to help resolve such conflicts: 
                                                 
8 Ross's use of “prima facie” is somewhat different from the legal use of the term; “pro tanto” is generally preferred 
currently; henceforth I will use this latter term. 
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Specification is a process of reducing the indeterminateness of abstract norms and 
providing them with action guiding content. For example, without further 
specification, “do not harm” is an all-too-bare starting point for thinking through 
problems, such as assisted suicide and euthanasia. It will not adequately guide action 
when norms conflict. 
Beauchamp and Childress 2001 p16 
The distinction between Ross and Beauchamp and Childress may not be as clear cut as the 
above paragraph implies, however the emphasis in Beauchamp and Childress is on practical 
decisions in the clinic, whereas Ross sets out to “examine the nature, relations and implications 
of three conceptions which appear to be fundamental in ethics – those of ‘right’, ‘good’ in 
general, and ‘morally good’” (Ross 1930 p1). I will return to specification in § 3.6.1. 
2.5 Particularism 
In discussing particularism, Dancy talks of reasons:  
When I talk … about reasons for action, I mean to be talking of what I call contributory 
reasons. A contributory reason for action is a feature whose presence makes something 
of a case for acting, but in such a way that the overall case for doing that action can 
be improved or strengthened by the addition of a secondary feature playing a similar 
role.  
Dancy 2004 p.15 
Reasons, in this sense, can count in favour of or against an action. For Dancy there can also be 
overall reasons, but overall reasons are not something other than the result of the contributory 
reasons, “To talk of what there is overall reason to do … is to talk of where the contributory 
reasons come down – on this side or on that.” (ibid p16) So far these do not sound so very 
different from pro tanto duties; for Dancy however 
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a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, 
in another. 
ibid p73 
For Dancy, this defines holism in the theory of reasons.  
Dancy initially distinguishes between two types of reasons, “theoretical reasons” or reasons for 
belief, and “practical reasons” or reasons for action. 
He illustrates theoretical reasons with the example of my believing that something in front me is 
red. In ordinary circumstances the fact that something in front of me appears red is a reason for 
me to believe that the thing in front of me is red. Now suppose I have taken a drug which makes 
blue things appear red to me and red things appear blue. In this case the feature of the situation 
“the thing in front of me appears to be red” is a reason for me to suppose that it is blue. 
Reasons for belief then are holistic. I think this argument is reasonable: if we construct the 
feature “the thing in front of me appears red” to be an invariant pro tanto reason to believe the 
thing in front of me is red, then when I have knowingly taken Dancy’s drug, I have an 
outweighing pro tanto reason to believe “the thing is blue” but must still have reason to hold the 
invariant belief “the thing is red” at the same time. Moreover my reason for my belief in these 
conflicting statements is based on the same feature (“to me the thing appears red”). The holistic 
interpretation, when I take the drug the feature “to me the thing appears red” changes its 
valence to be a reason to believe “the thing is blue”, is more straightforward and chimes better 
with experience. 
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If generalism is taken to be the view that all reasons are general reasons, i.e. that if a 
feature is a reason in one case, it is the same reason in another case, generalism is 
uncontentiously false of theoretical reasons. 
ibid p74 
Dancy’s ordinary practical reasons are reasons for action; they arise from the sets of features (F). 
For example, Fa (= that there will be a lot of people there), might be a reason for action Xb (= to 
go there) if Fb (= that I want to party) is true, but a reason for Xc (=to stay away from there) if Fc 
(=that I want to be alone) is true. So, in this ordinary practical example my action is guided by 
feature sets; I will be guided to (there will be overall reason to-) Xb if {Fa, Fb} or to Xc if {Fa, Fc}.  
In ordinary practical reasons a feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all or 
might be a reason to act differently in another case (“that there will be nobody much else around 
is sometimes a good reason for going there, and sometimes a very good reason for staying away” 
(ibid p74)). For Dancy this shows practical reasons to be holistic: 
[A]gain we should remind ourselves that nobody has ever really debated the question 
of whether ordinary practical reasons are holistic or not. There should be no parti pris 
on this issue; so the examples, which are legion, should be allowed to carry the day 
without resistance. 
ibid  p74 
Although Dancy admits this might be “too quick”, it is a sufficient statement of his views thus 
far for this thesis. I am not concerned to establish the truth or otherwise of particularism, just to 
understand it well enough to see what it would mean for practical medical ethics. 
According to Dancy, there are two types of reason beyond the theoretical and the practical, these 
are aesthetic and moral. Whilst mentioning in passing that aesthetic reasons are “largely holistic” 
(a feature which may be aesthetically pleasing in one situation may be anything but, in a different 
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situation) he says, “Luckily, I don’t have to decide about that here” (ibid p75) and moves on to 
the moral.  
The argument for moral reasons being holistic (in “Ethics Without Principles”) centres on their 
not being so very different from all other reasons. No one has identified a way of distinguishing 
moral reasons from non-moral. Simple moral reasons (such as “causing pleasure is good”) do 
seem to behave holistically at first sight (where the pleasure is sadistic the moral valence is seen 
to change) see §2.9 for discussion of this.  
Holism of moral reasons does not necessarily lead to particularism; it is theoretically possible to 
define a holistically principled ethical system by enumerating all possible contributory principles: 
If an act causes pleasure, there is reason to do that act 
unless 
the pleasure is sadistic 
... 
If you have promised, that is a reason to do the promised act 
unless 
your promise was given under duress 
you were deceived when making the promise 
... 
This would be very different from the sort of general principle(s) envisaged by Kant, Bentham 
or Mill. The point here is not that this could be a practical way of doing ethics; just that 
particularism does not follow necessarily from the holism of reasons. 
However Dancy does say the morality we have is not grounded in any invariant principles, and 
that this follows from the holism of moral reasons, and further: 
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It was because of this issue that I characterised particularism [...] as the claim that 
the possibility of moral thought and judgement (and in general, one might say, of 
moral distinctions) in no way depends on the provision of a suitable set of moral 
principles. So characterised, it seems to me that particularism does follow from 
holism. 
ibid p82 
Particularism, then, is bound up with holism of reasons; it says that moral principles are not 
necessary for moral action. The holism of moral reasons says that a feature which may carry a 
valence and so be a reason for assigning a moral value to an action in one situation may have a 
different valence and so be no reason at all or an opposite reason in a different situation. 
2.6 The Thin and the Thick 
2.6.1 Thickness of normative concepts 
One characteristic difference between generalists and particularists is that generalists seem to 
need to distinguish “morally relevant” features within the set of all possible features (FMR ⊆ F) 
whereas particularists see no way of drawing the distinction between morally relevant and non-
morally relevant features in a general way, outside of a particular situation; which facts are 
morally relevant in a situation, for a particularist, depends on the situation.9 To investigate this 
further I will look more closely at the relationship between principles and features. It is useful to 
start by considering the distinction between thick and thin concepts and to extend this 
distinction to principles. 
When discussing moral language Williams says: 
                                                 
9 I will discuss how an agent can come to see which features may be morally relevant in Chapter6.  
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[T]heorists have brought the fact-value distinction to language rather than finding it 
revealed there. What they have found is a lot of “thicker” or more specific notions ..., 
such as treachery and promise and brutality and courage which seem to express a 
union of fact and value. The way those notions are applied is determined by what the 
world is like (for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time, 
their application usually involves a certain valuation of the situation, of persons or 
actions. Moreover they usually (though not necessarily directly) provide reasons for 
action. 
Williams 1985 p129-130 
A normative concept C is thick if, when C is correctly applied in a situation S, it follows as a 
conceptual entailment that some non-trivial facts are true of S; that is to say, the set of features 
which are entailed by C (FC) is a subset of FS. Taking courage as an example of a thick concept, 
if we say John was courageous when he saved a child from a fire, then we are committing 
ourselves to asserting the truth of a certain FC, for example F1: entering a fire involves danger; 
F2: many people would have wanted to avoid this danger; F3: John was aware of F1 and F2, and 
so on. If we believe courage to have a positive moral valence in all circumstances then (in the 
absence of countering features with a negative valence) John’s act has positive moral value. 
A normative concept is thin if it is not thick. This is to say that no facts are entailed when the 
concept is used (or only trivial facts (e.g. that the situation is located in a possible world where 
the action is possible)); “good”, “bad”, “right” and “wrong” are often cited as thin moral 
concepts. If we are told of some action that it was good, we can deduce nothing more about the 
action. We cannot tell if it was an act of courage, of generosity, or a refusal to tell a lie. 
2.6.2 Thinness of moral principles 
I would like to extend this idea of thin and thick to discuss moral principles. McKeever and 
Ridge (McKeever and Ridge 2006 section 1.2) discuss their use of the term ‘principle’ in some 
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detail and I will take their term “action guiding standard” as a working definition in line with the 
discussion in §2.2. As such principles may be seen as the normative counterpart to moral 
concepts. The use of thinness and thickness to describe principles is analogous to the thinness 
and thickness of concepts.   
The use of “thin principle” here is at odds with my earlier definition of principles as providing a 
link between the morality of an action and the feature set of the situation in which it takes place. 
The idea of a thin principle will be useful in the discussion below of variable thickness, I will use 
it as a limiting case: consider the principle “Always do that which, all things considered, is the 
best thing to do”; while this has the apparent form of an action guiding principle, it does not link 
any particular action or class of actions with any particular feature or type of feature which 
would allow it to guide action in any world without at the least further definition of “all things” 
and “best”. I will use the term P0 to indicate a thin principle. If P0 is not thick then, from the 
above definition of “thick”, when P0 is correctly applied in a situation S it does not follow as a 
conceptual entailment that some non-trivial facts are true of S. That is to say the set of facts 
associated with a thin principle is empty; the empty set of facts (the null set) will be indicated as 
F0. P0 is associated with F0. Since the null set is a subset of any arbitrary set we see that thin 
principles are invoked in any, and all, situations, in all possible worlds. Since no facts are entailed 
when a thin principle is applied, it follows that thin principles cannot distinguish between 
situations. Consider the above example of returning a book. The situation S is defined by many 
facts 
 FS = { 
F1 = A borrowed the book from B, 
F2 = A promised to return the book to B, 
F3 = the book belonged to C, 
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F4 = B had stolen the book from C, 
… } 
When considering which course action to take A considered three normative principles 
P0 = Always do that which, all things considered, is the best thing to do 
P1 = Always keep your promises  
P2 = Always return goods to their rightful owner 
Each Principle has an associated set of facts, for example P1 is invoked when the set of facts FP1 
are true  
FP1 ={ 
FP1.1 = a promise was made, 
FP1.2 = the promise has not been fulfilled, 
FP1.1 = the promise was not made under duress, 
…} 
A sees that P1 indicates a pro tanto duty to return the book to B (FP1 ⊆ FS) and that P2 indicates a 
pro tanto duty to return the book to C (FP2 ⊆ FS); P0 however indicates only that A should do the 
“best thing”. If F3 and F4 were not true then there would be no pro tanto duty to return the book 
to C (-(FP2 ⊆ FS)), similarly if F1 and F2 were not true then there would be no pro tanto duty to 
return the book to B (-(FP1 ⊆ FS)). However no change in FS would effect a change with regard 
to P0; F0 is a subset of any arbitrary set and P0 always indicates that A should do the “best thing”; 
P0 is of no use for choosing which course of action to take in the absence of knowledge of what 
constitutes the “best thing”; I will look at this knowledge for naive and experienced agents in 
Chapter 4. 
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Thin principles cannot provide moral action guidance; it is the link with facts that allows thick 
normative concepts to guide action.10 
Although often used simply to distinguish between concepts such as “good”, “right” and 
“ought” (thin) and concepts such as “courage”, “greed” and “lewdness” (thick), the thickness of 
concepts or principles need not be considered simply as a binary classification; rather, the 
thickness of a concept C or a principle P can be taken as a continuous function11 of the set of 
facts FP required by P to indicate the value VP; thin concepts and principles stand at a low 
asymptotic limit of the thickness function: a concept cannot be more thin than C0, a principle 
cannot be less action guiding than P0. If B says of A, “He did the right thing”, it is legitimate to 
ask for explanation; we want to know what A did, and in what situation; the thin principle of 
doing the “right” thing was uninformative, only the thicker concept he “told the truth”, he “told 
a lie in order to protect an innocent” can help us understand what B means by “right”. 
2.6.3 Thickness and specification 
In the field of medical ethics Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp and Childress 2001) discuss 
how to decide between competing pro tanto duties; they use the term “specification” to describe 
“a process of reducing indeterminateness of abstract norms and providing them with action-
guiding content”.  They say  
progressive specification often must occur to handle the variety of problems that 
arise, gradually reducing the dilemmas and conflicts that abstract principles lack 
                                                 
10 Under this analysis, it seems we might deny the term “normative” to thin principles. 
11 I am using “function” here in a way analogous to a mathematical function. It can take any value between fully thin 
(FC = F0) and arbitrarily thick (FC FS). 
Such a continuous function would approach a low asymptote at 0 (“fully thin”), however features are in some sense 
“countable” and the continuous function model would break down at the level of a single entailment in the real 
world. Although it would be feasible to build the analogy with a discontinuous function (strictly an integer function); 
as a physicist I see this as similar to the difference between measuring radioactivity at high and very low count rates, 
I think this would complicate the argument unnecessarily. In a discontinuous function the low asymptote is not 
outside the function and fully thin concepts would not be outside the analogous “thickness” function, simply a 
description of the lowest possible value. 
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sufficient content to resolve. Adding substance through specification is essential for 
decision making in clinical ... ethics. 
p.16 
In terms of the above discussion, the process of specification can be seen as a means of 
thickening the thinner “abstract norms”. Consider a situation S where two fairly thin principles 
(P1 and P2) conflict and recommend different actions {X1, X2}. The moral value (V1) of X1 will 
be indicated by the principle P1 which depends on the set of facts FP1. Not all of, and not only, 
the member facts of set FP1 will necessarily be relevant to X2 and a different Principle P2 will be 
associated with the set of facts FP2 to indicate X2’s value (V2). {X1 – X2} (a subset of {X1 – Xn})
12 
may now be seen by Rossian generalists as  pro tanto duties in S.  
In any particular situation S two fairly thin principles Px and Py may both be able to associate 
action X with a moral value (the associated sets of facts Fx and Fy which are subsets of FS); 
however they may differ in the value indicated. This can be seen in well known examples such as 
the conflict between beneficence, which would dictate that a doctor should give blood to an 
accident victim with internal injuries who will otherwise die, and respect for autonomy when that 
patient is a Jehovah’s Witnesses who refuses blood on religious grounds. The first gives a 
positive value to giving blood; the second gives a negative value to the same course of action. 
Specification is the attempt to restrict the range of situations to which one of these concepts 
applies such that only one will indicate a value for a proposed course of action. For example, the 
above case might lead us to add “that the patient’s religious beliefs are not violated” to the 
requirements for beneficence in order to determine the right action. 
Specification (z) reduces the range of situations by adding facts to Fx (Fx’ = {Fx, Fz}) and Sx’ is a 
subset of Sx. This also tends to allow more of the territory to be undefined (P’ is silent on the 
                                                 
12 Not all possible actions in all possible situations have moral valence. 
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moral value of any actions in situations defined by {F, -Fz}). For example consider the general 
normative principle (P) “Maximising pleasure is good”, a well worn specification is (P’) 
“Maximising non-sadistic pleasure is good”, it is important to note that it would be a fallacy to 
draw any conclusion about sadistic pleasure from the more specified P’.13 The specification z 
reduces the scope of P: S={situations where pleasure is maximised}, S’={situations where non-
sadistic pleasure is maximised}, and S’’={situations where sadistic pleasure is maximised}; S= 
S’ S’’; the facts of any particular situation (SaS) then decide whether SaS’ or SaS’’.  
Hard line consequentialists may say that such specification is not necessary and accept that 
sadistic pleasure is good. I think this is simply wrong; the pleasure a sadistic paedophile gets 
from torturing a child is not morally equivalent to the pleasure an organist gets from playing a 
Bach Toccata.14 
Beauchamp and Childress describe specification as a “progressive” procedure; extending this to 
a limit beyond the discussion in Beauchamp and Childress, each Sa would have its own particular 
set of facts Fa and its own normative principle Pa which would associate the facts with the ethical 
valence Va. Referring back to Hare in §2.2  we see that in this limit we have lost all generality and 
Hare’s driving instructor is back in the car! Specification, by its nature, reduces the size of the set 
of situations in which a principle applies; the more specified a principle becomes, the larger the 
set of features required becomes and the fewer the number of situations which have the required 
features. The challenge for generalists is to demonstrate that there is any set facts FG such that 
necessarily PG is associated with VG for all situations SG where FG = TRUE, and for any 
                                                 
13 I accept that generally specification is called upon when normative concepts give apparently conflicting advice 
based on the same set of facts about a situation, both sets will be subsets of the facts-of-the-situation set; 
examination of the disjunction of the subsets should reveal members of one subset (the action giving pleasure is 
sadistic) which can be used in the specification of the other (the pleasure given is not sadistic pleasure); however it is 
not necessary for specification that it be used in this way, we can ask of a normative concept “Is that always true?” 
which invites specification without having to choose between conflicting guidance. 
14 This seems to accept a form of moral intuition as an ultimate arbiter in moral thought experiments. By and large I 
am happy with this at least as far as the writing of this chapter is concerned. 
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particular situation Sa which is defined by facts Fa where FGFa there can be no fact F (where 
F Fa) which results in Sa having a different value from VG. Otherwise FG is an insufficient 
specification for PG and a further specification F’G = {FG, -F} is required. 
In general we think that some features of a situation are relevant to the moral value of a 
proposed action whereas others have no influence over that value. Generalism can be seen as an 
attempt to codify between the moral and the non moral domains (in the terms above moral 
principles provide this codification); a criticism of particularism arises from the notion that, for 
the particularist, there is no way in principle of deciding beforehand which features of a situation 
will be morally relevant when an agent in the situation chooses an action; this seems to imply 
that any feature of a situation might count in deciding the moral value of an action. At first sight 
it seems nonsensical to suppose that the agent’s shoelace colour might influence the moral value 
of a proposed action. Holism of reasons, however, does not say that there must be a situation 
where shoelace colour affects moral decisions, but it does imply that the implausibility of such a 
consideration does not prove its impossibility. Reason such as shoelace colour may “arrive 
switched off” for moral relevance whilst reasons such as justice may “arrive switched on” for 
moral relevance. In §4.3 I will introduce default valence as a means of describing features which 
arrive switched on (with a positive or a negative valence).  
2.7 Supervenience 
It is generally accepted that moral features of a situation supervene on the non-moral. This is to 
say that there cannot be a difference in the moral properties of a situation without there being a 
difference in the non-moral properties. Given that not all the non-moral properties of the 
situation are required to imply the moral, it is useful to ask if supervenience has a bearing on the 
particularism/generalism debate. 
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If there are no morally-relevant differences between two situations supervenience implies that the 
right action in the first is also the right action in the second. Situation A (SA) has a set of morally 
relevant features FMR-A 
15 and action X is right in situation A. If situation B has a set of morally 
relevant features such that FMR-A  = FMR-B then action X is also right in SB. For supervenience to 
operate this must be a strict equality; it is not sufficient that all the features FMR-A are present in 
situation B (FMR-A ⊆ FB). For the generalist there could be a feature in SB which invokes another 
general rule which provides a pro tanto reason for X to be wrong; for the particularist there could 
also be a feature in SB which causes one or more features in FMR-A to be no reason at all or an 
opposite reason in SB. For Dancy: 
It is better to think of supervenience as a syncategorematic relation between moral 
and non-moral properties in general, expressed in the fully general claim that if we 
start from a wrong action and move out to the entire non-moral nature of the world in 
which it is situated, and then replicate that in a new world, we are certain to have a 
wrong action in the replicating world. There is nothing more to supervenience than 
this. 
Dancy 2004 p87 
This quotation is from the chapter entitled “Holism and its Consequences”; Dancy rejects 
supervenience as having nothing useful to tell us about moral decisions if we accept the holism 
of reasons. For the particularist, supervenience requires the entire non-moral nature of the world 
to be the same for there to be no possibility of a moral difference; supervenience then seems 
only to generate “rules” at the very end of the thickness function and cannot help with general 
principles. If supervenience itself is true then it is true independent of any facts in the world, and 
any attempt to generate a normative principle of supervenience would result in a thin principle.  
                                                 
15 Dancy would term FM-A as the “resultance base” for the decision that Xing was right in A. For him resultance is 
very vulnerable to changing situations and cannot generate general principles. 
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2.8 Justice: a principle or a range of usage? 
To examine specification further I will look the use of the concept of justice and the principle 
“do what is just”. This is used by several writers as an example. Hooker offers promoting justice 
as a counter example to particularism, “how could the fact that an act would promote justice 
ever be anything less than a pro tanto moral plus?” (Hooker 2000 p9) Dancy recognises “the pull 
of the idea that we are not just dealing with a default, and that justice always counts in favour.” 
(Dancy 2004 p121.).  
A problem with arguments using terms such as “justice” is that the term can be applied in a 
number of different ways and these can have different underlying concepts and the principle “do 
what is just” will be associated with different feature sets. The different uses have different 
thicknesses, at its thinnest justice entreats us to treat equals equally (Aristotle 350 B.C. Bk V 
Chap. VI). The principle of supervenience says that there cannot be a moral difference without a 
factual difference, if two situations or two agents are equal then there is no (non-trivial) factual 
difference between them and justice, in this thin sense, is derivable from supervenience; 
thickening the concept (increasing the size of the feature set required to associate the concept 
with a situation, thus allowing action guidance) allows a holistic interpretation of the set of 
features. 
If the just action is the right action, a situation (S) which involves treating two agents (p1 and p2) 
differently leads to an argument of the form: 
P1 if p1 and p2 are equal with respect to action X in 
situation S, then X is a right action iff p1 and p2 
are treated equally; 
If  then ℬ  
P2 Xing does not treat p1 and p2 equally  
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P3 Xing is the right action in S  
C2 From P2 & P3 -ℬ 
C2 p1and p2 are not equal with respect to X in S ∴ -   
For there to be a difference in the treatment of agents in the conduct of a right act, then, there 
must be a difference in the (morally relevant) features of the agents. This is a refining of the 
concept of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, which says that for there to be a 
moral difference there must be a difference of fact. This concept of justice is at best very thin, it 
is arguable that it belongs with supervenience in the realm of meta-normative rather than in the 
realm of normative ethics; it follows that acting with justice, in this very thin sense, is right 
independent of any features of any situation. 
To thicken the concept, an action can be “just” or “unjust” if it concerns the distribution of 
some good (or some evil) between agents. Justice, in this sense, is often considered in such areas 
as resource allocation. Although this use is not fully thin, it might be described as “very lean”; 
there is a minimal descriptive element that seems more concerned with saying what type of 
rightness is involved, rather than indicating how to choose an action in a particular case.  
The generalist, trying to choose a course of action, might think it reasonably to ask, “In what 
sense should the various actors be equal?” If she is deciding whether an agent’s freedom should 
be restricted, she might reasonably think the axe murderer and the lumberjack should not be 
treated equally if each is requesting the return of their axe; however, if she is deciding who could 
be the subject of medical experimentation without consent, she might think these two are equal. 
The generalist can explain the difference between these cases in terms of a pro tanto duty to act 
with justice and a pro tanto duty to protect agents from potential harm. Alternatively the generalist 
can make a specification that those who might want to harm others are not equal to those who 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
45 
 
do not in respect of actions which help or enable them to cause such harm. The holist sees the 
agent’s being an axe murderer as counting in the first case but not in the second. 
Now consider a fairly well worked set of thought experiments16:  
Case 1 
A person pi is in distress in the water and will drown if no assistance is given.  
Case 2 
Two people are drowning close to each other. 
Case 3 
Two people are drowning but are so far apart that only one can be saved. 
Case 4 
Six people (pi – pvi) are drowning; they are in two groups pi-piii and piv – pvi. 
Case 5 
Six people (pi – pvi) are drowning; pi is on his own and pii – pvi are grouped together.  
 
Agent A has access to the only boat and the necessary skills to save one person or one group of 
people. Given that we don’t know if any of the pns will turn into Hitler or Beethoven we can 
think of them all as equal. What should A do in each situation?  
Case 1 seems fairly clear: a duty to rescue requires A to save pi. Similarly A should save the pair 
in Case 2. In Case 3 A can only save one of the potential drowners, A has no reason to choose 
one over the other; if A is not to dither so long that both drown it seems he must choose at 
random whom to save and whom to abandon to her fate. Case 4 seems only different in scale 
from Case 3 and again random choice between the groups treats pi – pvi equally. In Case 5 most 
                                                 
16 The example here is a version of the thought experiments discussed by Taurek (Should the Numbers Count? 
Taurek 1977. This has led to a considerable literature over the years. I have found Lübbe (Lübbe 2008) and Hsieh 
(Hsieh et al. 2013) helpful in preparation of this thesis.   
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people’s moral insight will lead to saving the five and abandoning the one. As he goes down for 
the third time, pi can argue that his needs have not been given equal weight to the needs of pii – 
pvi. With his last gasp he can accuse A of failing to act in a just manner.  
pi-pvi are equal in all respects other than geographical position, although this difference might 
have arisen for any one of a number of reasons, some of which would be considered morally 
relevant if known to A (pi was an axe murderer and pii-pvi were cowering on the other side of the 
boat when it sank) or not (pi had forgotten that they had all agreed to wear shoes with yellow 
laces and was returning to the cabin to change his shoes when the boat sank), this is not known 
to A; from his perspective all are equal and justice demands all are treated equally; in cases 3 and 
4 equal treatment was achieved by a random choice of whom to save (see below). The 
particularist might say that in Case 5 justice simply does not count (has a valence of zero); the 
generalist has a few possible defences for saving the five. Firstly he might claim that pi is not an 
equal for, for example, piii because the latter has the good fortune to be part of a group. 
However this looks dangerously like the sort of feature which most generalists are loath to 
consider as important in ethical judgement (that pi happened to have put on shoes with red laces 
that morning). Alternatively a Rossian deontologist will see the needs of the five as outweighing 
the needs of the one17 and the saving of four extra lives as outweighing the requirement for 
justice.  
To develop this thought experiment further, consider how pi – pvi can be given equal treatment. 
If A rolls a six-sided die and sets out to save pi if he throws a 1, pii if he throws a 2 and so on, he 
can claim to have given equal consideration to all pns. If this model of the requirement for justice 
is accepted, then if A set out to save pii and reaches the area in time he will be able to rescue any 
one in a group with pii but unable to rescue any others; given that A has assumed some sort of 
                                                 
17 A consequentialist would not need to consider justice as right-making and might be exempt from this argument 
altogether. 
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duty to rescue, we see those grouped with pii as being fortunate in that they are saved alongside 
another member of the group. In case 4 there will be an equal chance of A’s going to either 
group, and the outcome will be the same as before. In Case 5 however, one time in six A will 
rescue the one and allow the five to drown. Consideration of justice can be seen in this case to 
lead A to the wrong action one time in six. That is to say, if this analysis is correct, then justice 
will guide A to save pi when he rolls a one thereby condemning the remainder to drown; saving 
pi would seem to be the wrong action and not a pro tanto right action with a low weighting 
compared to the pro tanto value of saving the pii-pvi. Justice here is thicker than the very thin sense 
in which it was used above. This thickening allows the reasons holist to question whether an act 
which promotes justice is always a pro tanto reason in favour of that act. The generalist could, of 
course, add a specification to the principle of justice to cover such situations. When the 
complexity of the situation allows rules to conflict the particularist might wonder which features 
count, and the generalist might look for specification of the principles; it is in complex situations 
where we find practical differences between particularists and generalists. In Chapter 5 I will 
discuss some the real decisions faced by medical professionals and try to see what differences the 
complexity of some of these situations exposes between the decisions of particularists and 
generalists. 
2.9 Counterexample 
Generalists opposing particularism often cite examples of supposed immutable principles as 
counterexamples. I will consider two in this section.   
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2.9.1 Causing pleasure 
Hooker [Hooker 2000 p7] considers the property of producing pleasure (F1: Xing will produce 
pleasure). The initial proposed principle (P) would be that any act X for which F1 holds would, 
qua F1, have a positive moral valance. He then says: 
However, particularists point out that, while the property of producing pleasure makes 
an act better in some circumstances, this property makes an act worse in some 
circumstances. That the act would give pleasure is not merely an overridden positive 
feature of the act. Rather, sadistic pleasure actually makes the act morally worse than 
it would be if it didn’t afford sadistic pleasure. 
p7 
Hooker says the Rossian generalist has two options. The first is to allow that P is a pro tanto 
principle, however he already seems to have ruled this out in the paragraph quoted above as F1 is 
“not merely an overridden positive feature” rather it “makes the act morally worse”. This seems 
right:  
P1: Producing pleasure has a positive moral valance 
P1’: If Xing produces pleasure then Xing has a positive moral valance 
P2: Sadistic pleasure is a type of pleasure  
C1: Producing sadistic pleasure produces pleasure 
C2: Producing sadistic pleasure has a positive moral valence 
As I discussed in Section 1.2.1, C2 does not seem to be the sort of thing we would want to say 
even pro tanto. If the argument is sound, and the conclusion unacceptable, then we must look to 
the premises; I suggest the problem lies with the thinness of P1. This brings us to Hooker’s 
second option which is to “start making distinctions”. He goes on to say “the moral status of 
pleasure depends on what kind of pleasure it is” [p8; original italics]. This does not, of itself, 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
49 
 
offer any generalist principle. Hooker gives “[n]onsadistic pleasure is always a moral plus”. The 
modified principle (P’) is thicker than P and requires a set of facts F’( = {F1: Xing will produce 
pleasure, F2: the pleasure is nonsadistic}). Hooker is satisfied with this slightly thicker principle, 
however it does not rule out the possibility of further Fα which require further distinctions or 
specification. Dancy comments that the pleasure people get from watching public hangings 
makes letting them watch morally worse; Hooker seems to accept this but subsumes this 
pleasure under sadistic pleasure. However there is a certain self-righteous pleasure in seeing 
someone “get their comeuppance”, but this need not be due to “inflicting pain, suffering or 
humiliation” (Concise Oxford Dictionary definition of “sadism”) and is not the same as sadism. 
To allow for this we may need a further Fα to give a larger set of facts F’’.  
Hooker says he “cannot see how a particularist can win on this battlefield” (p7); if this is so, it is 
because the process of making distinctions, or of specification, constitutes a moving of the 
goalposts and particularists cannot catch up. However the generalist would like to find a 
permanent place for the goalposts and it is difficult to see how either side can win. 
2.9.2 Is particularism refutable by counterexample? 
Hooker begins his discussion of counterexamples with the question “Is particularism refuted by 
counterexamples ...?” [p7]. The statement of particularism given in § 1.3 implies that 
counterexamples would not, of themselves, refute particularism. The version of particularism 
which this statement embodies is tolerant of general principles, it simply says they are 
unnecessary, Dancy does state that, in his opinion, the existence of general principles other than 
the sort of principle arising from the logical necessity of the limit of supervenience, would be 
serendipity. Hooker takes counterexamples to be significant in that they weigh against the idea 
that, if this principle is not general, then any principle we consider may be “merely particular”. 
Counterexamples, then, might weaken (albeit not fatally) holism; however none of the above 
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possible counterexamples seems sufficient. It is difficult to see how either side can win in this 
counter-example, counter-counter-example argument. I believe particularists can present 
arguments to help shore up the walls of particularism against the attacks of the generalists; 
however in many cases whether a feature which changes the value of an action in a situation has 
caused a pro tanto general principle to be outweighed or caused a (default) principle to no longer 
count is still a matter of debate.  
Looking at the example of pleasure above, we see that the generalist can use specification to fine 
tune their principles. “Pleasure” becomes “non-sadistic pleasure”. In the absence of proof that 
this list is closed (for particularists the holism of reasons necessitates that the list is open) this 
seems to be a game of constantly moving the goalposts each time a shot on goal is produced. 
This moving of the goalposts seems to me to be a reason for particularists to stay out of this sort 
of argument. If the generalist is allowed to extend FC indefinitely in pursuit of a general principle 
there seems to be no obvious boundary. In order to ensure that there can be no fact Fα which 
changes the value of an action we will ultimately reach FS the set of all facts when S exists. If this 
is a basis for a principle then is will hardly be a general one!  In discussing supervenience Dancy 
(2004) says 
[I]f we move to another case holding fixed all the non-moral properties of the case 
whatever, we know in advance there can be no [differences which conspire to prevent 
the original wrong making properties from doing that job in the new case]. Whatever 
was a reason in the first case must remain a reason in the second, and nothing that 
was not a reason in the first case can he reason in the second. 
Dancy 2004 p89 
In this limit, the generalist would reach a very particular principle. It would be better to 
characterise this end of the thickness spectrum as particular judgements made as a result of 
specification rather than make ever more particular general principles. 
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2.9.3 Is generalism refutable by counter example? 
Little (Little 2000) argues that it is possible to codify the connection between moral and non-
moral properties: 
Obviously, to defend particularism, it is not enough to keep offering counterexamples 
to proposed principles. Even if they are accepted, just what they suffice to show is 
precisely what is in question – those attuned to the richness of morality but loyal to 
the existence of principles will see counterexamples as evidence of complexity, not of 
irreducible complexity. (Besides there is something not a little farcical about 
measuring didactic success in terms of who can outlast whom – those who want to 
refine a principle and those who want to find exceptions.) 
P279 
Ultimately the game of example and counter-example helps us to sketch out some differences 
between the particularist and generalist camps and, thereby, to understand what is being claimed 
by each; but it will not resolve the question of which view of morality should prevail. 
2.9.4 Operative reasons 
Hooker (Hooker 2000) examines Dancy’s non moral examples of holistic reasons: 
[T]hat there will be nobody much else there is sometimes a good reason for going 
there and sometimes a very good reason for staying away. 
Dancy Particularists Progress in Hooker and Little p132 
he asks “are there any essentially particular practical reasons?” He states that all normative (or 
good) reasons are either moral or self-interested; Dancy’s examples are then taken to be 
incomplete self-interested reasons, if the reason is fleshed out: 
P1  Thinking things through will increase my knowledge  
P2  Time for reflection will allow me to think things through 
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P3  Getting away from people will allow me time for reflection 
P4  There will be nobody much else there 
C1  Going there will increase my knowledge 
P5  “[I] have self-interested reasons to pursue pleasure or knowledge for [my]self.” [p13] 
C2  I should go there 
Hooker says “the operative reason [is] general” [p13]; to see what he means by this it is useful to 
examine the propositions: P1 to P4 are all open to holistic interpretation, sometimes they will be 
a reason to do a thing sometimes not, sometimes I may want time for reflection sometimes I 
may want to party. Conclusion 1, then is also holistic, sometimes I will want to increase my 
knowledge, sometimes I feel I know enough. P5 then is what Hooker means by the operative 
reason.  
In these cases (as elsewhere) operative reasons are general. That some act would 
benefit you is a reason to do it. 
P13 
 What does P5 add? P5 looks to be a thin (or at least a very lean) principle. P5 is a non-moral 
normative principle which is true regardless of any particular feature set associated with any 
situation. It supports a self interested reason to go there in some situations and a self interested 
reason not to go there in others; the set of features required to invoke it in any situation is, in 
practical terms, empty. Without some thickening it will not do the work of telling you where to 
go. If going there will allow you to pursue knowledge and going elsewhere will allow you to 
pursue pleasure you have pro tanto reasons to go there and to go elsewhere. P5 is too thin to 
indicate which action to choose between the pro tanto reason to go there and the pro tanto reason 
to go elsewhere.  
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2.10 Conclusions 
The debate between particularists and generalists is not resolved, and shows no signs of 
resolving in favour of either side in the near future. In this chapter I have introduced the main 
points of the debate insofar as they will be important in the discussion of how medical ethics 
would be affected if particularism were true. I take this to be tantamount to how medical ethics 
would be affected if the holism of moral reasons were true.  
In this chapter I have followed the main protagonists in this debate and have taken generalism to 
be a form of Rossian deontology which allows for competing pro tanto principles or duties and 
have taken specification (as described by Beauchamp and Childress) to be a way for deciding the 
right action when there are competing candidates. I will look at the application of this idea in the 
next chapter. I have not included the ideas of virtue ethics in this chapter and will return to this 
important topic in Ch 4. 
From a practical point of view one might ask for a way of deciding whether pro tanto reasons or 
holism provides a better model for morality in a world where similar situations cam produce 
different results; examples of such decisions are given in the following chapters, but for a 
preview of those arguments consider whether the fact that a victim of a road traffic accident is a 
Jehovah’s Witness is a pro tanto reason not to give him blood, or if this fact changes the moral 
value of the fact that blood would increase his chances of survival from a positive value to not 
counting in this case. 
In the next chapters I will ask if this distinction has any influence on the way medicine should be 
taught and practiced. Currently medical ethics is based on generalist ideas, I will argue that the 
many codes of practice, standard operating procedure, and other forma of professional advice 
on offer embody a set of generalist principles and develop action guidance from there. I will 
propose that a particularist approach would indicate that we should rely on these codes and 
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guides less, and aim to produce professionals with a moral approach less reliant on following the 
guides and more reliant on seeing and doing the right thing. I will look at how the current 
generalist approach works for patients and how a particularist approach would change things. As 
well as some case studies I will look at one of the central planks of the relationship between 
doctor and patient, that of trust. 
The ideas contained within particularism raise real questions for generalism to answer. However 
while this debate continues there is still a need for ethical guidance, in the case here for 
professionals working within medicine. 
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3 Professional Ethics 
Thomas More: Will, I'd trust you with my life. But not your principles. You see, we speak of being anchored to our principles. But if the 
weather turns nasty you up with an anchor and let it down where there's less wind, and the fishing's better. And "Look," we say, "look, 
I'm anchored! To my principles!” - Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will look at why medicine and associated professions have professional ethics 
guidance and codes of practice covering ethical conduct; I will discuss what these codes are 
supposed to do, and look at some current guidance documents. I will look at where these 
documents provide guidance and where and why they fail to do so.  I will argue that providing 
guidance in all cases in an impossible objective. I will discuss some implications of this with 
regard to particularism.  
As a starting point for this discussion I will refer to an ethically naive clinician, by this I will 
mean a junior doctor, one who has had a course of lectures on Medical Ethics which was largely 
focussed on “Principles of Biomedical Ethics” (Beauchamp and Childress 2001) and 
“Philosophical Medical Ethics” (Gillon 1985), but who has little experience in clinical decision 
making.  
3.2 Why do we need professional ethics guidelines? 
In their private and professional lives people like to think they have acted in a correct manner; 
this can have many aspects: people wish to act within the law, in private enterprise they try to 
fulfil the company’s mission statement and to provide a good return for the shareholders, and 
people in general want to behave ethically. At this level there is nothing specific about medical 
ethics, however the actions of medical professionals (be they giving advice, prescribing a course 
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of therapy, or referring to a specialist) can have a considerable effect on the lives of others; the 
relationship between doctor and patient is often described as “special”. The doctor-patient 
relationship is complex, but a large element is based on trust, the doctor has knowledge and 
skills which she can use to help the patient; the patient trusts the doctor to apply these to the 
patient’s benefit. I will discuss this further in § 5.8. 
People also expect to have control over their own lives, for this to happen people must be able 
to make decisions (preferably well informed decisions) and act upon those decisions. Again, the 
doctor-patient relationship has special characteristics here; people are making decisions about 
their health and wellbeing, including life and death decisions, under the guidance of clinicians. In 
a paternalist context the clinician would have decided what she thought best for the patient and 
informed him of her decision, under our more enlightened system clinicians are expected to 
enable patients to make decisions. I will look at this in § 5.5. 
Clinicians are faced with dilemmas in their normal practice such as how to break bad news, how 
to respect a patient’s wishes when they think the patient will suffer as a result; just as they will 
turn to guidance documents about new drugs to find the best available treatment, or attend 
continuing professional development (CPD) seminars to understand a new technique, guidance 
and Codes of Practice documents assist them to maintain best ethical practice. 
3.3 Trust 
In discussing trust I will take it to be an interaction between people. The statement “I trust the 
brakes in my car” can be unpacked into several statements, such as “I believe they have been 
properly designed”, “I believe they are properly maintained” etc, many of these statements can 
be further unpacked; at the end of each will be will be either some person (or people), such as a 
designer or a car mechanic, or some scientific principle, such as the law of friction or some 
equations for hydraulic pressure. The latter are verifiable statements of fact and the former are 
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the true objects of my trust. If this analysis is correct then saying I trust something is often a 
shorthand for a number of systems of trust. Trusting is an interaction which can be direct (I 
know the chap who services my car) or indirect (I have no idea who designed the brakes (or 
even what country he, she or probably they live and work in)). 
The alternative that “trust” here is being used to say simply “I believe that the braking system 
will not fail” and that belief does not require two or more people, does not seem to look deeply 
enough into the situation. I am not expressing a religious belief where blind faith is required of 
the truster; I would like my belief that my family and I will not hurtle over the cliff as I press the 
brake pedal to be a rational one. That rationality is based on my belief that this is a trustworthy 
make of car and I have had it serviced by reliable mechanics. Ultimately trust is an interaction or 
a system of interactions, between trusters and trusted. 
In the late twentieth century and the start of the twenty first people in the western world have 
been increasingly mobile, one disadvantage of this is often a lack of continuity in the health care 
professionals a patient will see over the course of his or her life. Even within the course of 
treatment for a single ailment a patient may see a series of health care professionals (specialist 
nurses, therapists, clinicians etc), if the treatment is prolonged some of these professionals will 
move on in their careers and be replaced. All of this makes it difficult for the patient and the 
professionals to build a system of trust as the basis for giving and accepting advice.  
Meanwhile traditional trust relationships have been undermined by the high profile given to 
breaches of trust in the news media when individuals in a position of trust turn out to be 
untrustworthy.  
Many of Dr Harold Shipman’s patients trusted him; Durham Area Health Authority recorded 
that "Shipman had settled satisfactorily into his new employment, … and had been well received 
by both patients and professional colleagues alike" (Shipman Inquiry 2001) p 20-23). He was 
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convicted of killing 15 of his patients and is thought to have murdered in the order of 300 of 
them.  
Dr Andrew Wakefield caused a lack of trust in the advice of many G.P.s when he published a 
high profile paper suggesting a link between the MMR “Triple Vaccine” and autism (Wakefield et 
al. 2004). The report was later discredited and most of the authors retracted, however Wakefield 
denied any wrongdoing; in 2010 a report by the General Medical Council found allegations 
against him to be proved; they noted him to be “dishonest”, “irresponsible” and “misleading”, 
and that he acted “contrary to [his] duty” (GMC 2010a). 
Trust is a fulcrum around which many perceived problems of the early Twenty First Century 
turn. The news and information media tell us we cannot trust politicians, bankers, social 
workers, teachers, nurses and doctors or indeed the media professionals themselves! There are 
many proposed explanations for this perceived drift into a less trusting model of society, and 
questions as to whether the perception is correct (see for example the writings of O’Neill 
(O'Neill 2002b;O'Neill 2002a)). It may be that society is insufficiently homogenous in this 
respect for a clear picture to emerge; what does seem clear is that we believe there to be a crisis 
of trust. For the purpose of this thesis I am interested in looking into the mechanisms employed 
with the aim of engendering trust; I will not be concerned with the wider implications of the 
supposed crisis of trust. 
From this perspective trust is not automatically due to professional people, and doctors (among 
others) are expected to demonstrate trustworthiness. The mechanisms for this are often codes of 
practice and other guidelines, such as the Department of Health’s guide “Good Practice in 
Consent” (DoH 2001), which embody good practice in many senses, such as ethical , legal and 
technical. A process of audit is supposed to ensure adherence to good practice and thus 
trustworthiness. 
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3.4 Individuals in Society 
The second half of the twentieth century has also seen the rise of the individual over the 
member-of-society. This is exemplified in U.K. politics by the premiership of Margaret Thatcher 
who said, “you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, 
and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people 
must look to themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after 
our neighbour”.18  
A negative aspect of this emphasis on individuals is the “me first” attitude which some observers 
have described as arising in the final quarter of the twentieth century. For instance in 2009 the 
Children’s Society reported that many of the problems facing children in the early Twenty First 
Century are due to “excessive individualism” on the part of adults saying, “Most of the obstacles 
children face today are linked to the belief among adults that the prime duty of the individual is 
to make the most of their own life, rather than contribute to the good of others”(Children's 
Society 2009). The Daily Telegraph newspaper reported Lord Layard, one of the authors of the 
final report, as saying, “You have a decline in religious belief and a decline in what you may call 
socialism, that kind of social solidarity which was quite strong in the first half of the 20th 
century." (Beckford 2009).  
Early Twentieth Century medicine was characterised by a paternalistic system where “Doctor 
knows best” and patients did what the doctor said. As individuals have come to the fore they 
have expected more control over their own lives. This can set up a tension between patients and 
health care professionals, particularly when what is best in a medical sense (e.g. giving blood to a 
                                                 
18 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, talking to Women's Own magazine, [Keay, Douglas, “Interview with Margaret 
Thatcher”, Woman’s Own, October 31 1987]; the transcript of this interview given by the Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation [http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689] differs slightly in 
emphasis. 
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road traffic accident victim) does not chime with the patient’s view of what is best for him (e.g. 
he is a Jehovah’s Witness). Allowing patients control over their lives is the prime driving force 
for the emphasis on autonomy in current medical practice (see §3.4.1). 
Also inherent in the rise of the individual has been a break down in the feeling of responsibility 
for other members of society. In a society where there is a mutual feeling of responsibility for 
each other there is engendered a feeling of trust, but when I believe you are out for what is best 
for you without regard for me, I do not have a feeling of trust towards you. It is necessary for 
society to function that I know how far I can trust you (whether you are my Member of 
Parliament, a journalist writing in my newspaper, or my General Practitioner). Codes of practice 
are commonly used to define a professional’s responsibilities, in general, to his fellow 
professionals, and to his clients or patients. 
Good legislation, good regulation, good policies, good practices and consistent 
professionalism are a beginning; they need reinforcing with means of ensuring 
compliance, and demonstrating that compliance is reliably achieved. All this is easily 
stated, and hard to do. 
O'Neill 2002a p123 
The start of the Twenty First Century has seen a further breakdown in trust fired largely by the 
exposure of previously trusted groups of professionals as being principally self serving, although 
surveys of the general public still rate doctors as the most trustworthy group within society. 
 
 
3.4.1 Autonomy 
The term “autonomy” is derived from the Greek word used to indicate city states which were 
self governing; in current usage it is extended to apply to individuals who have the ability to 
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determine their own course of action. There is little general agreement between philosophers as 
to what this actually means (see Dworkin 1988, ch.1). 
Trivially we can see that we cannot have complete freedom of action, I cannot (meaningfully) 
choose to jump over the moon. Less trivially we are subject to a number of constraints placed 
on us by our nature or nurture, most people would find it difficult deliberately to cause 
significant harm to themselves; indeed those who do so may be thought to be psychologically ill 
and acting under the compulsion of their illness when they “self-harm”. A sufferer from 
arachnophobia may be unable either to watch television while a large spider sits on top of the 
set, or to go over to the set and remove the creature. Social constraints may be more variable but 
they play a significant role in governing our actions: I, for instance, cannot sit comfortably 
reading on a tube train whilst a pregnant woman is forced to stand. Society also imposes 
constraints on our actions: I may choose to break a law but (assuming I am caught) I may not 
then be able to choose to continue my life as before. 
Even when only confronted by possible courses of action, deciding on one rather than another 
is not necessarily acting with autonomy; few would think that the supposed author of The Dice 
Man (Rhinehart 1971) showed autonomous action in rolling dice to decide which course of 
action to follow. An alcoholic confronted with a glass of whisky may be irresistibly influenced by 
his addiction, and unable to make an autonomous decision as to whether to drink it. As O’Neill 
reminds us in “Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics” (O'Neill 2002b) “autonomy is not mere, sheer 
choosing”. 
It is useful, here, to distinguish between first-order and second-order desires. First order desires 
are the ordinary desires to have or to do something; second-order desires are desires about 
desires (the addict may desire that he did not desire to drink the whisky). It is the reflection on 
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second-order desires and consequent acceptance or rejection of first-order desires that is seen as 
important for autonomous action. 
[A]utonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically 
upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes and so forth, and the capacity to 
attempt to reject or change these in the light of higher-order preferences and values. 
By exercising such a capacity persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence 
to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are. 
Dworkin 1988, p20 
Within the field of medical ethics a working definition is generally based on that given by 
Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp and Childress 2001, ch3) In this analysis three 
components are required for an action to be autonomous, (1) it must be done intentionally, (2) it 
must be done with understanding, which is to say that the actor must have relevant knowledge 
of what would be involved in undertaking the action and must have had time and opportunity to 
reflect on that knowledge, and (3) it be done without “controlling influences”. 
Beauchamp and Childress take the first component to be an absolute; they state, without 
discussion, “acts are either intentional or nonintentional” (p59). Although it seems possible to 
argue with this, I will accept their contention at face value for this thesis.  
The second and third components are matters of degree as can be seen from simple examples. 
Children achieve understanding of increasingly complex ideas as they mature, and some elderly 
patients may lose their capacity for complex understanding with advancing age. We may feel that 
these patients have sufficient understanding to qualify as autonomous (at least as far as this 
component of autonomy is concerned). Some decisions are simple and these patients may act 
with “sufficient” autonomy; some are more complex and may be beyond grasp of some patients, 
if forced to decide here the action would be mere sheer choosing rather than autonomous 
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choosing. Some highly complex situations may be difficult for any lay person to grasp fully, the 
problem being how to help them to sufficient understanding to achieve autonomy. 
It is difficult to believe that any of us is, or would wish to be, without any significant influences; 
most of us are still subject to the lessons learned at our mother’s knee, many Christians are 
happy to defer to the Decalogue, and most of us hope for the good opinion of our peers, 
whoever we perceive them to be. 
It is not the job of the healthcare professional to force patients to make autonomous decisions 
(even if that were possible); it is their job to provide the tools needed for making autonomous 
decisions to those patients who desire them. We must understand what these tools are to see 
how they can be provided.  
Under the paternalistic system patients were not free to choose, they were under the controlling 
influence of the doctor, whilst this control was (generally, at least) benign it did not allow the 
patient to decide the course of his or her life. This being the case, it is a simple step to see that 
the patient had no use for an understanding of his or her condition, or the options for treatment. 
Making those decisions, and thus requiring that understanding, was the role of the doctor. The 
patient was only required to trust the doctor and to take the medicine. It is useful to see where 
this model has been replaced with the autonomy-driven approach, and how far it is possible to 
take respect for autonomy. 
Beauchamp and Childress observe that “[r]espect for the autonomous choices of persons runs as 
deep in common morality as any principle” (p57). Although the debate about what constitutes 
autonomy continues I will not pursue it in this thesis; I will take a simple view based on the 
Beauchamp and Childress view as sufficient for the arguments set out here. Autonomy refers to 
the right of agents to have control over their own lives. Autonomous individuals make decisions 
concerning their lives; they act according to their own beliefs, plans and life goals. This is 
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obviously simplistic, as noted above, not all things are possible, many actions interfere with the 
rights of others (no one should respect my autonomous decision to try out my new gun by 
shooting the first five people I meet) and autonomous desires are subject to limitations in 
resource limited situations. Respect for autonomy of others will often require actions rather than 
just the adoption of a respectful attitude.  
The characteristics of autonomy thus understood require certain behaviour from others; in the 
context of the doctor-patient relationship a major aspect of this is the provision of information. 
Autonomous decisions are informed decisions; it is part of the doctor’s role to ensure the patient 
has full knowledge of all possible courses of treatment, subject to the patient’s preferences. For 
example a patient might preface a discussion by saying, “I don’t want any surgery”, in which case 
only non surgical interventions need be offered. How far this goes may be a matter of 
judgement. A doctor might not consider a course of treatment with a low probability of success 
to be a valid option, a patient might say he wants to consider homeopathic treatments; both of 
these might change the range of options offered. Similarly the doctor must ensure the patient 
understands the potential outcome of the various options, their probability of success and their 
potential to cause side effects. All of these place the doctor in a position of trust to ensure a full 
(but preferably non-confusing) range of options is made available to the patient. 
The introduction of technology and the availability of information are two areas where medical 
professionals have to rely on professionals in other fields to be able to offer the best advice and 
treatment to patients. I have written elsewhere (Green 2009) about the chain of trust present in 
much modern medicine and how the special relationship extends to other professionals in the 
medical field; for clarity, in this thesis I will be concerned with ethics at the interface between 
medical professionals and patients and not with the interrelationships of the various 
professionals.  
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Complicating factors in this discussion are such as the increasing tendency for drug companies 
to promote their products, for example through press releases and internet sites, and in some 
countries direct advertisement to the public. There is also much information available to patients 
via the internet, patient groups and charities might have disease specific web sites, many pressure 
groups put information on web sites, and the problem of trust is again prominent. How to tell 
good information from misinformation, how to tell the painstaking researcher from the 
conspiracy theorist, are questions related to how the patient decides where to place his trust.  
Respect for autonomy is the basis for the requirement for informed consent. Medical 
professionals are required to obtain informed consent before any examination or treatment of a 
patient. The consent part of informed consent can take many forms, a patient who rolls up his 
sleeve and presents his arm can be considered to have given tacit consent to having an injection. 
This may be acceptable for standard minor procedures but more major procedures and clinical 
trials will require more active written consent. In a similar way the level of knowledge which 
needs to be imparted is dependent on the type of procedure being proposed. For a diagnostic 
blood test the patient may only need to know that the doctor “wants to rule out anything more 
serious”, before treating a minor complaint, he will then roll up his sleeve, effectively giving 
consent to the taking of blood, happy that he has all the information he requires. In clinical trials 
a doctor and a research nurse may spend an hour or more with the patient and his relatives 
explaining the nature of the trial, the alternatives and the possible outcomes, before giving the 
patient a booklet to read, and asking him to return a day later for any further discussion he may 
want before asking him to sign one or more consent forms. 
This imparting of information (and thus the system of informed consent) is reliant on the patient 
trusting the medical team to give sufficient true information. In the current “information age” 
many patients will use the facilities of the World Wide Web (“the web”) to search for 
information about their condition or the advice they have received. There is always a question of 
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which source to trust when conflicting advice is obtained. If a doctor has advised a patient with 
cancer that she should undergo radical surgery followed by a course of chemotherapy, but the 
patient has found an alternative medicine site on the web which she thinks would be a better 
alternative, the doctor might feel that simple respect for the patient’s autonomy would conflict 
with his duty of beneficence if he did not try to argue her out of her autonomous refusal of 
conventional treatment. He might feel that her wish to take the alternative medicine route was 
not fully autonomous as the information it was based on was not of a sufficient quality for such 
an important decision. In this situation a doctor might look to the GMC or the DoH for 
guidance, but in the end the doctor can only aim to be seen as sufficiently trustworthy that the 
patient will take his advice rather than the alternative. 
 
3.4.2 Guidance 
It is often not clear to the participants what the right action is in a complex situation, or even a 
simple one where a clear dilemma exists. In such situations detached reflection might help gain 
an understanding of how to act. Such reflection might result in different approaches from those 
dedicated to different normative approaches; it would allow a clearer understanding of the 
consequences, a chance to think through conflicting pro tanto duties, to undertake a process of 
specification or to reflect on the appropriate virtues. Any or all of these might help discussion 
and possibly ceteris paribus resolution of the dilemma in a philosophy class, however such 
reflection is not always available, for example, to physicians and paramedics treating casualties in 
acute need.  
Jehovah’s Witnesses believe they have a religious duty to refuse blood transfusion. This is a 
serious and deeply held belief based on their interpretation of The Bible; in particular Acts 15: 
19-21: 
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19 Wherefore my sentence is, that we trouble not them, which from among the 
Gentiles are turned to God: 
 20 But that we write unto them, that they abstain from pollutions of idols, and from 
fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood. 
 21 For Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the 
synagogues every sabbath day. 
King James Bible19 Acts 15: 19-21 (my italics) 
Some Witnesses carry statements (similar to the MedicAlert system) to inform emergency 
workers of their refusal of blood products.  
In discussing beneficence Beauchamp and Childress state: 
Morality requires not only that we treat persons autonomously and refrain from 
harming them, but also that we contribute to their welfare. Such beneficial actions 
fall under the heading of “beneficence”. 
 Beauchamp and Childress 2001 p165 
 
In acute situations beneficence might dictate some active intervention which involves giving 
blood, however if the patient is known to be a Witness respect for autonomy seems to imply 
respect for a preference not to be given blood. The naive Beauchamp and Childress trained 
medic now faces a dilemma between the principles of beneficence and respect for autonomy.  
Consider a doctor treating a known Jehovah’s Witness (A) in acute need of a blood transfusion. 
If she had time for reflection this doctor could follow a chain of specification to decide whether 
                                                 
19 The official Jehovah’s Witness web site (www.watchtower.org) refers readers to the “New World Translation of 
the Holy Scriptures”, whilst the language is more modern the text is not significantly different. 
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she should or should not arrange for a transfusion. However, in this case of acute clinical need, 
she may be denied this luxury. In the absence of a mentor (I will say more on mentoring in 
§6.3.2), two places she can look for guidance are precedent and codes of practice.  
3.4.2.1 Precedent 
The value of precedent for the naive agent is to try to do something which has not been judged 
to have a negative moral value in the past. For the current situation SC (FC = {f1, f2 … fn}) and a 
candidate precedent situation SP (FP = {fP1, f
P
2,…, f
P
m}) she needs to identify a subset of features 
they have in common which carry moral relevance (FM ⊂ (FC ∩ FP)). If this can be done then 
ceteris paribus if Xing in SP was judged to have moral value V then Xing in SC will also have moral 
value V.   
For the harassed medic above precedent can be found in the case of Emma Gough (Dolan 
2008). Emma Gough was a 22 year old Jehovah’s witness who developed life threatening 
haemorrhaging after giving birth to healthy twins, she lost over four pints of blood. Her 
physician believed a transfusion would have saved her life, but she had given an advanced 
directive that she should not receive blood. After she lost consciousness her family (also 
Jehovah’s Witnesses) continued to refuse blood transfusion for her. According to the post 
mortem examination the cause of death was "profound anaemia" as a result of haemorrhaging. 
Although it is possible to compile a potential list of elements of {FC ∩ FP}: 
fa: no treatment was available which did not involve the giving of blood, 
fb: the patient was a practising Jehovah’s Witness, 
fc: the patient had expressed a wish not to have blood, 
fd: this wish had been expressed in a way consistent with Beauchamp and Childress, 
fa: the patient was competent, 
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ff: the patient was female, 
fg: the patient was 22 years old, 
fh: the patient had brown eyes, 
…, 
and a potential list of elements not common to the cases ({(FC - FP), (FP – FC)}) 
fz: A’s family were not known to be Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
fy: A’s condition resulted from a road traffic accident, 
fx: A was not called Emma, 
…, 
it is not clear how these derived sets relate to FM. The statements made by those involved in the 
potential precedent case might elucidate what they saw as morally relevant (and thus worthy of 
being elements of FM). In the Gough case, the care team reported to the inquest that they had 
discussed the risks with the patient before the birth; that she had signed an advanced directive, 
that they had “pleaded” with the family five times to be allowed to give blood, but finally that it 
was a “matter of conscience”. 
Use of precedent, then, is an appeal to supervenience. Determining which facts are relevant for 
supervenience to provide precedent in particular cases may be a matter of fine moral judgement 
which is not available to the naive agent; I will return to supervenience in §4.3. 
3.4.2.2 Codes of practice 
The naive clinician might try to find a code of practice which covers the situation and dictates 
which actions should (or should not) be undertaken. A code of practice20 will, typically, describe 
                                                 
20 Not all codes of practice operate in this way, many have no moral import. In this thesis I am only concerned with 
those which do carry moral significance. 
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features of the situation in which it applies, e.g. “the patient is a Jehovah’s Witness”, and 
describe actions to be taken to ascertain whether other features exist (or can be brought into 
being), e.g. “if the patient is competent, ask them to read and sign an advance directive”, it will 
then dictate which actions are to be taken or refrained from taking, e.g. “you should not give 
blood or blood products”. The naive clinician can expect any action prescribed to have a 
positive moral21 value and any action proscribed to have a negative moral value. The code of 
practice, then, is an attempt to provide a definition of FM, or to provide more than one set FM1, 
FM2, … such that if FMn ⊂ FS then the associated action Xn has moral value Vn; this is expected 
to be sufficient to provide action guidance. 
East Kent Hospitals NHS Trust publishes “Guidelines on the Clinical Management of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses” (East Kent Hospitals NHS Trust 2005) which discusses all aspects of clinical 
management of Jehovah’s Witness patients. Section 4 (p5) gives “Principles for management of 
life threatening bleeding in an unconscious adult JW”; 4.1 states: 
If it has not already been found, any documentary evidence, for example an Advance 
Decision stating that the patient will not accept blood transfusion even in the event of 
life threatening bleeding, should be requested from relatives or associates. 
p5 
If the required evidence is not forthcoming Section 4.4 states: 
                                                 
21 Codes of practice often do not make explicit reference to moral value; their raison d’être often seems to be to 
protect the doctor and the employing authority (often the originator of the code) from potential law suits. For 
simplicity I am assuming that the law is in step with morality. 
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If the patient’s Advance Decision refusing blood transfusion cannot be properly 
established by the above means, the doctor may have to act in the best interests of 
the patient, which may involve giving blood if no alternatives are available. 
p5 
Section 5.5 requires that the thought processes involved in decision making are written into the 
patient’s notes. Section 7 deals with additional legal issues and 7.1 states 
A competent adult has an absolute right to refuse any aspect of medical treatment. If 
the patient is treated against their will the Tort of Battery is committed. A written, 
signed declaration of refusal of blood products is legally binding and cannot be 
revoked by the court or a relative even if massive blood loss occurs whilst the patient 
is anaesthetised. 
p6 
This emphasises of much of the reasoning behind this document is the protection of clinicians 
and the NHS Trust. An appendix to this document contains a copy of the form the patient is 
expected to sign; it starts: 
I hereby expressly withhold my consent to and forbid the administration to me of a 
transfusion of allogeneic (another person’s) whole blood or any of its four primary 
blood components, red cells, white cells, platelets and/or plasma. 
p9 
and later says: 
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My decision to refuse blood and choose non-blood management MUST BE RESPECTED 
EVEN IF MY LIFE OR HEALTH IS THREATENED by my refusal. 
I accordingly absolve the health professionals involved in my care, the hospital and 
every member of the medical staff concerned from all responsibility and from any 
liability to me, or to my estate, or to my dependents, in any way arising out of or 
connected with this. 
p9 (original caps) 
The document does not allow any leeway to the doctor, patient or relatives. It defines a closed 
list of features: 
fa: the patient was competent, 
fb: the patient was a practising Jehovah’s Witness, 
fc: the patient had signed the consent form not to have blood, 
fd: the signature was properly witnessed, 
fe: all procedure were recorded in the patient’s notes, 
FM is now the closed set {fa, …, fe} and if F
M ⊂ FS then the clinician is right not to give blood 
or blood components and acts wrongly if she does give them (in the case where the patient is a 
competent adult). 
The Code of Practice shown in this example is a deontological strict generalist system. It does 
not allow for any new or unforeseen feature, fα which can change the moral value of giving 
blood when FM ⊂ FS. Not all Codes of Practice offer such a defined closed set although it is 
interesting to see the difference between the DoH Guidelines on Consent as published on their 
web site in 2001 and 2003, and the current guidance (DoH 2009;DoH 2012). The earlier 
documents have been taken down from the web site. The 2001 document said: 
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There may be occasions when, assuming a serious question arises about the 
competence of the patient, the situation facing the authority may be so urgent and 
the consequences so desperate that it is impracticable to attempt to comply with 
these guidelines. The guidelines should be approached for what they are, that is 
guidelines. Where delay may itself cause serious damage to the patient’s health or put 
her life at risk then formulaic compliance with these guidelines would be 
inappropriate. 
Department of Health 2001 no longer available 
There is no such clause in the 2009 document. In general throughout this thesis I have assumed 
deontology to be the pro tanto form following Rossian lines. Particularly in some recent updates 
to guideline documents this approach is not expressed and the rules are given in an absolutist 
way. This tends to lead to an “algorithmic deontology” which may be more due to aiming for 
legal rather than moral defensibility. 
Some Codes are designed to cover only the majority of cases or “normal” cases; it will be in the 
nature of such Codes that there are particular situations in which they do not apply. In the case 
of the consent guidelines a reference is made to beneficence: 
In the very rare event that the healthcare professional believes that to follow the 
[guidelines] ... in full will cause the patient serious harm, the GMC guidance states 
that this view, and the reasons for it, should be recorded in the patient’s notes. When 
such concerns arise it is advisable to discuss the issue within the team caring for the 
patient. 
DoH 2009 paragraph 20 
Codes of Practice can be seen as surrogates for reflection and specification, the reflection and 
specification having been done under more conducive conditions by clinicians and others who 
have a wealth of relevant experience. 
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3.5 What role do codes of practice play in ethical decision 
making? 
As I said in §3.3  trust in the medical profession has been weakened by both the general 
lessening of trust in all figures and bodies of authority, and by a series of high profile cases 
where members of the medical profession have proved untrustworthy. This has led to a desire 
by the public that members of the professions should not only act ethically, but that they should 
be seen to act ethically. In this context, the creation of open, common standards of ethical 
behaviour is supposed to provide a yardstick against which behaviour can be judged. 
From the point of view of the professional, society is becoming more diverse and medicine is 
becoming more complex; these factors combine to make if more likely that a doctor will meet a 
situation in which she is inexperienced and is unsure how to act. In this context she might look 
for guidelines and codes of practice to indicate which actions have been prejudged to be right. 
In the rest of this chapter I will look at whether ethical guidance can answer the questions posed 
by the naive clinician and in the next Chapter I will look at how they interact with the expertise 
of more morally aware clinicians. For the purpose of this argument I will assume that a 
satisfactory answer can be found to the eternal question, “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”, and that a 
suitable committee of The Great and The Good can be found to construct the guidelines. 
3.5.1 Quick fix ethical acceptability 
In the context of their working lives most busy medical professionals simply do not have the 
time to reflect on the ethical implications of every decision they make. Indeed it would be odd if 
they did; GPs’ time is a limited resource in the health service. A GP might spend time with a 
patient discussing whether he should go through a course of chemotherapy, but she will not 
spend time reflecting on the ethical issues relating to his case. This particular case might not be 
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significantly different22 from half a dozen other cases she has dealt with this week; she believes 
she does the right thing for her patients but has no special interest in medical ethics. If GPs 
spent time reflecting on ethical implications of individual cases they would either spend less time 
on the medical issues or see fewer patients. In this circumstance it is not surprising that in many 
practices GPs and associated professionals work within practice guidelines, or to Codes of 
Practice, which carry some acceptability, such as approval by the local primary care trust or the 
Department of Health, or accepted practice.23 
In the field of clinical research a proposed procedure will be referred to an Ethics Committee 
whose approval is required before a research project can go ahead. This generally involves 
ensuring the trial protocol and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) contain ethically 
approved processes, such as obtaining written consent and ensuring patient confidentiality, and 
that justification has been given for potentially harmful procedures (such as administration of 
radioactive substances).  
In routine practice and research these mechanisms are aimed at doing the things required above. 
Firstly, they provide the patient with an assurance of trustworthy behaviour by the medical 
professionals. The patient has to be given the information which he requires to make a decision, 
such as to make his consent or refusal of chemotherapy “informed” or to take part in the trial of 
a new treatment. Secondly, the professionals are assured they have behaved correctly and will 
have a good defence of their actions should anything go wrong. 
This tends to lead toward a belief that ethically correct actions consist of following the approved 
procedures and ticking the right boxes. “Tick box” ethical decisions might protect the individual 
                                                 
22 I will discuss “significantly different” cases in terms of features and moral value later in this chapter and in Chs 4 
and 6  
23 Here I take ethically acceptable practice to work in a way analogous to the “Bolam Criterion” which was provided 
by McNair J in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committe: 
[A doctor] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art. 
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from disastrously wrong decisions (although it is possible to construct scenarios where they do 
lead people into just such disaster), but they will also avoid the creatively good and can leave the 
professional in ethical no-man’s land. There will (of necessity) be no box for a new situation or 
for a new twist to an established scenario. At its worst then, tick box ethics simply gives up on 
how to act and offers no advice at all.   
3.5.2 Action guidance 
To approach this I will draw an analogy with the data collection in the conduct of clinical trials. 
In clinical trials a considerable amount of data can be collected; this data often has multiple uses, 
for instance, it is used in the publication of results, in “meta analysis” where data from different 
trials is brought together to improve the evidence base for drawing conclusions, and in 
determining future clinical practice, such as the drawing up of guidelines by the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). In order that these activities can be carried 
out, there must be trust. A series of guidelines have been developed to help engender this trust. 
Good Laboratory Practice (GLP), Good Clinical Practice (GCP) and so forth (sometimes 
referred to collectively as G*P) describe the way in which data should be collected and recorded  
by the various professionals involved so that it can be verified and used for the benefit of 
patients (the ultimate trusters in this web). G*P frequently requires the use of SOPs to define 
data collection and analysis. As an example consider a trial in which patients are injected with a 
drug labelled with a small amount of radioactivity and blood samples are taken every hour to 
measure the clearance of the drug from the patient’s circulation. “Measure the amount of 
radioactivity in the blood sample” is not considered a sufficient instruction to the operator and 
s/he is expected to follow a sequence of steps described in an SOP; this will typically define how 
much blood is to be measured, which machine is to be used for the measurement, what the 
settings on the machine must be, how and where the data is to be recorded (including recording 
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the settings of the machine). By analogy with the discussion of thick and thin concepts above 
§2.6 “measure the clearance of the drug” is a fairly thin instruction, it gives an idea of what is 
required but is insufficient for action guidance, within the context of a trial where knowledge of 
the clearance of a drug is a required outcome we can see this instruction as always true;  
“measure the radioactivity in a series of blood samples and calculate the clearance equation” 
fleshes out the requirement, it is thicker than the first attempt but still does not tell the operator 
what actions to take; the SOP, on the other hand, is a far thicker instruction (or instruction set), 
it contains a description, at a much more detailed level,24 of the actions necessary to make the 
measurement. The thin instruction would be equally applicable if a fluorescent rather than a 
radioactive marker were used, but another thick SOP would have to be developed for the action 
guidance required for G*P trust. 
The following statements might be considered as guidance for ethically correct behaviour: 
Do what is ethically correct. 
Respect autonomy. 
Ensure the patient gives informed consent. 
Enact the SOP: 
Take a copy of the form Trial-A01 given in the appendix.  
Discuss the implications of the trial with the patient 
Ask the patient to read Form Trial-A01 and to sign it if s/he agrees to take part in the 
trial. 
The first is fully thin and offers no guidance. The second gives some idea that there are two 
people involved, one of whom might have his ability to control his own life compromised if 
things go wrong; it is not clear how this might happen or (more importantly) how this is to be 
avoided. This third increases our information about what features define the situation we are 
discussing; it will only help if knowledge of what constitutes “informed consent” can be taken as 
knowledge held in common by those who developed this guidance and the professional being 
                                                 
24 It is my experience that the level of detail in SOPs has increased over the past five years. Where previously an 
SOP would have said “Start the counter”, recent SOPs say “Press and release the central GREEN button; observe 
the operating light has illuminated”. 
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guided. The last leaves very little room for misinterpretation of the requirements; it gives no 
transferable knowledge for acting in another clinical trial (such as one where the relevant form is 
in a different appendix  and Trial-A01 contains a list of abbreviations used in the protocol); 
referring back to §2.2 Hare’s driving instructor is back in the car again. 
3.5.3 Normative theories 
In Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics (Fieser 2000) Fieser defines “normative 
ethics”: 
Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong 
conduct. We may view the field of normative ethics as a search for an ideal litmus test 
for morally proper behaviour. 
(Original US spelling) p139 
The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of 
moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. 
p139 
He defines “applied ethics”: 
Applied ethics is the branch of ethics that involves analyzing specific controversial 
moral issues. 
p369 
Professional ethics (including medical ethics) is generally concerned with how professional 
people go about their business in an ethically acceptable way. Guidance documents and codes of 
practice are playing an increasing role in the day to day practice of medicine, many of them carry 
some normative content. They are not aiming to provide norms for all behaviour in all 
circumstances; however they are looking to guide the professional in her profession, both as a 
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basis for the everyday decisions, and as guidance for dealing with new situations posing new 
dilemmas.  
I have argued that general theories are too thin to offer the precise action guidance the naive 
clinician requires in the clinic; she will require a way of interpreting those theories in terms of her 
practice. The more general the theory the more lean it can be seen to be. Leaner principles have 
an apparent wider sphere of application. “Give blood to patients who will come to harm if they 
do not receive a transfusion” seems to apply to all situations in which a patient is bleeding 
internally;25 it is lean and its application is broad. However there are situations in which other 
principles indicate that refraining from giving blood would be the right thing to do. “Give blood 
to patients who will come to harm if they do not receive a transfusion and who are not 
Jehovah’s Witnesses” is a thicker principle with a smaller set of situations in which it applies and 
gives more precise action guidance. 
In medical practice, one of the main ways of moving from thin or very lean principles to thicker 
guidance is the use of guidance documents.  
3.6 Guidance documents 
In this section I will look at two types of guidance to ask how well they guide the naive clinician. 
I will consider the text which is often taken as the starting point for serious study of medical 
ethics, “Principles of  Biomedical Ethics” (Beauchamp and Childress op. cit.), this is a general text 
covering the whole gamut of medical ethics. In contrast I will consider the DoH Guidance on 
Informed Consent (DoH 2009), this is a specific guidance document concerned with “obtaining 
valid consent for any examination, treatment or care that they propose to undertake” (p ii). The 
                                                 
25 There are many other situations where this would apply, but highlighting this one will serve this argument 
sufficiently. 
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guidance is primarily aimed at legal requirements, but I will take the law as attempting to enforce 
morally acceptable action. 
3.6.1 Four Principles Approach 
Before proceeding I must refer back to the discussion of principlism I gave in §1.7 that 
“Principles of Biomedical Ethics” (Beauchamp and Childress (2001)) is often taken to mean a 
system of four interacting principles. While this does not do justice to the complexity of their 
work, it is how it is commonly used in practice. 
Based on the work of Beauchamp and Childress the four principles approach says four 
principles underlie medical ethics: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and 
justice.  
To continue with the example discussed above, the general theory of respect for autonomy 
indicates a need to find out what the patient wants and a need to ensure the patient understands 
the implications of the proposed treatment in terms that he can relate to his desires. The general 
theory of beneficence indicates that the doctor should perform the action which will do the 
patient good. These principles can be seen to conflict in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses in need 
of blood transfusions. Beauchamp and Childress describe the process of “specification” to 
resolve apparent conflicts in guidance; in the terms used here this is a process of building a 
thicker action guidance. In this situation autonomy (when properly applied) is taken to overrule 
beneficence. 
Other conflicts arise such as the conflicts seen between justice and beneficence in the resource 
limited NHS. In the example of use of drugs in Alzheimer’s disease beneficence might be seen 
to overrule justice if research which postdates the NICE advice shows the benefit of the drugs 
to be greater than was supposed when the advice was written. 
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In order to resolve conflict in these examples the lean four principles have been thickened to 
reduce the scope of one principle to allow the other to overrule. For generalist ethics the 
resolution of the conflict will always apply in relevantly similar situations. 
3.6.2 Department of Health Guidance on Informed Consent 
The DoH publishes a “Reference guide to consent for examination or treatment” now in its 
second edition (DoH 2009: 
The guide describes the process of seeking consent, the importance of establishing 
whether the person has capacity to give consent, what constitutes valid consent, the 
form that consent might take and the duration of that consent. It highlights the need 
to ensure that the consent is given voluntarily and that sufficient information has been 
imparted to allow valid consent to be made. 
p3. 
Although much of the guide is based on legal requirements it does say that it is a general “legal 
and ethical principle” that consent is obtained before any procedure is commenced on a patient. 
The document contains information of the requirements for consent to be valid, such as 
sufficient information must be given, there must be no coercion; the duration of consent; and 
what constitutes consent, it may be verbal, non verbal or written, such that a patient may 
consent to having a blood pressure measurement when he holds out his arm or may be required 
to sign a form before surgery. 
There is very little room in the document for considering the obtaining of consent to be a pro 
tanto duty rather than an absolute one. Where there is the possibility of undertaking any 
procedure without consent the conditions which apply are spelt out: 
During an operation it may become evident that the person could benefit from an 
additional procedure that was not within the scope of the original consent. If it would 
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be unreasonable to delay the procedure until the person regains consciousness (for 
example because there is a threat to the person’s life) it may be justified to perform 
the procedure on the grounds that it is in the person’s best interests. However, the 
procedure should not be performed merely because it is convenient. For example, a 
hysterectomy should never be performed during an operation without explicit consent, 
unless it is necessary to do so to save life. 
p14 
 
3.7 Thickness and Professional Ethics 
Those seeking guidance will be doing so because they do not know how to act in a situation. It 
would seem that for this there must be at least two possible courses of action open to them 
(accepting that “doing nothing” is a course of action). The situation is defined by its features (F 
= {f1, …, fn}) and each possible action is associated with a moral  value by a feature set A1 is V1 
if {fa1, …, fam} is a subset of S. Most simply FA1 and FA2 are both subsets of F. The dilemma can 
arise if A1 and A2 are the same action but V1 and V2 are opposite, or if A1 and A2 are different 
actions but V1 and V2 are the same. In order to decide which course of action is right the 
clinician might look for a further feature of the situation which alters one of the associations of 
action and value. For example if it were shown that the patient was coerced into signing an 
advanced directive that he not be resuscitated then the moral value of following this directive 
would be voided. The clinician here has found that she needed a thicker version of the guidance 
when she found a potentially morally relevant feature which allowed the conflict to be resolved. 
If the conflict remains after looking at as many features as possible, then a process of 
specification (as discussed by  Beauchamp and Childress) will lead to thickening the guidance 
(§2.6) to allow one pro tanto action guiding principle to outweigh the other. 
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Many decisions in medical ethics are made in these complex situations and action guidance has 
to be correspondingly thick to allow for the nuances required to treat patients individually.   
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4 Naivety and experience in moral decision making  
“It is well for the heart to be naive and the mind not to be.”  Anatole France 
4.1 Introduction 
In the discussion in Chapter 3 I have assumed throughout that the prime agent is morally naive. 
That is to say her sole moral reason for choosing one action over another is embodied in a set of 
generalist principles (a set which might have only one member for hard line consequentialists), 
which can be written down or conveyed to her in some other way. There are plenty of such 
systems of rules and calculi for their application. These can cover any breadth of interest, from 
general books on everyday choices to highly specific guidance documents for proper 
professional conduct in particular circumstances. In this chapter I will contrast this naive agent 
with the morally experienced agent who can make morally defensible decisions without recourse 
to guidance, including in unforeseen circumstances. 
In the real world we rarely expect adults to consult a rule book when deciding whether to utter 
an untrue statement whereas we do expect professionals to adhere to codes of conduct. We 
teach children “how to behave” and condemn adults for not behaving correctly.  
At the end of the chapter I will consider the difference between the experienced particularist and 
the experienced generalist. 
4.2 Naivety and rules 
4.2.1 The morally naive agent 
In Chapter 2 I have taken normative ethical theories to equate to one or more statements which 
would provide action guidance to the naive agent in a particular situation. From the point of 
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view of practical ethics this seems reasonable; in “Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied 
Ethics” James Fieser says,  
We may view the field of normative ethics as a search for an ideal litmus test for 
morally proper behaviour. 
and  
The key assumption of normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of 
moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. 
Fieser 2000 p139 
This view is supported by McKeever and Ridge 
[T]he history of moral philosophy is in large part a history to map the moral landscape 
with a set of principles. Socrates famously searched for ‘true definitions’ for moral 
predicates. … Modern moral philosophy is understood as a debate between 
[consequentialists26] like John Stuart Mill and deontologists like Immanuel Kant. 
Crucially, both sides of this modern debate are committed to the generalist idea that 
morality is best understood in terms of principles limited to moral philosophy. 
McKeever and Ridge 2006 p4 
This view is more easily seen for deontology and consequentialism than for virtue ethics. In her 
book “On Virtue Ethics” (Hursthouse 1999) Hursthouse sets out to demonstrate that virtue 
ethics can be action guiding in a similar way to consequentialism and deontology.27 In Chapter 1 
she characterises consequentialism as “act utilitarianism” by the premises: 
 P.1.: An action is right iff it promotes the best consequences 
 P.2.: The best consequences are those in which happiness is maximised 
                                                 
26 I have substituted “consequentialists” for “utilitarians” as the former covers a wider gamut of moral theories 
which judge the rightness of an act by the extent to which if furthers the goal of bringing about some predefined 
good (such as happiness or preference fulfilment).  
27 Not all virtue ethicists agree that virtue ethics can be codified in this way, even in principle. 
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She then says that “many simple” forms of deontology can be characterised using the same basic 
structure: 
 P.1.: An action is right iff it is in accordance with a correct moral rule or principle. 
 P.2.: A correct moral rule (principle) is one that... 
here she offers a list of potential ways of completing P.2.: 
... is on the following list (then a list follows – perhaps completed with an “etc”); 
... is laid down for us by God; 
... is universalisable/a categorical imperative; 
 ...would be the object of choice of all rational beings; 
etc. 
Next she offers a version of virtue ethics which fits this structure: 
P.1.: An action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in 
character) would do in the circumstances. 
P.1a.: A virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, certain character traits, namely the virtues. 
P.2.: A virtue is a character trait that... 
P.2. might be completed “simply by enumeration” or by some other means such as reference to 
eudemonia. Some versions of virtue ethics, then, can fit with the view of normative ethics I gave at 
the start of this section.  
Normative ethics is then a search for such a principle or set of principles. If it were developed 
this set would tell us in all and every situation what is morally right and what is morally wrong. 
Whilst such a set may be unachievable in practice, the belief that such a thing is in principle 
possible is challenged by particularism arising out of holism as presented by Dancy, and the idea 
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that such principles are necessary for morally correct action is challenged by all forms of 
particularism. 
Even if such a set were available it would not be action guiding for an amoral agent. A set of 
principles which arise from a normative theory will be action guiding only for an agent who 
wants to do the morally right thing. The moral agent is one who accepts the null principle P0 as 
saying one should “do the right thing”. There is considerable literature on action guidance and 
motivation;28 for the purpose of this thesis I will assume that clinical and non-clinical medical 
professionals wish to behave in an ethically correct way (at least in their professional lives). We 
can assume that any clinician consulting a Code of Practice which deals with medical ethics will 
be seeking such guidance; for the sake of perversity we could envisage an immoral clinician 
seeking guidance to ensure that they do not undertake a good act, but even for such an agent 
seeking the code is tantamount to seeking action guidance. Normative theories (and codes based 
on them) need not be, in and of themselves, action guiding. Such theories can be couched in 
terms of such-and-such an action being “good” or “right” or (possibly more often) the reverse.  
It is wrong to tell lies. 
It is unethical to treat a patient without obtaining consent. 
The right action is the one which maximises the good. 
These statements have different degrees of thickness and can be turned into action guiding 
statements when combined with P0  
Tell no lies. 
Do not treat a patient without obtaining consent. 
Do that which, all things considered, maximises the good. 
                                                 
28 A search of the on-line Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy for “motivation” gave 490 hits (August 2012). 
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Returning to the naive agent, is it reasonable for her to expect action guidance from such codes?  
Suppose a chemistry student in the first year of senior school is asked to perform an experiment 
in an acidic solution; she is given a choice of two solutions. Suppose she has never studied 
chemistry before and is naive in the subject of chemistry.  She will look to some standard 
procedures for guidance on which solution she should use. She might find instructions to 
perform the litmus test. A drop of one solution turns the paper red and a drop of the other turns 
the paper blue, she can proceed to choose the former with reasonable assurance that it is the 
right one for the experiment. She is unaware that other solutions might be more acidic or that 
certain conditions can cause the litmus test to give an inappropriate colour change. The naive 
chemistry student is thus able to perform the experiment correctly by using written procedures 
to guide her action. A broad analogy can be drawn for the ethically naive doctor. Suppose she 
has an unconscious patient and a choice of Xing or not Xing, and she knows that some patients 
have reservations about Xing. She can look for local or national guidelines concerning the use of 
Xing. These might give her some simple tests such as “Has the patient left an advance directive 
concerning Xing?”, “Are there any friends or relatives with evidence about the patient’s attitude 
to Xing?” If she follows these guidelines she can be assured that the patient has received 
ethically correct treatment; given her initial naivety we can see the action guidance from the 
written procedures directed her to an ethical solution to the problem. 
In this sense then, written procedures, codes of conduct, standard operating procedures etc can 
indicate a correct course of action or a procedure for finding such. In the terms used in the main 
theme for this thesis, these sources can be seen as pointing to sets of possible morally relevant 
features. Such features would each be associated with a moral valence, however the guidelines 
generally are not written to make such distinctions clear, but rather they amalgamate features and 
provide a moral value for final actions. In this sense the Rossian pro tanto duties are “pre-
weighed” by the writers of the guidelines and the readers provided with the overall guidance.  
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There is nothing unique to morality in this; many medical codes of practise are concerned with 
technical or clinical decisions; the chemistry student was not looking for an ethical way to 
perform her experiment. A P0 for the chemistry student could be devised such as “Always 
perform those experiments which will test the hypothesis under investigation”. 
Following the procedures will help the naive agent develop experience. The chemist will soon 
learn several ways to test for acidity, she will learn which features of which experiments or 
processes require acidic or alkaline solutions; as she become “chemically experienced” her need 
to consult guidelines will diminish. 
4.2.2 Mother’s knee morality 
An analogy can be drawn between the relationship of the naive doctor to the ethically 
experienced practitioner and the relationship of the child to the fully formed moral agent; to 
make use of this analogy I will briefly look at a child learning to behave in society.29 The child 
learns sets of rules from a parent or guardian, one of these sets will turn out to be moral rules, or 
at least the basis for moral rules as the child’s understanding develops. Children learn not to lie, 
not to take each other’s toys or sweets, to share with others etc, within a small society of family 
and playmates. As their understanding of the world increases their understanding of morality 
matures; their moral understanding moves from “mummy says you must not take Johnny’s 
Lego” to “taking other people’s property, without asking, is wrong”. There are two factors 
involved in this generalisation. Firstly, there is the move to general rules when the child 
understands that it is not just Johnny’s Lego he should not take without permission but that the 
rule applies to anyone and to all their possessions, that the feature of an object “being owned by 
someone else” brings a negative valence to the action “using without permission”. Secondly he 
                                                 
29 Here again is a potentially vast subject which I will largely ignore in the interests of staying on track for this thesis. 
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understands that the rule is in some sense independent of his mother; his mother may be his 
source for such rules in early life but this may not always be the case.  
The features of this short discussion about learning moral rules that I want to focus on for this 
section are the generalisation of rules and the role of a moral teacher or mentor. The junior 
doctor is in an analogous position to that of the child. She is in a world where she has little or no 
experience of how to interact with others by virtue of the fact that she is in a role in relation to 
patients she has not previously experienced, she will need guidance about the ethics of her 
interactions with these patients. For example, she will have learned that a certain course of 
treatment would be medically best for a certain patient, but not that the patient should have a 
chance to understand the implications of the treatment and refuse if he so wishes. 
4.2.3 “When I was a child… 
…I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a 
man, I put away childish things.  
1 Corinthians 13.11 King James Version 
This quotation from the Christian Bible indicates that the learning acquired as a child needs to 
be re-examined and reinterpreted in the light of an adult understanding of the world. 
As the child becomes a morally experienced agent the simple moral rules often seem less 
straightforward. The simple proscription against lying seems less clear as we interact in more 
complex society. Is all lying necessarily wrong? If so, what actually constitutes lying? Are the 
small concealments and diversions we employ to avoid making a false statement also lying? 
These two questions seem to work hand in hand; those for whom any form of deception is a lie 
seem to accept that “white lies” are necessary for society to function. Those who see lying as 
always wrong seem to have a tighter definition of lying and a weaker proscription against other 
forms of deception.  “Did you enjoy the meal I spent all day preparing for you?”, “Does this hat 
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suit me?”, “Am I dying?” are all questions which, in some circumstances, will increase human 
misery without any commensurate increase in good, if answered truthfully. (see Jennifer Jackson 
“Truth, Trust and Medicine” Ch 4 “What truthfulness requires” Jackson 2004). Both the 
positions mentioned here take the feature “that it is a lie” to imply a negative valence to the act 
of stating it, one group would give this feature less weight in an overall decision as to whether to 
say it or not, whereas the other group would have a very high weight for the feature but their 
definition of “lie” would mean the feature was included in the feature sets of fewer situations. 
As the medical professional moves away from training and into practice she will face similar 
problems with interpretation simple moral rules. She might look for guidance or she might feel 
she has sufficient knowledge of the relevant issues but that she needs to resolve a conflict which 
arises from the different sources of ethical guidance she has. Where guidance conflicts, she can 
consider a process such as specification. When looking for guidance the she might also consider 
asking a mentor whose ethics she believes to be sound or she might turn to the available 
guidelines for advice.  
A question which will arise in this discussion is one of how prescriptive (or proscriptive) the 
guidelines are. More prescriptive guidelines can be seen on one hand to give more precise action 
guidance, but on the other to allow less scope for the professional to apply their own judgement 
in a situation. Prescription need not imply a high level of thickness. To say Xing is wrong may be 
highly prescriptive: under no circumstance should you perform an action which involves Xing. 
“Xing” might have a thin description such as “doing evil”, or a lean one such as “killing 
humans” or it might have a highly detailed interpretation of undertaking a certain action 
(“making a statement known to be untrue” or “giving blood products without consent”) in a 
clearly defined situation (“attempting to gain pecuniary advantage by deception” or “when the 
patient is believed to be a Jehovah’s Witness”).  
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Where the professional is restrained by guidelines, can she or he develop a mature ethical sense 
similar to the more complex understanding of the relationship between lying, concealing and a 
wider morality as discussed above? If not, is it desirable that they should? I think this raises again 
the question of what society expects of medical professionals. I will return to this question in 
Chapter 6. 
4.3 Particularism and experience 
Particularism is a meta-normative position concerning the need for, and the possibility of, 
generalist moral rules. Particularists argue that it is not possible to guarantee that a given set of 
features, which give an action a certain moral valence in one situation , simply will not count, or 
even indicate a different moral valence for the same action, when found within the features of a 
different situation. In simple clinical situations the features Fb = {fn: is an unconscious patient, fn+1: is 
bleeding internally} would imply that not giving blood would be wrong, but Fb would not count if 
the situation also had the feature fj: is a Jehovah’s Witness.
30 
Particularists also contend that an agent can perfectly well behave ethically without need of 
generalist rules. This raises a question of how a morally naive particularist decides how to act. If 
she has no experience of what constitutes morally good behaviour, how is she to decide on 
matters of morality without a generalist code? I will argue that the particularist answer to this can 
be found in the idea of a mentor, and propose that codes of practice (and other generalist 
systems) can be seen as formalised surrogate mentors. 
Most of the published writing on particularism is in the theoretical realm; in this section I have 
tried to understand what the implications of particularism are for practical (in particular medical) 
ethics, in order to ask, if particularism is correct, what (if any) implications would that have for 
                                                 
30 Generalists would have a different interpretation of this case but I believe it is illustrative of the particularist point 
of view. 
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the practice and teaching of medicine? In particular, in this chapter, I will be interested in the 
relationship between naivety and experience for moral agents. 
The idea of default valence is one which will be important in developing the argument 
concerning how particularists can function morally in the real world. Holism of reasons is not 
inconsistent with default values, provided that they are defeasible. In the previous section I 
showed how different generalists might hold different views on the weight given to the feature 
“that it is a lie”, here we might see the particularist accepting the, ceteris paribus, lying is wrong-
making; she would still think that when asked by the axe murderer about the location of his 
intended victim, lying has a positive valence. 
4.3.1 Supervenience and generalisation 
A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two things can 
differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-
properties. In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference”. 
McGlaughin and Bennett 2010 
It is widely accepted that moral properties supervene on natural properties, and I propose to 
take this as a given; further I will take the “natural properties” to be just those features of a 
situation which are discussed throughout this thesis and the “moral properties” to be just the 
moral valence ascribed to a proposed action as a result of the features of the situation in which 
the action is proposed. 
The notion of supervenience is important in the development of moral experience. The naive 
agent may see two situations and be told that Xing is correct in one but not the other; her first 
question will be to ask what the difference between the situations is. She will expect that 
difference to be some feature set Fd which is a subset of the features defining one situation F1 
and is not a subset of the features defining the other situation F2 (Fd ⊂ F1 , Fd ⊄ F2). As she 
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gains experience she will recognise what sorts of features are included in Fd. “That the patient 
had shoelaces of a particular colour” is often taken to be the sort of feature which is a poor 
candidate for inclusion in Fd, whereas that the patient was a follower of a particular religion is 
often taken as a good candidate for inclusion. When developing moral experience an agent might 
start to recognise certain classes of feature which are good candidates for inclusion in Fd and 
certain classes of feature which are not. Crisp (in Crisp 2000 p33) talks of explanatory, 
motivating and grounding reasons, all of these types of reason can be features of a situation 
under the broad definition of feature I noted in footnote [4]. Simple explanatory features such as 
those which describe the interaction of two billiard balls colliding on a baize covered surface do 
not seem good candidates for inclusion in Fd, the balls are not motivated to bounce apart at 
particular angles in the sense in which Crisp uses “motivating”. Motivating features can be of 
many types, “she went to the fridge because she was thirsty”, “I gave him the pill because I 
believed him to be in pain” include motivating features (“she was thirsty”, “I believed him to be 
in pain”). These features can provide reasons for action (“going to the fridge”, “giving him the 
pill”), some of these actions may have a moral value and others may not. Crisp’s grounding 
reasons are features of the type “if someone is in pain, giving them the pill will decrease 
suffering”. The partially experienced agent might have developed some rules of thumb for 
picking out the morally relevant features and might refine the initial statement of supervenience; 
moral properties depend on morally relevant natural properties.  
This dependence provides the basic underpinning for the development of moral experience, 
when we need to decide how to act in a situation our decision tends to be guided by experience. 
That the patient is unconscious, that the patient has signs consistent with internal bleeding, that 
Beauchamp and Childress say “Morality requires not only that we treat persons autonomously 
and refrain from harming them, but also that we contribute to their welfare” (p165) may be 
features the junior doctor in A&E has met before and which incline her to believe the right 
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action is to order a blood transfusion. Whether this decision is the right one might depend on 
features of the situation she has not recognised as morally relevant as she has not met them 
before.  
Whilst this dependence helps to elucidate the relationship between moral judgements in similar 
situations it should not be confused with supervenience. Supervenience says the moral 
properties of an action depend on the non-moral properties of the action. If Xing is right in 
situation S then Xing is right in S’ if FS = FS’. For supervenience to entail that Xing is right in S’ 
all the non-moral properties of the two situations must be the same; it would be impossible to 
enumerate all the features of a situation. Does the dependence of moral properties on non-moral 
properties allow the semi-experienced agent to start formulating general principles? As I said 
above she might begin to formulate a distinction between morally-relevant non-moral properties 
and non-morally-relevant non-moral properties. This could be very onerous and would not be 
guaranteed to identify any common non-moral properties associated with situations where Xing 
is right, if Xing is the right action in several different types of situation. She might ask a moral 
mentor for some general rules, whilst this might help the semi-experienced agent, it raises the 
question of how the mentor acquired these rules. She might ask more experienced colleagues 
what features of a particular situation led them to a particular moral conclusion, this would be a 
natural extension of her training in which she will be used to asking these more senior colleagues 
what signs and symptoms led them to a particular diagnosis. 
Continuing the example above of the junior doctor in A&E faced with an unconscious patient 
showing signs of internal bleeding; she is in the process of writing up the blood transfusion 
when a senior colleague walks in, takes one look at the patient and tells her to stop ordering the 
transfusion, when asked why he says, “This is the patient who is wearing red and silver shoe 
laces.” He then explains that he saw the patient being brought in, and knowing that members of 
the Thor’s Advocates sect identified themselves to others of the sect by the wearing of just such 
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shoe laces, and that they were opposed to receiving blood transfusions, he sought the patient’s 
relatives in the waiting room. They have refused a blood transfusion.  
Particularism says that we cannot know in advance which features of a situation are “morally 
relevant”. In this highly contrived and trivial example a feature often taken to be the epitome of 
irrelevance had at least an indirect bearing on the moral decision.  
4.3.2 Gaining experience by learning from experience 
Underlying the actions of the naive doctor is P0. In order for her to implement this principle she 
must have a way of determining the best thing for her to do. Her initial training will have refined 
her mother’s knee morality with specific reference to her chosen profession. One of the most 
important things for her to learn is to distinguish situations in which she needs guidance. In a 
situation where she has to choose between Xing and Ying (or simply not Xing) there will be 
situations where the morally correct action is to seek guidance. In an ideal world she would have 
access to a moral mentor and time to discuss the pros and cons of Xing and of Ying; she will 
understand the principles (PX and PY) which underlie the reasons pro and con the actions and 
how thickening one of both of these allows her to make the correct action. In practise in many 
situations something very akin to this will happen at case conferences or multi disciplinary team 
meetings where reasons (clinical and ethical) for choosing particular actions will be discussed. 
Such discussions will help the naive doctor towards becoming ethically experienced. However 
returning to § 2.2 where Hare draws analogy with learning to drive simply seeing how to behave 
in a number of fixed cases would be teaching her to change gear now and now, not teaching her 
to be able to tell when to change gear. She has several alternative sources of guidance, I will 
return to the General Medical Council’s (GMC) published “Standards and ethics for doctors” 
(GMC 2012c) including Good Medical Practice (GMC 2010b in §6.3. These and other codes of 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
97 
 
practice can provide guidance with varying levels of thickness. Discussions with colleagues and 
reflection on all the guidance available will be part of the doctor’s development of a moral sense. 
4.4 The role of experience 
Particularists do not hold that moral judgements or moral actions are impossible simply that a 
moral agent does not need generalist principles to act morally. Particularists accept the 
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral but argue that this is very weak in helping make 
moral decisions as it is not possible to know in advance which features of a situation are morally 
relevant and thus, on which non-moral features the moral features supervened. If two situations 
were found to be sufficiently similar in morally relevant features such that if Xing in one has a 
positive moral valence then Xing in the other will also have a positive moral valence, we could 
say that the first case provided a moral precedent for divining the morally correct action in the 
second. Particularism does not deny the possibility of such cases; it just states that they are not 
generally available and that we have no reason to expect them to be so. Precedent, while being 
useful for suggesting a possible course of action, does not provide definitive moral judgement 
for generalists or particularists. 
The means by which we decide if a pro tanto principle applies in a particular situation, or if pro 
tanto precedent does indeed apply to a particular situation, is by reflection. What we reflect upon 
is our moral experience. At first this may seem to fit with a system where all duties are pro tanto 
and arise from features of a situation, and where there are no absolute duties. This however does 
not deal with the situation in which a feature gives rise to a positive moral valence in one 
situation but a null or negative moral valence in another situation. When an agent reflects on a 
moral choice to decide on a correct course of action, she is relying upon her moral judgement, 
and her moral character and her experience. The quotation from McKeever and Ridge above 
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sets moral philosophy as a debate between consequentialists and deontologists. For the 
particularist neither of these camps is acceptable as ultimately both deny the holism of reasons. 
Experience is important for consequentialists, deontologists and particularist agents developing a 
moral sense. For the consequentialist precedent will indicate how to undertake the 
consequentialist calculus to choose the action with the best outcome; for the Rossian 
deontologist31 precedent can indicate both which features carry pro tanto duties (which features 
are associated with a moral valence) and how to balance these various pro tanto duties to reach an 
overall duty; and for particularists precedent can indicate default valences.  
 
4.5 A three dimensional function 
In the field of practical ethics (and professional ethics) agents are concerned to know how to act 
so that they have done the best thing, or at the least not done a wrong thing. I have looked at the 
problems facing a fully naive agent and at how experienced agents can reflect on their moral 
experience to gain insights into how to act in a given situation. I will reiterate some of what I 
have said in order to draw the strands of this thesis together, before discussing how this would 
apply in medical ethics (Chapter [cross ref]). 
The moral agent can look to external sources for moral guidance. One place such guidance can 
be found is in codes of practice. As an example I will consider a doctor advising a course of 
action and seeking a patient’s consent for a particular procedure, the first place she might look 
could be Department of Health guidelines. For consent she would find the DoH initiative 
“Good practice in consent”, the implementation guide from this document set (DoH 2001) 
                                                 
31 I have not included absolute deontologists in this account; although they might gain some insight into interpreting 
absolute rules (in a similar way to consequentialists) absolute rules such as the religious commandments are not 
learned from precedent. 
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states that its aim is to assist “NHS organisations to promote good practice in the way patients 
are asked to give their consent to treatment, care or research” (p3). In order to use this 
document our naive agent must have some experience; obviously experience of what is involved 
in the procedure which she has advised and for which she is seeking consent is a prerequisite. 
There are some issues which ask more of the doctor’s insight and moral sense. She must be able 
to judge (p9) whether the patient: 
is competent to take the particular decision; 
had received sufficient information to take it; and 
is not acting under any duress. 
Having found that she needs to establish these conditions, she might still not know if the patient 
can consent if she does not have a sufficient understanding of competence. Here she might 
consult Beauchamp and Childress: 
[T]he concept of competence in decision-making has close ties to the concept of 
autonomy. Patients or subjects are competent to make a decision if they have the 
capacity to understand the material information, to make a judgement about the 
information in the light of their values, to intend a certain outcome and to 
communicate freely their wishes to care givers or investigators. 
p71 
She might seek further information or guidance on some aspects of this part of the 
requirements; she might also look for information on the other aspects of consent. Once she has 
done all this she may feel ready to act. 
Suppose the patient has come to her in late autumn saying that, as an asthma sufferer, he is 
worried about the flu. She may judge him competent from the fact he has sought her advice and 
stated his need for help in relation to his underlying health problem, she might then explain that 
the flu vaccine only offers protection against the flu strains expected this year and say “I’ll get a 
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vial of vaccine while you roll up your sleeve.” She will take his action of rolling up his sleeve as 
passive consent to injection of the vaccine. 
A second patient who has cancer then asks if there is anything more she can offer him; she 
believes he qualifies for entry onto a clinical trial of a complex new treatment. She may think his 
asking for more help is not of itself sufficient to indicate that he is competent to decide about 
entering the trial, she might discuss his disease and prognosis with him before offering him a 
place on the trial. There will be a patient information sheet associated with the trial which she 
will give him to read and she will give him time to reflect on whether he wants to undergo the 
treatment. If he does he will then be asked to sign a consent form and a form to say he has read 
and understood the patient information sheet. 
The two patients are treated differently with respect to consenting to the doctor’s advice. So the 
DoH guidelines have helped in guiding the doctor’s actions but without further understanding of 
the difference between the two cases they were insufficient to guide the doctor’s actions. More 
detailed (thicker) knowledge of the particular cases was required to treat each patient properly. 
This understanding could have come from one or more of several sources such as a senior 
colleague, the doctor’s own experience, or the guidelines provided by the trial sponsors. 
The collection of sources and advice she consults do not necessarily constitute a single coherent 
normative system but this is not surprising. When discussing thick and thin principles above, I 
have treated these principles as coherent, developing (thickening) systems; this is an idealisation 
of the real world processes. An agent confronted with a dilemma will search his memory of his 
own and others’ moral decisions and compare the features of them with the features of the 
situation giving rise to the dilemma, this need not be a structured search; the resulting extension 
of the set of principles occurs post hoc. In the same way, the ethically naive doctor above can 
construct a coherent prima facie understanding of consent. The collection she brings together 
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constitutes a thick set of features which need to be present or absent in order that consent is 
successfully given (or denied).  
In contrast an experienced clinician might see the patient for a few minutes and have a sufficient 
grasp of the situation and the requirements of consent that she can move straight to telling the 
patient what she recommends and asking if he will consent. Her experience allows her to 
understand the application of the principle of respect for autonomy without explicit thickening 
for the particular patient in the consulting room. The basic four principles generally taken to 
arise from Beauchamp and Childress can constitute such principles, e.g. respect for autonomy is, 
by itself, fairly thin. When fully understood it leads to the requirement for consent in both the 
above cases, but a further understanding of each case is required for ethical practice. 
For the naive agent to reach ethical action she requires a very thick set of principles. She can gain 
no guidance from the fully thin P0 based on the null set of features, “Always do that which, all 
things considered, is the best thing to do”. Turning to B&C she finds she must respect the 
patient’s autonomy which, while thicker, again offers her no real guidance as to how to act with 
either. The DoH guidelines now offer her some slight help telling her what sort of action she 
must undertake: she must seek the patient’s consent and she must ensure the patient is not 
acting under duress, has sufficient information and is competent to consent. From here she may 
be able to formulate some plan of action but not distinguish between the active and passive 
forms of consent required by the different features presented by the two cases. The highly 
detailed (very thick) instructions which form part of the protocol for a clinical trial will come 
much closer to full instruction but only for how to take consent for a patient entering that 
particular trial. It is interesting to envisage an automaton programmed to enter a patient onto a 
clinical trial to see what a fully thick instruction set might look like. In such a set an instruction 
as “The patient information sheet must be given to the patient at least twenty four hours prior to 
the patient being asked to sign the consent form” would cause the automaton to run subroutine 
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to check the time is within the specified time constraint, it would contain such instructions as 
“unclip the patient information sheet from the back of the patient’s trial folder”, this would 
break down into a number of sub routines which in turn call lower level routines until the level 
of actual movement of motors or automaton muscle is controlled. This would require a program 
of many hundreds or thousands of instruction lines. Many programmers would be involved, 
each dealing with an area of specialism. This again is analogous to human learning where a baby 
learns to grasp an object, prior to learning to pass an object to another person. When a student 
enters medical school she arrives with many of the skills she will need (reading, writing, passing 
objects to other people …) “built in” by her previous experience and education so that these 
very low level functions can be taken for granted and new skills (use of a stethoscope, 
venipuncture, requesting consent) can be built on top. The level after which we feel that the 
doctor can be assumed to have sufficient instruction (a sufficiently thick description of the 
feature set) will depend on the level of experience she has achieved. 
If we return to the naive practitioner she will require a very thick definition to be fully certain of 
ethical action, but even she will be assumed to have some pre-existing understanding where 
further thickening of the guidance will not be required. At the other end of the scale for the 
same practitioner, moving from thin to lean guidance (this might be the move from P0 to B&C 
four principles) will not add much towards guiding her actions. When there is a relationship 
between two factors like this there is a temptation to construct a simple mathematical model to 
describe that relationship which would define a line graph with two axes (e.g. Thickness vs. 
Guidance). Simple models can easily be misinterpreted and the shape of such a line would be 
open to speculation. 
Having introduced the idea of such a diagram it seems reasonable to suggest a similar one for the 
relationship between experience and action guidance. Consider a highly experienced moral agent, 
one who can see clearly the best action when presented with a situation. When presented with 
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the unconscious patient with clinical signs of internal bleeding she will not only know of the 
possible consequences of the patient being a Jehovah’s Witness but will know how much time 
and effort should be expended to ascertain whether or not this is so. The only guidance she 
needs to motivate her into action is P0, the injunction to do the right thing. If she gains more 
experience it will contribute little to her ability to know the right action as she is already highly 
experienced (for example this might imply that this relationship tends to an asymptote). To 
consider the other end of this relationship consider the naive agent. She will need to experience 
several situations before her concepts of ethical right and wrong start to coalesce into a coherent 
set and she can start to assess the rightness of a proposed action. For this exercise I am assuming 
she has no access to any guidance apart from P0; she has no copy of B&C, no access to the DoH 
web site and no moral mentor. Suppose that after each patient interaction she is given the ethical 
value of her action, but no guidance to tell her why such a judgement was made (she is relying 
solely on experience and the thin P0). Suppose she sees an unconscious patient with clinical signs 
of internal bleeding and prescribes a blood transfusion (she has, after all, clinical training, just no 
moral training); she is told this interaction had a positive value. After four or five more similar 
cases, all judged to have positive value, she is beginning to conclude that saving life in this way is 
good. After treating the next case in the same way she is told her action had a negative moral 
value. She might collect the hospital notes on all the patients she has treated in this way and look 
for features in the first set that were not present in the most recent and features of the most 
recent that were not present in the others. This turns out to be her first patient over sixty years 
old, her first America citizen and her first Jehovah’s Witness patient. She might form a working 
hypothesis that there is no justification for allowing people to die simply because they are 
American or belong to a particular religious sect, so thinks the allocation of the expensive 
resource of blood transfusion to someone over sixty is unethical in a resource strapped health 
service. It might take considerably more experience before she associated an ethical dimension 
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with blood products and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Again justification for any particular shape for a 
curve is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a general form of more experience being more 
action guiding can be seen. 
In practical ethics we are concerned more with the real world. These two theoretical 
relationships deal with limiting cases but can form the basis for discussion of action guidance in 
real situations. Most professionals within the medicine will fall somewhere between these two 
extremes. This means that two factors combine to contribute towards action guidance. The 
naive clinician will attend medical ethics courses, read Gillon or Beauchamp and Childress, talk 
with senior staff and gain experience in workshops and in the clinic. This results in three 
interacting factors, the thickness of the principles she has understood, the extent of her 
experience and the resulting action guidance. A combination of experience and advice will be 
used by naive and semi-experienced agents for ethical action guidance. The junior doctor (who 
we may think of as a “fairly naive” agent) will not feel she can rely on her experience in any but 
the most straightforward of cases and will look for guidance form a source external to herself. In 
the case of the Jehovah’s Witness who is bleeding internally, in the real world she might be 
alerted to a possible problem by a member of nursing or other staff to the fact of the patient’s 
religious beliefs, while this person may not feel qualified to advise they may well feel qualified 
(they will often feel they have a duty) to alert the doctor to a problem which needs to be 
considered before the proposed action (here a blood transfusion) is undertaken. Once alerted 
the doctor will recognise that she is insufficiently experienced to act in this particular case and 
will seek guidance. This external guidance will be of different types depending on the actual 
circumstance. During the day in A&E there will be more experienced senior staff to ask for 
advice, she might even ask the more senior doctor to take over so that she can observe. In other 
circumstances she might prefer to consult local or national guidelines. Turning to the highly 
experienced practitioner, she would have no difficulty with the case of the Jehovah’s Witness but 
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she might still look for guidance in more complex situations. Consider a patient who just failed 
to meet the inclusion criteria for a clinical trial but who might be helped by the trial treatment; 
further the patient is the father (and bread-winner) for a young family. The experienced doctor 
might feel she needs input from other sources in this complex situation. Any discussions will 
inevitably focus on the specifics of the situation and be very thick in their feature set. 
4.5.1 “Find a virtuous agent and ask them” 
So far I have represented normative ethics as deontological or consequentialist, recently32 there 
has been a rise in writing about virtue ethics (see for example Fieser 2000 pp140-144). Virtue 
ethics can be introduced by the slogan “Do what the virtuous agent would characteristically do 
in the situation”, when phrased this way virtue ethics puts the emphasis for moral behaviour on 
the agent, as opposed to deontology where the emphasis is on the action or consequentialism 
where the emphasis is on the outcome. When expressed this way virtue ethics can be seen as 
rejecting formal sets of deontological rules. There is a fine line to be drawn by proponents of 
virtue ethics to avoid an approach which asks for a definition of what a virtuous agent will do in 
order to avoid virtue theory condensing into a form of deontology. If it were possible to define 
under what circumstances the virtuous agent would lie, at what point a courageous action 
becomes a foolhardy one and so on, then virtue theory would become a set of rules for virtuous 
action. Some forms of virtue ethics are compatible with some forms of particularism but there is 
no general agreement on the relationship (Blum (Crisp and Slote 1997) states “‘Virtue ethics’ is 
theoretically agnostic on the particularism issue” (p205 footnote)). A second slogan is sometimes 
used to describe action guidance in virtue ethics, when facing a situation where she cannot 
decide what to do the naive agent may be urged to “find a virtuous agent and ask them”.  
                                                 
32 The current resurgence of virtue theory can be seen as arising from G.E.M. Anscombe’s “Modern Moral 
Philosophy originally published in Philosophy (33) in 1958 and reprinted in Crisp and Slote 1997) 
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The need to seek advice is not a feature unique to virtue ethics. All moral agents sit somewhere 
on the naive – experienced scale and all might find the need for advice in novel or challenging 
situations. This advice can come from a variety of sources (as I discuss in §6.3.2) from senior 
colleagues and mentors to national guidelines.  Advice concerning the right course of action in a 
situation, as far as I am concerned in this thesis, is a statement of the moral rightness of the 
available actions, as such it supervenes on the features of the situation.  
For the out and out generalist, I assume she has recognised a combination of features which give 
rise to two pro tanto advised actions, but has no rule for choosing one over the other; or has 
recognised a new feature which she believes may be a morally relevant feature but is unsure of its 
moral implication. For her, finding the requisite advice is tantamount to finding a new general 
rule, even if it only applies to two cases in her career, for the generalist doctor it will always 
count in the same way. When she cannot find a guideline, she will still have to decide on a 
course of action and will have to rely on her moral understanding to choose it.  
The particularist’s relationship with advice is less straight forward. Although the advice might 
specify a certain set of features in which it applies (“the patient in unconscious”, “the patient in 
bleeding internally”, “the patient is a Jehovah’s Witness”), she has no reason to suppose that 
those features, or that combination of features, will always count in the same way, indeed she has 
no reason to suppose they apply in this particular case. If the advice comes from a senior 
colleague or a mentor she can discuss why she thinks the features do not count. When the advice 
is from a DoH guideline, the possibility for discussion is much more limited, she might seek her 
mentor if she believes the guidelines point in the wrong direction, but otherwise she, also, must 
rely on her moral understanding to choose her course of action. 
In the end, both the generalist and the particularist have to rely on their moral understanding to 
make a judgement; as Hare says, “the problems of conduct, though sometimes less diverting 
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than crossword puzzles, have to be solved, in a way that crossword puzzles do not. We cannot wait 
to see the solution in the next issue” (Hare 1952 p1 (original emphasis)). The practical difference 
between the particularist and the generalist is when she must apply her moral understanding. It is 
possible, in principle, to envisage an algorithm which will take the generalist from enumerating 
the features of a situation through to choosing an action which could be programmed into a 
computer and would require no moral understanding. This might be a highly sophisticated 
algorithm capable of interpreting many nuances of the real world, butwould not be open ended 
Such an algorithm might have a structure such that, if the situation contains Features {F1 – Fn} 
then Xing is right unless Fx, Fy, or Fz is also present, in which case Ying is right. When she meets 
a new situation { F1 – Fn, Fα} the algorithm knows nothing about Fα and indicates Xing to 
be right. It is then for the generalist to think Fα to be the same sort of thing as Fx or Fy so 
that she must consider Ying. The particularist will see the choice between Xing and Ying from 
the outset, she may recognise the importance of F1 or Fα and think that {F1 – Fn} simply do not 
count when they are present. She may have seen all the advice which underlies the generalist 
algorithm, but she will see the situation as holistic. 
Returning explicitly to the generalist particularist divide, the generalist clinician takes guidelines 
and guidance from senior colleagues as identifying features of situations which are associated 
with pro tanto reasons for Xing. In complex clinical situations she might find one or more 
features indicating a positive valence for Xing, one or more other features indicating a negative 
valence for Xing and one or more features indicating a positive valence for Ying (which would 
preclude Xing). With experience she will recognise these features without needing to consult 
guidelines or colleagues. As she develops a moral sense she will learn to balance the competing 
pro tanto duties to arrive at a decision as to the right thing to do. For her, allowing a patient to die 
from internal bleeding when suitable blood was available always carries a negative valence even 
when outweighed by other features.  
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For the particularist the situation has the same features, one or more feature might carry a 
default valence for or against Xing or Ying which could be indicated by a guideline document or 
a senior colleague’s opinion. She will have a holistic view of the situation, some features with 
default valences might be switched off in the presence of other features and some features might 
(e.g.) acquire a positive valence for Xing. With experience she will recognise which features 
count and which do not in particular situations, she might still be left with features counting for 
Xing and other features counting against and still have to find a way of resolving the course she 
should take. For her, allowing a patient to die from internal bleeding when suitable blood was 
available arrives with a default negative valence switched on, however this valence can be 
switched off by other features; features such as that the patient is a Jehovah’s Witness, that the 
patient has made a valid advance directive and that no other treatment is available might bring a 
positive valence to allowing the patient to die. 
 I will return to this distinction in Chapter 6. 
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5 Particularism and Medical Ethics 
“Medicine rests upon four pillars - philosophy, astronomy, alchemy, and ethics.” Paracelsus  
5.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter of this thesis I noted that particularism is a meta-normative theory, as such it 
is not the kind of theory that could indicate the correct course of action in any given situation; 
which is to say that it is not a normative ethical theory. In the subsequent chapters I have tried 
to look at the very practical field of medical ethics to highlight the areas where I think the meta-
normative debate between generalists and particularists has something to say about ethical 
medical practice. Current medical ethics is a generalist system; I have interpreted generalism 
quite broadly, in particular I have looked at the use of conventional generalist normative theories 
(deontology, consequentialism and virtue theory), at practical ethics (especially at the 
principalism which is seen to arise from the writings of Beauchamp and Childress), and at 
practical guidelines which are provided to those working in early Twenty First Century health 
care. There is some debate as to whether principalism could be considered a fully functional 
normative theory, which I discussed in Section §1.7; for the purpose of this thesis I have taken it 
to be normative, at least in the way in which it is normally applied. Practice guidelines published 
by the UK Department of Health (DoH) cannot be considered generalist normative theories, 
however in that they do prescribe and proscribe certain actions or types of action in defined 
situations likely to arise in medical practice; they are normative within their sphere of action. 
Within that sphere of action there is little doubt that the DoH intends them always to define the 
acceptable (or unacceptable) available courses of action; within their sphere they are then strong 
generalist principles. Many of them do not cover ethical decisions, but I have tried to include 
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only those which do have an ethical impact, in particular the guidelines on consent to and refusal 
of medical treatment. 
In this chapter I will revisit the central themes of particularism and introduce some examples 
from my practice in clinical trials to highlight the areas where generalist and particularist medical 
ethics differ. I will discuss the question of trust in relation to this debate. 
5.2 Counting and not Counting 
In the introduction to “The Particularist’s Progress” Dancy says: 
There is a common suggestion that to be a particularist is, at the outset, only to admit 
that circumstances can make a difference. But if this were all that particularism 
amounted to, it would be uncontentious. 
Dancy 2000 p130 
He goes on to say that to be a particularist one commits oneself to “holism in the theory of 
reasons”: 
I maintain that all reasons are capable of being altered by changes in context – that 
there are none whose nature as reasons is necessarily immune to changes elsewhere 
(original emphasis) p130 
Whilst accepting in a footnote that this may be unfair to Ross he states that he is specifically 
concerned with opposing what he identifies as Ross’s theory of prima facie reasons: 
What is a reason in one case is the same reason in all. 
Judgement is the attempt to determine the balance of reasons, so conceived.  
 p131 
In order to look at practical implications of this position, and to restrict it to the scope of this 
thesis, I have generally taken “reasons” to be reasons to undertake, or refrain from, certain 
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actions, specifically in this context as indicators of moral valence, and thus indicators of whether 
certain actions are morally good, neutral or bad. I have tried explicitly to duck the argument that 
indicators of moral valence are not in and of themselves reasons for action and have assumed 
that medical professionals have a preference for (in some hand-waving sense) “doing the right 
thing”. 
In his illustrative passages Dancy tends to use fairly simple statements as “reasons”. “That there 
will be a lot of people there” is a frequent example of a feature which is sometimes a reason to 
go there and sometimes a reason to stay away. Such a feature becomes a reason to choose to go 
there or to stay away depending on other features “I want to party” or “I need to think over an 
important decision”, whereas the set of features which describe almost any situation is which a 
medical practitioner has to decide how to act will be complex.   
5.2.1 Thickness and Holism 
I have used the term “thickness” in an extension of its use in thick and thin concepts to describe 
moral principles as thick or thin. In extending the concept of thickness I have argued that, rather 
than there being a binary division between thick and thin, there is a continuum so that one 
principle can be thicker than another but thinner than a third. Thickness in this sense is an 
indicator of how many features (Freq) have to be present in a situation for a principle to come 
into operation and indicate the moral value of an action in the situation where Freq is a subset of 
the features defining the situation. A fully thin principle (P0) relies on no features of the situation 
and is true in all situations, a fully thick one would include all the features that are true of a 
situation (Freq = FS), this would simply be a statement of the principle of supervenience; it is 
difficult to see how either of these limiting cases could be action guiding principles. Under this 
description generalist normative ethics attempts to define the subset of required features and, in 
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a general sense, the subset of morally relevant features. The principle of holism says that there is 
no general way of distinguishing morally relevant features from morally irrelevant ones. 
5.2.2 Does particularism have implications at the practical level? 
It is reasonable to ask if the divide between particularists and generalists is only a theoretical one 
or if it has practical implications for the way decisions are made in practice, especially in the case 
here in clinical practice. If there are practical differences, do these have implications for the way 
clinical guidelines are written and how medical professionals are trained? 
Writing about possible practical differences between generalists and particularists Dancy says: 
[Such a difference] comes out when we consider two pretty similar cases of which we 
nonetheless want to make different judgements. Nobody supposes that this is 
impossible. The question is rather what is rationally required of the judge in such a 
case. The generalist might end up demanding that one make the same judgement in 
both cases unless one can provide a principle that distinguishes them. The 
particularist, by contrast, might demand only that one make the same judgement in 
both cases unless one can offer some reason for not doing so. 
Dancy 2009 
To see this difference, consider two similar situations S1 and S2 and a set of features which 
enumerate the difference between them Fdiff, whereXing is the right action in S1 but Ying is the 
right action in S2. Both generalists and particularists agree that the moral features of the situation 
supervene on the non-moral, and thus they can agree that the reason for a difference in right 
action will be found in Fdiff: 
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In the form of particularism I have been discussing, the particularist would be expected to be 
able to indicate which feature or features of S2 resulted in the difference in right action. The 
generalist would require an extra rule to say that the pro tanto reason to X will be outweighed by 
the pro tanto reason to Y given Fdiff. 
For the generalist the feature of a situation which indicates the Ying is right in S2 must have a 
positive valence for Ying (or a negative valence for Xing) and carry sufficient weight to change 
the overall balance of the decision between Ying and Xing This is not to say generalists need to 
search the DoH website, scan B&C or some other source of generalist ethical wisdom; they do 
have to recognise that some other generalist rule or principle is being invoked and know how to 
balance these rules or principles against each other. There is considerable scope for generalists to 
disagree over the weight of factors which might be used to balance the various principles at play; 
in difficult situations different generalists might well come to different conclusions. 
At the level of normative ethics, for Ying to be correct in S2, at least one member of the set Fdiff  
must be recognised as invoking or strengthening a general rule in favour of Ying, or as negating 
or weakening one of the reasons why Xing is right in S1,.  
Take two broadly similar situations, S1 and S2. We wish to say Xing is right in S1 and Ying 
is right S2. 
For both the generalist and the particularist there must be differences in the feature 
sets for this difference in the rightness of Xing and Ying to be present. 
Generalist Approach 
For the generalist those features which made 
Xing right in S1 (pro tanto reasons to X) which 
are present in (broadly similar) S2 must 
promote Xing in S2. Any counterbalancing pro 
tanto reasons not to X did not outweigh 
reasons to X in S1 so will not do so in S2.  
So other features in S2 must invoke another 
principle which provide pro tanto support for 
Ying, and that on-balance Ying is to be 
preferred. 
Particularist Approach 
The particularist believes reasons to be 
holistic; she recognises that Xing is right given 
S1 and Ying right given S2 .  
Rationally she believes this results from a 
difference in the features of S1 and S2. This 
difference in one or more features is the 
"reason" Dancy refers to for not making the 
same judgement in both cases. 
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The particularist’s decision seems at root reflective, given her moral experience she believes she 
should Y in S2. She must see that the difference in the situations provides “some reason” for 
Ying rather than Xing. 
If normative ethics is the search for an ideal litmus test of morally proper behaviour, then 
normative ethics seems at odds with the holism of reasons which is a central plank of Dancy’s 
particularism. However supervenience holds under particularism, so if she has concluded that 
Xing is correct in S1, the particularist must accept that something in Fdiff acts to modify the 
reasons for that decision such that Ying is correct in S2.  
At the level of practical generalist ethics the different features will be relevant to some aspect of 
the guidelines. For example, a doctor trying to follow the four principles approach to medical 
ethics, might recognise some fact of the patients’ psychological makeup which would alter the 
balance between respect for autonomy and beneficence in the two cases, such that it was correct 
to reveal to Patient 1(the patient in S1) the whole truth about his condition as soon as possible, 
while Patient 2 (the patient in S2) would need the situation explained in a series of consultations 
over an extended period of time.  
There may be nothing in S1 to make a doctor think she should not follow a general proscription 
against lying; in S2 however following that proscription might bring some harm to an innocent 
party, for example where a patient’s blood type means that he cannot be the biological child of 
his parents, it may be that nothing would be gained by the revelation but considerable stress 
could be put on the whole family. 
 We might think of the generalist as having to run the difference between S1 and S2 through what 
might be termed a “generalist filter” (normative ethics, practical ethics or practice guidelines) 
before the correct course of action can be determined. The experienced agent will be able to 
apply such filters without recourse to external sources; she will have learned the relevant aspects 
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of the particular system to be applied. If asked to justify her decision her ultimate justification 
would be reference to the generalist system; she might say, “Lying can be justified when there is 
no benefit in telling the truth and such truth telling would cause harm to innocent parties.” Or 
she might cite the relevant DoH guidelines. In this situation telling the truth has the feature “that 
it would cause harm”, this does not change the pro tanto proscription of lying, but carries its own 
pro tanto valence opposing that general proscription, since truth telling is not supported by any 
specific benefit in the situation, not telling the truth carries the day. If the situation requires that 
some statement is made then lying is the right action. 
For the particularist, the approach would be different; she would reflect on the particular 
situation and decide whether to X or to Y as a result of the features of S1 or S2Here “that the 
statement is a lie” would have a default negative valence, but this would be switched off by the 
feature that it would cause harm, allowing the particularist to choose the statement which would 
bring most benefit.  
When considering a doctor acting to follow specific guidance documents a similar approach 
would be taken, here however the application of the documents will be far more explicit. The 
doctor might recognise that the patient is a Jehovah’s Witness. For the generalist this will bring a 
strong pro tanto duty not to give blood which has been judged by the guideline writers to have 
stronger weight than the general pro tanto duty to do what will bring benefit to the patient. For 
the particularist, giving blood has the feature “it would benefit the patient” which arrives with a 
positive default valence, the guidelines indicate that the feature “the patient is a Jehovah’s 
Witnesses” will switch off this default, this, of course, is also defeasible.  
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5.3 I see the particularist’s approach as having resonance 
with the approach taken by virtue ethics33 or at least by 
agent based virtue theory.Professional guidance 
Much of the work done by clinical and non-clinical medical professionals and nursing and 
technical support staff is guided and sometimes dictated by professional guidance. Some of this 
guidance, such as the “Good practice in consent implementation guide” (DoH 2012), make 
explicit reference to ethical practice; the introduction to this document says “Patients have a 
fundamental legal and ethical right to determine what happens to their own bodies” (p9). 
Others, such as the IR(ME)R regulations (DoH 2000), which will be discussed in §5.4.1, make 
no explicit claim to guide ethical practice (apart from noting that procedures must be approved 
by the relevant Ethics Committee) but have ethical components; IR(ME)R guides the 
practitioner in the justification of an inherently harmful procedure (exposure to ionising 
radiation) and defines when this can be carried out in the interest of the individual patient or in 
the interest of society. We may thus consider these guidelines as part of the ethical framework 
within which the clinician is working. For the generalist, they form part of the framework of 
principles within which decisions about patient care are made. For the most part I will take them 
as providing Rossian or pro tanto moral reasons for undertaking or refraining from actions and 
associating those reasons with certain features of situations clinicians might meet in their 
practice. For the particularist, they are an element of the advice which she might consider when 
                                                 
33 Blum comments “ ‘Virtue ethics’ is theoretically agnostic on the particularism issue – there could be a non-
particularist form of virtue ethics – but in general virtue theorists recognize that some virtues ... have an irreducibly 
particularist dimension” (Blum 2000 p203 footnote). Stangl thinks that particularist virtue ethicists are caught in a 
dilemma whilst recognising “There is an obvious affinity between virtue ethics and particularism” (Stangl 2008 
p665) 
Whilst I believe there is a strong resonance between the views of some virtue ethicists and the position of the 
particularist, this thesis is not the place to pursue that discussion. 
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making decisions about patient care, they will indicate actions with default moral values or 
features of situations which have default moral valences. 
5.4 Some illustrative examples  
So far in this thesis I have visited many illustrative ethical questions and dilemmas, I would like 
to discuss two real situations which arose in my practice in early stage clinical trials of novel 
radiolabelled agents in cancer treatment. I will also consider some questions raised by 
consideration of one of the UK’s main providers of guidelines. I will briefly outline the case 
studies in the following subsections and outline the ethical issues raised by each in §5.5. In §5.6 I 
will look at the generalist and the particularist practitioner and look at each of the case studies to 
identify whether these practitioners approach them differently, and if so, what differences this 
might lead to. 
The particular treatments my research group is mostly concerned with are known as molecular 
radio therapy (MRT) and molecular imaging (MI); they consist of injecting a patient with an 
agent which is designed to carry radioactivity to a particular molecular target associated with 
cancer. In general the agent is a construct of a targeting moiety and a molecular structure which 
holds an atom of a radioactive nuclide. The radioactive part of the construct may emit particles 
(alpha or beta radiation) intended to cause damage to the tumour as therapy (MRT) or it might 
emit gamma radiation which can be measured from outside the patient (MI) using Single Photon 
Emission Computed Tomography (SPECT) for calculating how much therapeutic radionuclide 
can be administered to the patient or if the patient is suitable for non-radioactive treatment 
aimed at the same molecular target. In order to make these measurements accurately a hybrid 
imaging system is used; this consists of a SPECT imaging subsystem linked to an X-ray CT 
imaging subsystem. Every imaging session (SPECT-CT) involves an exposure to X-radiation in 
addition to the absorbed radiation dose the patient receives from the radioactive agent itself. 
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5.4.1 Unnecessary exposure to ionising radiation 
In the first case we are setting up a clinical trial of an agent to assess whether patients with breast 
cancer who are being treated with Herceptin®34 should continue with the treatment or whether 
their cancer has mutated and no longer carries the necessary molecular target (HER2 receptor). 
In the early (Phase I35) trials we would like to establish the time course of the MI agent in normal 
organs and cancer deposits in man. The mathematics of the standard model of kinetics of drugs 
dictates that we will need measurements at five time points to establish the parameters for the 
time course. Establishing this time course will be of benefit to the scientific community as this is 
the first use of this type of agent in man; our aim is that it will be of benefit to future patients as 
we can establish the best time delay between administration and imaging; but it will offer no 
advantage to the patients undergoing the trial. These patients will, however, receive the X-ray 
absorbed dose from the five SPECT-CT imaging time points.  
In the case of this MI trial it is interesting to trace the chain of the ethical justification from the 
clinician who approves the actual administration to the patient to see where, and at what level, 
ethical justification is made. All medical exposure to ionising radiation is covered by the Ionising 
Radiation (Medical Exposures) Regulations Parliament 2000 (IR(ME)R), while these are a 
statutory instrument, they are helpful in setting out a framework of responsibilities for the 
medical use of ionising radiation, this framework can be of use in for investigating the ethical 
issues. IR(ME)R regulation 5(2) says 
                                                 
34 Herceptin® (trastuzumab) was approved for use in a certain patients (around 25% of all breast cancer patients) by 
the National Council for Clinical Excellence in 2002 (NICE 2002). It is a treatment (rather than a cure) which slows 
or stops the progression of the disease while it is being given. In 2006 The Times newspaper reported the cost as 
£20,000p.a., while Barrett A et al (Barrett et al. 2006) estimated the total cost of treatment at nearer £30,000p.a. given 
the pathology and cardiology tests required. There is thus a significant saving to be made, if patients who will no 
longer benefit are withdrawn from treatment. 
35 See Cancer Research UK’s website for details of cancer trial phases 
http://cancerhelp.cancerresearchuk.org/trials/types-of-trials/phase-1-2-3-and-4-trials 
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The practitioner shall be responsible for the justification of a medical exposure 
Regulation 5(2) 
where “practitioner” is defined by  
“practitioner” means a registered health care professional who is entitled in 
accordance with the employer’s procedures to take responsibility for an individual 
medical exposure  
Regulation 2(1) as amended 2006 
IR(ME)R allows for 
the exposure of patients or other persons voluntarily participating in medical or 
biomedical, diagnostic or therapeutic, research programmes 
Regulation 3d 
Under IR(ME)R no exposure can be made unless  
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it has been justified by the practitioner as showing a sufficient net benefit giving 
appropriate weight to the matters set out in paragraph (2) 
Regulation 6(1)a 
The matters referred to in paragraph (1)(a) are— 
the specific objectives of the exposure and the characteristics of the individual 
involved; 
the total potential diagnostic or therapeutic benefits, including the direct health 
benefits to the individual and the benefits to society, of the exposure; 
the individual detriment that the exposure may cause; and 
the efficacy, benefits and risk of available alternative techniques having the same 
objective but involving no or less exposure to ionising radiation. 
Regulation 6(2) 
Of particular interest in clinical trial exposure is 
In considering the weight to be given to the matters referred to in paragraph (2), the 
practitioner justifying an exposure pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) shall pay special 
attention to— 
... 
exposures that have no direct health benefit for the individuals undergoing the 
exposure;  
... 
Regulation 6(3) 
The DoH also publishes a document which “provides guidance on [IR(ME)R] 2000 (the 
Regulations) and notes on good practice” (DoH 2005). This document says, “The process of 
justification must ... pay special attention to the matters set out in regulation 6(3)”, and describes 
the practitioner as having responsibility for justifying medical exposure, further it says the 
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practitioner must be adequately trained to undertake this function. However it gives no extra 
guidance for the practitioner concerning the application of regulation 6(3). For the practitioner 
faced with authorising or declining a request for the exposures which will result from a patient 
being entered onto the trial, guidance from the DoH has run out at this point; the practitioner is 
left to decide how to “pay special attention” to the matters identified in Regulation 6(2) above. 
The practitioner can look for further guidance; in practice, in this case, to justify an individual 
exposure in a clinical trial the practitioner would look to see that the Local Research Ethics 
Committee has approved the trial; this committee will have acted on an application from the 
investigators. The practitioner also requires that the Administration of Radioactive Substances 
Advisory Committee have authorised him to approve the exposure. Part of the role of these two 
bodies it to assess whether the justification for the exposures offered by the investigators is 
reasonable. 
5.4.2 Unnecessary Biopsy 
The second case arose when we were setting up a protocol for an MRT trial. This is a Phase II 
trial and is expected to be effective in some patients. It would be scientifically worthwhile to 
look for differences between those patients in whom the treatment is effective and those in 
whom it is not; material obtained by biopsy would be useful in this context. Biopsy is not risk 
free (a study in 1995 showed complications requiring blood transfusion in 0.8% of patients and 
mortality in 0.3% Gilmore et al. 1995) and is of no benefit to the individual clinical trial subject. 
This case is less bound up in regulation. The patients entered on the trial might benefit from the 
treatment; however the cost of putting patients through these technologically advanced trials is 
relatively high (the total cost per patient of a similar recent trial was £47,80836). This cost is 
                                                 
36 “Full Economic Cost” per patient for a recent MTR clinical trial, charged by University College Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust. 
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justified to the funding bodies by the expectation of scientific progress; this expectation is 
considerably enhanced when the patient agrees to undergo biopsy. 
5.4.3 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) 
One major source of guidelines is The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. 
NICE performs a range of functions among which are 
NICE is here to help those working in the NHS, local authorities and the wider 
community deliver high-quality healthcare. 
... 
NICE's technology appraisals programme is designed to ensure that people across 
England and Wales have equal access to new and existing medicines that are deemed 
clinically and cost effective, reducing the risk of a postcode lottery of care. 
NICE 2012 
For the purpose of this thesis I will not discuss the ethical status of NICE and its 
recommendations (see, for example, Harris 2005 and Claxton and Culyer 2006 for this debate) 
but view it as a source of guidelines. 
One major aspect of NICE’s work can be seen as an application of the consequentialist calculus 
in the framework of a resource limited health service (the UK’s NHS). Essentially this asks how 
the country can make best use of the limited funding available to the NHS. Benefit is calculated 
in terms of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY), in 2008 the threshold cost for acceptable 
treatments was £30,000 per QALY (NICE Citizens Council 2010) with some leeway for 
particularly severe disease recommended by NICE’s Citizens Council. 
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NICE can then be seen as providing a generalist (consequentialist) answer to questions regarding 
the justice of offering particular treatments to patients with a particular disease or other 
condition.  
NICE recommendations are sometimes ignored, either to treat patients when the 
recommendation is that they should not be treated or to deny treatment when NICE 
recommends that a patient should be treated. An example of the latter was reported by Sky 
News in June 2011: 
In 2004, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (Nice) said couples 
should be given up to three cycles of IVF on the NHS, where the woman is aged 23 to 
39. 
... 
A new report from the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Infertility shows 73% of 
NHS trusts are failing to implement the guidance. 
Sky News 2011 
An example of the former is the prescribing of unlicensed medicines or the prescribing of 
medicines outside the terms of their license (so called “off-label” prescribing). 
Variations in adherence are common, in 2004 a report by the UK’s National Cancer Director 
noted: 
variation in usage does exist across the country and cannot be accounted for by 
differences in casemix and, for most drugs, is unlikely to be accounted for by cross 
boundary flows alone. 
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clinician factors - it appears that the use of drugs is heavily dependent on individual 
doctors’ perceived usefulness of the particular drugs and, in some cases, the choice 
between different drugs that exist.  
DoH 2004 
In 2001 NICE issued the guidance document TA19 which recommended that a drugs of a 
particular class (acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (AChEIs)) should not be used in mild Alzheimer’s 
disease (AD), but were recommended in moderate AD. 
Many clinicians were asked by relatives and carers of patients with mild AD to prescribe these 
drugs and the Alzheimer’s Society (www.alzheimers.org) campaigned for a change in the advice. 
In 2007 Wilkinson and Deas wrote of mild AD patients: 
There is an increasing body of evidence that the use of [these drugs] offers 
considerable respite from the more distressing aspects of the disease in this group of 
patients who are most in need of treatment. 
Wilkinson and Deas 2007 
 
5.5 Ethical issues 
The first two sections above (§5.4.1 and §5.4.2) describe situations which contain a procedure 
which is generally considered a harm (in the first case exposure to X-rays, in the second an 
invasive procedure with a risk of complication or mortality) which will not be of medical benefit 
to the subject. In this I am taking the risk of harm as being something which should be avoided 
if the principle of nonmaleficence is followed (the feature “that it could cause harm to the 
patient” has a negative pro tanto valence for the generalist or comes with a default negative 
valence for the particularist). Although this principle is generally expressed in terms of actual 
harm and can be taken as an expression of the doctrine of primum non nocere it seems reasonable 
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to extend from “do no harm” to “do not expose to risk of harm”.  Most patients who undergo 
X-ray exposure or biopsy do not suffer long term harm, but some do.  
The idea of altruism is often cited when the question of participation in early phase clinical trials 
is discussed. In that people undertaking altruistic acts feel better about themselves, allowing 
patients to participate in a trial can be seen as a potential good for a patient who would not 
otherwise benefit from the trial, however this does not apply to all patients: 
A systematic review of published literature examining patients' motivation to 
participate in clinical trials concludes that self interest is a more common reason for 
participating than altruism. 
Ellis 2000 
Patients in early phase clinical trials in cancer often express the hope that they will “the one”, i.e. 
that there will be clinical benefit in their case. For many patients undergoing these trials there is 
measurable harm without benefit to the subject. 
In the case of healthcare professionals acting against NICE guidelines there are two subgroups, 
In the first there is a loss of benefit to patients (not being given the recommended number of 
cycles of IVF), presumably for a perceived greater benefit of cost saving providing more 
resource for other patients (for the generalist the pro tanto right of infertile couples to a fair crack 
of the whip when it comes to IVF is balanced against the pro tanto rights of access to resources 
(in particular financial resources) for patients with other medical conditions, I will contrast this 
with the particularist’s view in the next section). In the second the clinicians prescribing against 
guidelines are offering potential benefit to particular patients at the potential loss of benefit to 
others if the drug budget runs out (a similar clash of pro tanto rights to access to resources is seen 
here). 
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5.6 The Particularist and the Generalist 
Is there a difference between the way a generalist would practice and the way a particularist 
would? 
5.6.1 Similarities 
Healthcare professionals work in a highly complex environment. The pharmacology and 
technology available to modern medicine can make the situations in which patient care decisions 
are made difficult to comprehend fully. As well as clinical decisions the physician may be faced 
with a range of diagnostic technologies, possible treatments etc all of which might have ethical 
implications for her decision as to what to offer or recommend to her patient. Within the 
context of this thesis this represents a very rich feature set and ethical considerations are one of 
several filters on the possible range of actions she might take. Some features will be represented 
in more than one filter. Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) does not employ ionising radiation 
and may be preferable to X-ray CT in that it is not generally thought to be a potential harm to 
patients, so imaging technology may be a feature included in the ethical filter, it is also better at 
seeing soft tissue in the neighbourhood of bone but is worse at seeing bones themselves so the 
diagnostic question filter may also influence the choice of imaging modality. 
In the very practical field of medical ethics the features which the particularist sees as relevant 
and those the generalist sees as relevant are likely to be very similar. It is probably that both will 
see the potential harm from ionising radiation as relevant but that neither will consider the 
colour of the patients’ shoelaces to be so. 
5.6.2 Differences 
It is reasonable to suppose that both particularist and generalist clinicians are attempting to do 
the right thing for their patients; however they might be expected to have different attitudes 
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towards ethical frameworks and guidelines. This difference is seen in the debate between Dancy 
(in “Ethics Without Principles”) and Hooker (in his paper “Moral Particularism: wrong and bad” 
in “Moral Particularism”) which is pertinent to the discussion of trust §6.2. Hooker considers a 
situation in which particularist Patty and (Rossian) generalist Gerry have both made the same 
promise: 
As a particularist, Patty thinks there are no considerations which always retain their 
moral polarity. She thinks that a consideration (such as the fact that she promised to 
do something) might be a reason for keeping her side of the deal in some situation, but 
a reason against keeping it in another situation. So, will she think that having made a 
promise to you gives her any reason to do what she promised? 
Hooker 2000 p18 (original emphasis) 
He answers his own question “Not necessarily”. On the other hand: 
[We] know that Gerry subscribes to the general principle that promise breaking is 
always a moral minus ... [No general] defeating conditions obtain in the case in hand. 
So Gerry would hold that breaking his promise to you is a moral minus. 
Admittedly, Gerry does not think that breaking his promise ... would necessarily be, all 
things considered, wrong. 
p19-20 
Hooker believes that we should think Gerry more likely to keep his promise; although Dancy 
does not dispute this assertion he says: 
Hooker writes that ‘whether or not particularism is likely to lead agents to make moral 
mistakes, the Rossian generalist seems in the circumstances more likely to keep the 
promise’ [p21]. But if the particularist Patty is making no mistake in not keeping her 
promise, that means that morality does not require her to keep it. If so, it does not 
require Gerry to keep it either. ... It seems then, that, Patty and Gerry will only differ 
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in their behaviour in cases where it is certain that Patty will do the right thing, and 
not at all certain that Gerry will. 
Dancy 2004 p134 
 
How is it that Dr Patty and Dr Geri37 (here the particularist and the generalist clinicians) might 
reach different conclusions about what is the right thing to do? In the case given above of the 
choice of drugs for a patient with mild AD Dr Geri would consider the NICE guidelines to be a 
pro tanto reason for not prescribing AChEIs. Once Wilkinson and Deas had published their 
analysis, she might consider this to be evidence of benefit to mild AD patients (a pro tanto reason 
to prescribe) and thus weigh the NICE guidelines against beneficence to decide what treatment 
to recommend. In parallel with Hooker’s Patty, Dr Patty might (in some circumstances) not 
think that the NICE guidelines give her any reason not to recommend AChEIs to a patient with 
mild AD. Dr Geri would always consider breaking NICE guidelines as a moral minus but might 
not think that it would necessarily be, all things considered, wrong. Dr Patty might think weaker 
evidence of effectiveness in mild AD (or no evidence at all if she believes her patients might 
benefit) would be sufficient to mean that NICE guidelines did not count. It does seem that Dr 
Geri is more likely to hold to the NICE guidelines and Dr Patty is more likely to offer AChEIs 
to mild AD patients. 
In the case of unnecessary exposure to X-radiation in the clinical trial example, Dr Geri will 
always consider IR(ME)R guidance to have ethical force although this might have a low weight 
in her final balancing of pro tanto considerations; Dr Patty can simply say such exposure does not 
count when patients do not have sufficient life expectancy for late effects of X radiation 
                                                 
37 For consistency I have made the doctors both female. 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
129 
 
exposure to be seen.38 Both might see the discomfort imposed on patients in late stage cancer, 
by subjecting them to multiple imaging sessions, to be a significant harm. 
 
5.6.3 Is the distinction meaningful at a practical level? 
The current model of ethical practice in medicine is very much a generalist one. It relies heavily 
on the writings of Beauchamp and Childress and the model of principalism.39 Guidelines play a 
strong part in interpreting this ethical framework for application in the clinic. Guidelines come 
from a variety of sources ranging from departmental policy, through hospital rules to DoH and 
NICE guidelines.  
The main concern of clinicians is the care of their patients. In this they can be forgiven for not 
wishing to spend a large portion of their professional time worrying about the ethical aspects of 
their clinical decisions. Whilst they wish to act within acceptable ethical boundaries, they are 
happy to have those boundaries set by people or bodies whose concern is the ethical 
implications of medical practice. In many cases then, “because a moral authority endorses Xing” 
is a reason for Xing. This reason works for both generalist (as a pro tanto reason) and particularist 
(as a default reason) agents. In their day to day practice both generalist and particularist clinicians 
could use this as a rule of thumb for staying within the boundary of acceptable practice. The 
ethically interesting cases occur when this reason fails. This moral authority rule of thumb might 
fail for one (or more) of several possible causes. For example, a new treatment option might 
raise ethical issues while it is not sufficiently mature to be subject to the guidelines. Alternatively 
                                                 
38 This ignores the legal duty on both physicians imposed by the IR(ME)R Statutory Instrument.  
39 I use “model” and “framework” here as I do not think that principalism is in and of itself a normative ethical 
theory; rather it should be seen as a template provided by some moral authority in his study to guide the medic in 
her clinic. 
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guidelines might offer conflicting advice. It is at such a point where we might expect differences 
between particularists and generalists emerge. I will examine the examples laid out above in the 
light of this analysis. 
5.6.4 Unnecessary exposure to ionising radiation 
The generalist approach to this can be seen as grounded on Kant and the Humanity Formula of 
the Categorical Imperative (Johnson 2010),  
So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in 
every case as an end withal, never as means only. 
Kant 1785a 
The generalist following Ross’s line will consider this as a strong pro tanto reason for not 
proceeding and will consider balancing reasons.  
In general the investigators in the clinical trial will not be the IR(ME)R practitioner but the legal 
responsibilities laid down here for the practitioner will help the generalist agent in weighing the 
pro tanto duties when developing an ethically acceptable protocol for this trial. The legal concept 
of the practitioner is not relevant here but the moral agent is indeed trying to justify the exposure 
on the grounds that the net benefits to society are sufficient to justify exposures that have no 
direct health benefit for the individuals undergoing the exposure. 
One potential source of guidance for the generalist will be the IR(ME)R guidelines. Initially 
IR(ME)R seems to lay out something like a Rossian process. He has pro tanto reasons for 
rejecting the proposal (that there is no benefit to the patient in undergoing the CT exposures, 
that all X-ray exposure increases the patient’s risk of developing new cancers40) and pro tanto 
reasons for approving the proposal (these are generally thought of in terms of the benefit to 
                                                 
40 The actual risk from low level X-radiation exposure is still a matter of debate, but the regulatory framework 
assumes that all exposure accumulates risk over a patient’s lifetime. 
 Alan J Green DMedEth 
131 
 
medical research which are ultimately regarded as a good for society). However IR(ME)R seems 
to run out at this point, leaving the practitioner to pay special attention to the exposure in this 
case as it has no benefit for the subject but not indicating how she should do so. 
When considering clinical trials and other experimental medicine Beauchamp and Childress look 
to the Declaration of Geneva: 
The Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Association affirms that “the health of 
my patient will be my first consideration”, and the Physician’s Oath of this same 
association demands that “Concern for the interests of the subject [of research] must 
always prevail over the interests of science and society”. 
Beauchamp and Childress 2001 p319 
At first sight this seems more Kant than Ross, but B&C draw a distinction between two roles for 
the physician: the physician acting as clinician and the physician acting as investigator. The 
Declaration of Geneva gives a clear statement of the clinician’s duty, but this becomes a pro tanto 
duty for the physician who also has pro tanto duties as investigator: 
As an investigator, the physician acts to generate scientific knowledge to benefit 
individual patients in the future. ... 
Research involving human subjects is socially important but morally perilous. ... 
Ethically justified research must satisfy several conditions, including (1) a reasonable 
prospect that the research will generate the knowledge that is sought, (2) the 
necessity of using human subjects, (3) a favourable balance of potential benefits over 
risks to the subjects, and (4) fair selection of subjects. 
B&C p319-320 
This does provide a clearer statement of  how the various features of the situation bring pro tanto 
duties to bear on the overall final decision; most of these can be dealt with in a reasonably 
concise way: 
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(1) The research question is well formulated: “Can we distinguish HER2 +ve tumour masses 
from HER2 –ve masses by external imaging using this agent?” The relevant technology is 
understood and interpretation of the results is not expected to be different from interpretation 
of results in similar established procedures. 
(2) By the time we are ready to open the study for patients41 the agent will have been shown to 
be effective in animal models of human breast cancer and no further non-human testing will 
answer the research question. 
(3) See below. 
(4) Patients from the group of patients expected to benefit from the research in the future will 
be invited to participate. 
Item 3 looks at the conflicting pro tanto duties. A simple cost-benefit analysis of potential benefit 
to many “individual patients in the future” versus the potential harm for the individual trial 
subjects does not give the weight to the duty of care for the subject that B&C, citing the 
Declaration of Geneva, require. In balancing these risks the IR(ME)R framework ensures that 
the risk to the subject is minimised (the lowest radiation  absorbed dose consistent with 
achieving the required data), and the protocol design is aimed at ensuring the most future 
patients benefit (the requirement for five imaging time points to make the best model of the 
uptake and clearance of the agent will ensure optimal imaging for future patients). The generalist 
may next look to the past to see what protocols have been judged ethically acceptable. Simply by 
the nature of clinical research this study differs from previous studies in significant ways, there is 
then always some difference in the nonmoral features of the situations and there need be no 
                                                 
41 The length of time taken to negotiate the regulations in order to open a clinical trial mean that the protocol is 
often developed in parallel to much of the pre-clinical work and amended as necessary, rather than waiting for the 
pre-clinical results to be ready before starting setting up the trial. 
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algorithmic precedent set. A less strict study of precedent might help find elements of protocols 
which have been judged acceptable and elements which have not in past studies. 
In concluding their section on clinical trials42 B&C do not provide any fixed rule for determining 
how one can balance individual risk with collective benefit: 
Our obligations to future patients are so strong that we should permit, encourage and 
support research that can generate knowledge, but do so without violating the rights 
and interests of current patients.  
B&C p327 
In the end, it seems that the generalist can run out of guidelines, rules and principles and she 
must weigh the pro tanto duties in the light of her moral experience. 
The particularist will see the same set of features defining the situation and is also subject to 
IR(ME)R regulations, however she may not see the same features as relevant, as the generalist 
does. In the case under discussion the particularist looks at the question of the unnecessary X-
ray doses and argues that the reason for controlling X-ray doses at this level is the possibility of 
later developing cancers (that an exposure to X-rays would have no benefit for the patient would 
be a default reason not to make the exposure), this is an early phase trial so that the patients 
invited to take part in the trial are late stage breast cancer patients whose life expectancy is less 
than five years, new cancers resulting from the X-ray absorbed doses would not show up on this 
time scale. The default reason becomes no reason at all in this case and the question of X-ray 
exposure is not relevant and need not be considered when justifying this trial. 
The particularist is looking to her own judgement to decide which features of the situation are 
relevant to the ethical acceptability of the trial. In this she is using the holism of reasons (“A 
                                                 
42 Much of B&C’s section on clinical trials is concerned with randomised trials undertaken from a position of 
equipoise, which is not the case here. 
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feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all ... in another”) to see that the feature 
“the procedure gives rise to an exposure to X-radiation” may be a reason to ensure there is net 
benefit to the individual patient in most cases where the procedure is considered, but it is not a 
reason in this case. The generalist might consider unnecessary radiation exposure always to be a 
consideration albeit one with a low weight, or she might increase the specification of the rule 
“avoid unnecessary radiation exposure” to “avoid unnecessary radiation exposure in patients 
who have a reasonable expectation of living long enough for the effects of that exposure to be 
seen”, the specification is the development of a rule for balancing the pro tanto duties, giving a 
low weight to the feature “the exposure will not benefit the patient” when the feature “the 
patient’s life expectancy is too short for any disbenefit to manifest” is also present). 
5.6.5 Conflict in biopsy case 
In this case a strict absolutist deontologist line would rule out the biopsy option for the trial; the 
biopsy offers no benefit to the patient and undertaking it is treating the patient as a means to an 
end (the acquisition of scientific data). The Rossian generalist following the four principles must 
weigh autonomy, nonmaleficence and benefit to society.  
Nonmaleficence and benefit to society are both fairly clear features and are an obvious source 
for ethical conflict here. If all patients have a biopsy then there will be a significant amount of 
material available to provide scientific data for the benefit of society, however all those patients 
will have been put at risk without benefit to themselves. As stated in §5.5, I am taking the harm 
due to a biopsy to be the risk of complication not the simple harm of cutting the skin etc 
inherent to a minor surgical procedure.  
The patient’s autonomy must be protected by ensuring they are fully informed as part of the 
consent procedure. In clinical trials patients are generally given an information sheet where the 
risks and benefits are clearly set out, usually they are invited to discuss anything they do not 
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understand before deciding whether to participate. Some patients have a desire to participate in 
trials on an altruistic basis while some want to participate under the belief that they might benefit 
from the treatment. The former group are simpler for the generalist to deal with, as long as they 
understand the level of risk and thus their decision is fully autonomous, thus autonomy will carry 
considerable weight in the decision. The latter case is more problematic, this is a Phase II trial so 
some patients are expected to benefit, and it is at the level where some patients benefit that 
biopsy material is particularly useful. However those patients who benefit will do so whether or 
not they undergo biopsy. So the line of reasoning It was agreed that the consent documents 
should not open the way for patients to think “taking part in the trial involves having a biopsy, I 
might benefit from the trial, therefore I might benefit if I accept the biopsy” as the relies on the 
premise that the biopsy is a necessary part of the trial.  
The feature set being examined by the research group contained a wide variety of elements 
including: 
F1: Subjects have a limited life expectancy without treatment. 
F2: No conventional treatment is available. 
F3: This is a Phase II trial so some patients are expected to benefit. 
F4: We cannot predict which patients would benefit. 
F5: Biopsy would help decide which future patients would benefit. 
F6: Biopsy offers no benefit to the subjects. 
F7: Biopsy exposes subjects to risk. 
F1-4 provides pro tanto reasons to offer a patient a place on the trial; F5 a pro tanto reason to ask 
them to undergo a biopsy; and F6-7 a pro tanto reason not to ask them to undergo a biopsy. In this 
case the particularist cannot argue that the risk to the patient does not count (as she could in the 
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X-ray exposure case) as the risk is more immediate and the patient’s life expectancy could be 
enhanced by the treatment. 
One proposed option was that acceptance onto the trial should be conditional on consent to 
biopsy. The reasoning put forward was that these patients had a chance of benefit not available 
to those not on the trial, the trial would be expensive to run so the best use of money was to 
maximise scientific benefit: 
F8: Phase II trials are expensive. 
Those who proposed this were appealing to justice to provide a pro tanto reason to ask all 
patients to undergo a biopsy. 
  
An argument was proposed that the trial protocol be written in such a way that a decision 
whether or not to ask a patient to undergo biopsy should be made when the decision whether or 
not to invite the patient to participate in the trial was made (usually at the Multidisciplinary 
Team43 (MDT) meeting). The MDT would decide on an individual patient basis from a 
sufficiently detached standpoint. This accepts that deciding for an abstract patient is not possible 
and the feature set is still too thin; the decision requires a thicker feature set, which must include 
patient specific features, for the correct action to be identified.  
A faction I class as generalist were in favour of defining a list of reasons for deciding which 
patients should be in the biopsy group and which not. Features such as, “The patient lives a long 
way away”, “The patient is close to feeling he has had enough discomfort” and, “The patient has 
a young family” were proposed for inclusion in this list. A faction I class as particularist were 
                                                 
43 Current best practice in cancer care is based on the Multi Disciplinary Team concept; see for example the Cancer 
Care Network handbook “The Characteristics of an Effective Multidisciplinary Team (MDT)” 
(ncat.nhs.uk/sites/default/files/NCATMDTCharacteristics.pdf) 
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opposed to defining such a list; for them the MDT should choose patients to be offered a place 
on the trial, but the decision concerning biopsy would be made by the individual doctor when 
interviewing the patient prior to offering them a place on the trial. They argued that it would not 
be possible to define such a list as we could not know in advance which features would be 
important. 
5.6.6 The difference between the generalist position and the 
particularist here is in whether the features which distinguish 
those who should be invited to undergo biopsy can be 
defined “up front” and built into the protocol; the 
particularist will reject this attempt as being against the 
holism of reasons.NICE  
The guidelines produced by NICE can be seen as resulting from a consequentialist analysis and 
thus as a guide to the just action when deciding which (if any) drugs or treatment should be 
prescribed for patients suffering from certain conditions in certain situations.44 Accepting that 
NICE’s remit is to see the big picture, I will take it that their recommendations define the just 
action and thus will always have a positive moral valence for the generalist clinician. Nonetheless 
variations in adherence are common as was noted in §5.4.3. 
Both generalist and particularist clinicians can use the literature and the reports which are pooled 
to provide the evidence for “meta-analysis”, such as the paper by Wilkinson and Deas cited 
above, in their feature set when deciding whether to break the NICE guidelines. For the 
                                                 
44 There are many who would argue with this statement, but for the purpose of this thesis I will take it to be a 
reasonable statement of the aim of NICE. 
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generalist this paper provides strong evidence of benefit to mild AD sufferers and they can 
weigh the beneficence of prescribing these drugs against the justice of not doing so. The 
generalist has to wait for sufficiently strong evidence to be available (here a peer reviewed meta-
analysis of several small studies) for beneficence to acquire the weight needed to overcome the 
pull of the NICE advice. The particularist clinician is able to act earlier on her moral insight, or 
on the weak evidence of one of the papers pooled by Wilkinson and Deas, that her mild AD 
patient will benefit from her not following NICE guidance. This case seems most similar to the 
scenario discussed in §5.6.2 and we see the generalist clinician as more predictable in following 
NICE guidelines but the particularist less likely (in an extension of Dancy’s view) to make a 
moral mistake.45 
5.7 Becoming an experienced agent 
In Chapter 4 I looked at the relationships between naivety and experience, and the thinness and 
thickness of principles, and how these interact in action guidance.  
In discussing the role of experience I have tried to avoid the question of whether experience can 
guide the particularist at the most basic level of morality. Does the particularist learn from 
experience that killing innocent people is wrong by default, or that ceteris paribus, the feature “it 
will bring pleasure” will have a positive moral valence? (See also §6.3.2.1.) I am more concerned 
to see how experience allows moral agents to understand how the features of complex (thick) 
situations interact to give moral values to possible courses of action; I have referred to this 
loosely as developing moral insight. 
When guidance from what I called “algorithmic deontology” (§3.4) runs out the generalist 
clinician still needs to act and must make up her mind what to do; in this situation there is little 
                                                 
45 In 2007 NICE issued revised guidelines (TA111) with a further revision in 2011 (TA217).  The drugs discussed in 
the text are now recommended as options for managing mild as well as moderate AD.  
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difference between the particularist and the generalist. Hard line generalists might argue that in 
principle the principles do not run out, in practice it seems that they do; for instance IR(MR)R 
guidance (as discussed in §5.4.1) says the physician must be adequately trained to make the 
decision. 
A difference might arise between particularist and generalist if the particularist is used to making 
decisions whereas the generalist is used to principle based guidance. The particularist is better 
equipped to deal with practical guidance running out. The generalist, on the other hand will be 
more experienced at finding and interpreting what guidance there is. 
5.8 Trust 
I will conclude this chapter by returning briefly to the topic of trust, preparatory to a longer 
discussion in the next chapter.  
In seeking advice and treatment from a doctor the patient is inherently placing his trust in the 
professionals in the healthcare system. The doctor-patient relationship is based on this trust; the 
doctor (explicitly or implicitly) agrees to being trustworthy. 
Elaborate measures to ensure that people keep agreements and do not betray trust 
must, in the end, be backed by - trust. At some point we just have to trust. There is, I 
think, no complete answer to the old question: 'who will guard the guardians?'. On the 
contrary, trust is needed precisely because all guarantees are incomplete. Guarantees 
are useless unless they lead to a trusted source, and a regress of guarantees is no 
better for being longer unless it ends in a trusted source. 
O'Neill 2002a p6 (original italics) 
This quotation from O’Neill serves to remind us that trust can lead to a source; the person 
sitting opposite the patient in the consulting room is not necessarily the one ultimately being 
trusted. Many forms of trust might be involved: trust in the research scientists who develop 
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drugs and publish the results of clinical trials, trust in the skills of the laboratory technicians who 
perform the various diagnostic procedures. Here I am concerned with trust in the ethical 
decision makers. 
5.8.1 Trust the writers of guidelines 
Under a fully generalist scheme it is not clear who the public would be trusting. A trusts his 
doctor to prescribe the best treatment for his condition. If the doctor follows NICE guidelines, 
there is a chain of trust from A, via the doctor, to the NICE committee who considered the use 
of the relevant drugs: 
Every piece of NICE guidance and every NICE quality standard is developed by an 
independent committee of experts including clinicians, patients, carers and health 
economists. 
 All of our guidance is considered and approved by the NICE Guidance Executive, a 
committee made up of NICE executive directors, guidance centre directors and the 
communications director, prior to publication. 
 Our Citizens Council, comprising 30 members of the public, provides NICE with advice 
that reflects the public's perspective on what are often challenging social and moral 
issues raised by NICE guidance. 
NICE 2012 
The doctor might have seen reports of compelling evidence that weighs against the NICE 
guidelines and may follow a process of specification which could result in her not following 
those guidelines.  
5.8.2 Trust doctors 
The system of trust is shorter and clearer under particularism. A again trusts his doctor, but here 
the doctor considers the features of the situation, these will include the NICE guidelines, any 
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evidence to the contrary and the individual patient’s needs. She will make a decision about what 
course to recommend. The particularist doctor does not rely on an adequate supply of principles 
to behave ethically. 
5.9 Conclusions 
In many cases both doctors will reach the same conclusion and make the same recommendation. 
However we are here concerned to identify the differences between particularism and generalism 
in medicine.  
What then will be the differences between a generalist and a particularist approach? 
By extension of Hooker’s analysis, the generalist is more likely to follow guidelines; he is not 
necessarily bound by these guidelines but he will always regard them as being reasons in favour 
of choosing the recommended course of action. These guidelines can come from a variety of 
sources (such as medical ethics text books (I have considered the “four principles” interpretation 
of Beauchamp and Childress as the primary example of these in this chapter), national and local 
guidelines and professional web sites).  
By extension from Dancy, the particularist does not need a supply of guidelines and will regard 
them holistically in that they might not count in any particular situation. Dancy’s position is that 
the generalist might be expected to behave more consistently but that the particularist will be 
more likely to behave ethically correctly. 
In the next chapter I will look at the differences between these positions with regard to the trust 
a patient requires in the medical profession. 
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6 Generalism and Particularism in Practice 
“I never trust people's assertions, I always judge of them by their actions.” Ann Radcliffe 
6.1 Introduction 
In much of this chapter I will use trust as an ethical feature of interest for the discussion of the 
differences between the particularist and the generalist practitioner. In “Moral Particularism: Bad 
and Wrong” (Hooker 2000 p1-22) Hooker questions how much one can trust a particularist. If 
being a particularist makes an agent’s trustworthiness questionable then this is a significant 
problem for particularist doctors.  
Trust is central in the doctor patient relationship (and, by extension, the relationship of the 
patient to other professions in modern medicine). There is much talk in current medical practice 
of the autonomy of the patient backed by informed consent; for a patient to be able to give 
informed consent he must have access to relevant information. Although many sources of 
information are available in modern society a primary source for patients is their doctor. For 
instance, a patient can look up alternative forms of treatment on the internet but this will often 
be based on the diagnosis given to him by his doctor. For patients to give consent they must 
have trust in the information underlying that consent. Based on my argument (§3.3) that finally 
trust is an interaction between people, the patient must be able to trust that the doctor has 
provided sufficient true relevant information for him to make the required decisions.  
Again, if a patient consents to any procedure, be it allowing the doctor to listen to his heart with 
a stethoscope, give him an injection or perform open heart surgery, he is trusting the doctor to 
have the relevant skills to undertake the procedure competently and with as little risk to the 
patient as is reasonably practicable. 
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I will propose that to trust the particularist46 is to place trust directly in the individual practitioner 
whereas to trust the generalist is to place trust in the system of guidelines and standard 
procedures (and thus in the committees of the great and the good who develop and publish 
those documents). I will then propose that if particularism is correct, then this will have 
implications for how healthcare professionals are taught medical ethics. 
6.2 Trust 
At the time of writing there is much discussion of trust in Britain. Politicians, bankers and 
journalists are all subjects of reports of wrong-doing of one sort or another, following several 
high profile cases. In 2011 only 17% of those surveyed said they would trust government 
ministers to tell the truth; at 88% doctors have retained their status as the most trusted 
professionals in the UK (Ipsos Mori 2011).  I will look at the examples introduced in §5.4 to see 
how a patient’s trust is affected by the different approaches of the particularist and the generalist 
6.2.1 Risks in Clinical Trials 
The clinical trials discussed in §5.4.1 and 5.4.2 are performed on patients suffering from the 
relevant type of cancer, in early phase trials these patients will have undergone normal “standard 
of care” treatments before being referred for assessment for suitability for participation in the 
trial. Many of these patients, then, are especially vulnerable, many will be desperate for the 
medical profession to find something else to offer them when standard treatments have failed. 
Patients and their relatives trust professionals to keep risks at acceptable levels, in the 
development of new cancer treatments this is done by a system of pre-clinical (“bench-top” and 
animal) experiments which allow a reasonable estimation of potential effectiveness and potential 
                                                 
46 The generalist and the particularist are here the idealised generalist who always follows the guidelines, and 
particularist who always sees the guidelines from the holistic viewpoint. 
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adverse events. Moving into the clinical phase of trials, Phase I trials involve starting with a dose 
of the proposed therapeutic agent which is below the level expected to show therapeutic 
advantage or adverse effect. Phase I trials are generally dose escalation trials where the 
administered dose is increased until a predefined level of severe adverse events, or a predefined 
effectiveness, is seen; safe levels for administration and identification of side effects are usually 
the primary goal of Phase I trials. Phase II trials follow successful Phase I trials and their primary 
goal is to look for statistically sound evidence of effectiveness. 
The trial described in §5.4.2 is a Phase I trial. In this case, at this stage of development of the 
targeting agent, the aim is to use it for diagnostic imaging, so that the expected outcome is either 
a level where adverse events are seen or a level where there is sufficient differential uptake of the 
agent that diagnostic quality images can be obtained. 
The research group finally had to choose between two proposed protocols for the trial. Both 
involved the same dose escalation regime. The first protocol had one imaging time point set at 
the time expected to be most likely to give diagnostic quality images based on the results of the 
pre-clinical studies. The second protocol involved five imaging time points to allow for kinetic 
modelling of the time course of the agent in tumour and normal tissues. 
The argument in favour of a single imaging time point is based on putting the patient to as little 
discomfort as possible and giving them as low as possible a radiation absorbed dose, whilst still 
getting the minimum information required from the trial: can we achieve acceptable image 
quality without significant side effects? 
The principal argument in favour of the complex trial is that this will be the first systemic use in 
man of a protein of this type and much valuable scientific information for future uses of such 
proteins can be gained from the measurements at multiple time points. Justification for the more 
complex trial was split between two camps. On one hand were those who were concerned to 
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ensure that sufficient “net benefit” (see discussion of IR(ME)R) §5.4.1) could be seen by the 
practitioner (the physician who would finally approve the administration of the trial agent to the 
individual patients) for him or her to agree with the justification for the exposure. The fact that 
these patients were taking part in a Phase I clinical trial in cancer, and their life expectancy was 
less than a year, was seen to reduce the weight given to increased radiation exposure, as late 
effects would not be seen on that time scale. Although no diagnostic or therapeutic benefit to 
the trial subjects could be expected, the net benefit to society from having data on a new class of 
proteins for in vivo use in man were thought to be considerable, giving a strong positive weight to 
giving the exposure. IR(ME)R paragraph 6(2)d gave rise to the option for SPECT imaging 
without CT. This is an older technique which gives qualitative images with considerably poorer 
quantitative accuracy, but does not involve the extra X-radiation exposure of SPECT/CT. On 
the other hand a group of those present saw scientific merit in the complex trial but thought the 
radiation exposure to the patients simply had no bearing due to their clinical condition. Both 
groups felt the increased time on the imaging couch was relevant and that this should form part 
of the discussion when patients were invited to join the trial (including a visit to the imaging 
suite and a chance to test the couch before consenting to the trial).  
In the discussion of justification for the complex trial, the first group are taking a largely 
generalist stance and using a set of guidelines to identify and weigh the relevant features from 
the feature set which defines this trial. The second group’s assertion that increased exposure had 
no bearing is (in the terms of earlier chapters) a statement that in these patients radiation 
absorbed dose at these levels does not count in the decision. This group are taking a largely 
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particularist stance. Although those identified as generalist and those as particularist reached this 
position by different routes, in the end all agreed to the complex protocol.47 
A patient considering a place on this trial is trusting that she will not be placed at undue risk by 
taking part. Under the generalist analysis, this trust is ultimately placed in the developers of the 
IR(ME)R regulations. These were brought into force in 2000 to implement the European 
Directive 97/43/Euratom (The Medical Exposures Directive) (EEC 1997) and are overseen by 
the Care Quality Commission (“the independent regulator of health and adult social care services 
in England” The Care Quality Commission 2012). All of this represents a large bureaucratic 
framework but it is difficult to find who actually has the expertise to write guidelines for 
justifying radiation exposure. In general the patient relies on a committee of “the great and the 
good” to have developed the guidelines and the local research team to have applied them in her 
best interests. 
 Under the particularist analysis, the patient is trusting the collective opinion of the research 
team.  
Looking at the second example case, three questions were raised concerning biopsy. Firstly 
should every patient be asked to undergo a biopsy when entering the trial? Secondly, if not, how 
should the biopsy group be chosen? Thirdly, should entry onto the trial for those asked to 
undergo a biopsy be conditional on agreeing to the biopsy?  
                                                 
47 The participants in the discussions described were a mixture of medical doctors, research nurses, research 
scientists and clinical trial administrators. To the best of my knowledge none of participants (apart from me) has 
studied the particularist/generalist debate. I have characterised them as particularists and generalists based on the 
opinions they expressed in the debates. This is similar to the proposal expressed in the quotation from Hare in §2.2 
of understanding a man’s moral principles from what he does. I have taken the arguments put forward by the 
participants at face value and have assumed that by saying “A bit of extra X-ray dose really doesn’t matter here” the 
doctor in question is making a particularist statement that this feature does not count, rather than a generalist 
statement that it is a low risk and should have a low weight in the decision. 
These are by no means exhaustive descriptions of possible generalist or particularist positions in the situations and 
are more akin to the Patty/Gerry characterisations in the Hooker-Dancy debate on promise keeping. I believe they 
can serve to allow me to discuss the issue of trust for the patient entering the trials. 
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The first question seemed to provoke more debate between different generalist factions than 
between generalists and particularists. This debate centred on the cost of the trial.  This trial is 
funded by donations from several small charities and the cost:benefit ratio was taken to have two 
aspects, one concerned with the benefit in the trial at hand and one concerned with the benefit 
to scientific progress. The cost per patient without biopsy was significantly less than the cost 
with, so more patients could be recruited for the same pool of money, thus increasing the 
statistical strength of the trial while sacrificing wider scientific knowledge. It was agreed that this 
knowledge would be valuable but that sufficient knowledge could be gained by biopsying around 
30% of patients recruited onto the trial. Those of a more particularist disposition simply said it 
would not matter if the protocol stipulated all patients should undergo biopsy as clinical 
decisions in individual cases would overrule the protocol and it would be counterproductive to 
then exclude other data from non-biopsied patients from the main trial analysis. 
The second question divided more between those I characterise as generalists and those I 
characterise as particularist. The generalists were in favour of writing a list of criteria for deciding 
which patients should be asked to undergo biopsy, these criteria would be used at the MDT 
meeting when deciding whether to invite a patient to participate in the trial and, if so, whether to 
ask them to undergo biopsy. The particularists argued for looser wording in the protocol to 
allow the MDT greater freedom of action, particularly in not asking a patient to undergo biopsy 
where it was felt it would be against the patient’s interest for unforeseen reasons as many 
patients feel pressured to agree to such optional procedures. Further the particularists wanted to 
include a clause in the protocol to allow the clinician undertaking the first trial consultation with 
the patient to overrule the MDT decision if s/he thought it appropriate to do so. The examples 
given by the particularist group were concerned with patient specific features such as a patient 
not being asked to undergo biopsy who has spoken with another patient on the trial and is really 
keen to volunteer for this aspect of the trial; or a patient due to be asked to undergo biopsy who 
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turns out to be the sole carer for pre-school children; it was argued that an exhaustive list of 
such factors was not possible.  
The third question was quickly decided as all thought it would be unjust to exclude patients on 
the grounds that they would not consent to biopsy, especially when some patients entered the 
trial without being asked to undergo biopsy. This being a Phase II trial some patients are 
expected to benefit from participation. 
The difference between the two groups can be characterised as how close to the patient the 
decision would be made. Under the generalist approach the research group would develop a 
system based on generalist rules to decide whether or not the patient should be included in the 
biopsy group; these rules will guide the MDT and thus the doctor discussing the trial with her. 
The particularist approach is to allow the decision to be made much closer to the patient. The 
doctor interviewing the patient has to form an opinion based on her understanding of the 
patient’s situation and desires. 
6.2.2 Adherence to NICE Guidelines 
Nice guidelines can be overridden by generalists who see some other feature in a situation as 
outweighing the guidelines or by a particularist who thinks that the guidelines operate holistically 
and in some circumstances do not count as a reason for suggesting or for refraining from 
suggesting some course of treatment. 
When NICE guidelines are followed, the patient is relying on those who wrote the guidelines. 
NICE maintains an open and transparent way of working: the evidence and those who assess it, 
are easily findable on their web site (http://www.nice.org.uk). The patient might reasonably ask 
what NICE is guiding her doctor to do. 
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NICE's technology appraisals programme is designed to ensure that people across 
England and Wales have equal access to new and existing medicines that are deemed 
clinically and cost effective, reducing the risk of a postcode lottery of care. 
NICE 2012 
In the IVF case there is conflict between NICE guidelines and local NHS Trust policies. Both 
particularist and generalist are able to consider the best interests of the individual patient. There 
seems to be little practical difference between the generalist seeing NICE guidelines and the 
NHS Trust policy as providing different pro tanto guidance, and deciding that the patient’s 
interests (represented be consideration of beneficence) come down on this side or that, and the 
particularist seeing these three features holistically and making the same decision.  
With the generalist clinicians the patient’s trust is placed on various people in a structured way. 
The first node is the clinician who has to decide whether or not to offer a third course of 
treatment; to do this she is choosing between pro tanto guidance to undertake one of two 
different courses of action. These always count in the generalist scheme, so the patient relies on 
the guideline writers not only to have written the guidelines but to have presented them so that 
the clinician discussing options with the patient can weigh them against other pro tanto guidance. 
The particularist clinician will see the features of the situation holistically and the patient here is 
trusting the doctor in a much more straightforward way.   
As I said in §5.6.6 the mild AD case seems more likely to produce different actions from the two 
doctors. I think the difference can be illustrated by consideration of when each clinician decides 
to breach NICE guidelines and prescribe AChEIs. When presented with a mild AD patient the 
generalist is unlikely to think the pro tanto guidance from NICE can be outweighed without 
strong evidence, such as that provided by the meta-analysis paper (Wilkinson and Deas 2007). 
The particularist might decide much weaker evidence is sufficient. In the promise breaking 
example used by Hooker and Dancy, Hooker asks, “If Patty would really live by such beliefs, 
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how much could you trust her?” (Hooker 2000 p18). For Dancy Patty would only differ from 
Gerry “in cases where it is certain [she] will do the right thing” (Dancy 2004 p134), so, in this 
case it is reasonable to ask what the patient is trusting the doctor to do. A patient (or more likely 
in AD, a relative) might want the doctor always to prescribe AChEIs, but neither clinician can be 
relied on to do this. In parallel with the Hooker-Dancy exchange, the generalist can be trusted to 
be more likely to follow the NICE guidelines whereas the particularist is more likely to breach 
these in favour of the needs of the individual patient. On selfish grounds the patient with AD 
(or their relative) might prefer the particularist, while the next patient in the waiting room who is 
waiting for a hip replacement in a cash-strapped NHS might prefer the doctor who is less likely 
to spend money against NICE advice. 
6.2.3 Trust in GP 
The Hooker-Dancy exchange raises the question of what we trust doctors to do. The opinion 
poll referred to in §6.2 asked the interviewees “would you tell me if you generally trust them to 
tell the truth, or not?", this is not the same as trusting the doctor to act in my best interest when 
NICE indicate that the morally correct action would be against my self interest.  
If the above analysis is correct the patient can expect the generalist doctor to be more likely to 
adhere to guidelines, which is to say she would see the guidelines always as a reason; the patient 
would expect the particularist doctor to be more likely to see all features of the situation 
holistically such that some features might mean the guidelines are no reason.  
For the self interested patient in the case of AD it seems that he is more likely to receive the 
drugs which might help his condition from the particularist doctor. However in the IVF case the 
self interested patient who would like the maximum number of treatments might be more likely 
to receive them from the generalist doctor following NICE guidelines than from a particularist 
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who thinks that the guidelines are no reason after two treatments when there are other calls on 
available resources. 
Less self interested patients want to trust their doctors not only to tell the truth but to do the 
right thing. It is in the interpretation of “the right thing” that a difference between generalists 
and particularists becomes apparent. The right thing for the generalist is that which follows the 
guidelines as closely as possible or which sees the different guidelines as presenting pro tanto 
duties to be weighed when recommending a course of action (or a choice of courses of action) 
to the patient. The particularist will see these recommendations by the guidelines as based on 
some features of the situation and may draw the same conclusion as the generalist, but she will 
view the situation holistically and might see the guidelines as default reasons but in a particular 
situation she may see them as no reason to recommend a course of action depending on other 
features. 
For the patient to trust the generalist doctor he must trust the chain by which the guidelines are 
reached. In a particularist world the patient trusts the doctor more directly. He trusts her to see 
the situation holistically, to understand which features count and which do not. For Hooker the 
generalist is more consistent but Dancy says the particularist will only differ from the generalist 
where the generalist would make a moral mistake by following the guidelines. For the patient to 
trust the particularist doctor he must believe the doctor’s understanding of the ethical features is 
well developed and correct. 
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6.3 Ethical Development 
Medical training includes one or more courses on “Medical Ethics”. Nursing degrees generally 
include an introduction to ethics.48  Although there is, in general, no explicit training in 
professional ethics for non-medical clinical scientists,49 the body which issues certificates of 
proficiency which allow them to practice includes in its required attainments, “Understanding of 
the legal and ethical requirements of the modality, and the ethical aspects of scientific research”. 
6.3.1 Generalist nature 
Medical ethics is often taught around the “four principles approach” attributed to Beauchamp 
and Childress but more explicitly stated by Gillon who 
[hypothesises and argues] that "the four principles of medical ethics" can explain and 
justify, alone or in combination, all the substantive and universalisable claims of 
medical ethics and probably of ethics more generally. 
Gillon 2003 p307. 
The four principles are often described as being like four part harmony, so that each “voice” will 
dominate in different circumstances, and indeed sometimes producing disharmony when the 
principles conflict. Gillon prefers a more complex analogy: 
                                                 
48 For example the description of the Nursing Degree on Southampton University’s web site says “You will be 
introduced to the key sciences in nursing ..., as well as topics such as assessment, care planning, communication, law 
and ethics. 
49 I apologise for the confusing terminology; holders of medical degrees are sometimes referred to as “clinicians”, 
“clinically trained” or “medically trained”, so that biochemists, pharmacists, physicists etc working within health 
care are sometimes referred to as “clinical scientists” and sometimes as “non-clinical scientists”. 
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But I think the four principles should also be thought of as the four moral nucleotides 
that constitute moral DNA-capable, alone or in combination, of explaining and 
justifying all the substantive and universalisable moral norms of health care ethics and 
I suspect of ethics generally! 
(original punctuation) Gillon 2003 p308 
However, whatever the analogy, the way the approach is presented is as a generalist system, 
where the problem is to interpret the rules in line with the situation to achieve ethical guidance. 
As I have discussed, one way in which this interpretation can be achieved is through training in 
the use and interpretation of guidelines.  
 
6.3.1.1 Guidelines 
 The GMC publishes guidelines for Good Medical Practice (GMP) and has an interactive web 
site (GMC 2012c). This web site offers doctors a range of scenarios (20 in total in December 
2012, but more are added as they are developed).  
One scenario from module 1 concerns a patient who is a student (“Katy”) who has taken illegal 
drugs and is now unable to sleep due to anxiety attacks; the patient asks for diazepam (a 
tranquiliser) to help her sleep. The web site the offers a set of three possible courses of action, 
clicking on one of these will navigate to the GMC’s opinion of that response, e.g. for “refuse to 
provide treatment for Katy unless she agrees to settle down and not take any more illegal drugs” 
the web site says “This would not be in line with GMC guidance” and provides an explanation 
for why not. The other two possible answers are within GMC guidelines, although one is 
preferred over the other. A set of references to GMC guideline documents and explanations is 
given to explain the reason why the answers are classed as they are. This is a three part scenario 
with Katy returning for further consultation.   
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Overall this part of the GMC web site contains a training in following GMP guidelines; 
explanations of why a particular choice of action is advised (or not) are given in terms of GMC 
guidelines. This is a fully generalist approach to ethical practice. 
The GCP guidelines contain fairly lean guidance in the doctor patient relationship such as: 
“Make the care of your patient your first concern”, and “You must make sure that your conduct 
at all times justifies your patients’ trust in you and the public’s trust in the profession”. 
6.3.1.2 Looking Deeper 
Some professionals within medicine wish to have a deeper understanding of medical ethics, 
often they will take a course leading to a diploma or a higher degree; one example of the latter is 
the MA in Medical Ethics and Law at Keele University. Keele gives an outline of the course 
content on the university web site, as well as modules dealing with specific medically related 
ethical issues (e.g autonomy and paternalism). The course has an introduction to ethical theory: 
Introduction to Moral and Legal Concepts: 
This module provides an introduction to the concepts and theories used on the course. 
It explores the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories of 
ethics, the relationship between law and morality and the nature of moral and legal 
rights, as well as providing an introduction to some basic legal concepts, the structure 
of the English legal system, and the Human Rights Act. 
Keele University 2012 
This then takes a generalist approach to ethics. 
6.3.2 Ethical behaviour in particularist world  
If particularism were to be accepted as the underlying model for ethical decision making, doctors 
would be placed in a more central role of guardian of the ethical value of their own decisions. 
This is a key practical difference between generalists and particularists which is brought out in 
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the Patty/Gerry debate. Gerry, being the generalist, is more likely to keep the promise because 
he subscribes to the general rule “promise keeping is morally good” and he wants to do what is 
morally good. Patty, being the particularist, sees the situation holistically, she had intended to 
keep the promise when she made it,50 but she must make her mind up whether to keep it in this 
particular case. Patty views the situation holistically and decides what moral value to give to 
keeping her promise.  
[As in Footnote 37 I will then change Gerry’s gender and call her “Geri”.] 
 The patient who has Geri as a doctor will be able to trust her to be likely to follow national and 
local guidelines, to respect his autonomy and to act with beneficence, nonmaleficence and 
justice. 
Patty’s patients, however, have (by extending Hooker’s argument) no reason to trust her to act in 
any preordained way. Patty is not, however, some scatterbrain acting on whatever whim catches 
her attention; she is a professional doctor wanting to act in the best interests of her patients. In 
many cases she and Geri will act in the same way. To paraphrase Dancy, if Patty is making no 
mistake in not following NICE’s recommendations then morality does not require her to follow 
them. He goes on to say that Patty and Geri will only differ in cases where it is certain that Patty 
will do the right thing, and it is not at all so certain that Geri will (as discussed in §5.6.2). This 
seems a little harsh on Geri if we accept that there can be degrees of good in complex situations. 
However my concern in this section is to see how Patty can learn to make morally correct 
decisions. She wants to make correct decisions, although the Bolam criterion is no longer 
regarded as a final arbiter, I will take it as a sufficient arbiter of which decisions are morally 
                                                 
50 There is an obvious difficulty in this statement in that Patty’s promise is a more complicated statement than 
Gerry’s. Gerry is saying Xing will have a positive moral valence in the future qua having been promised; Patty must 
know that she regards the promise as breakable and is saying something such as “It seems to me now that the 
situation in the future will be that the morally correct thing will be to X”; always assuming that she sees moral value 
in telling the truth when making the statement. 
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correct for the purpose here; so she might summarise her position by saying she wishes to act 
“in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical 
[practitioners] skilled in that particular art”. This seems close to the idea that the right thing, 
according to virtue ethics, is that thing which a virtuous agent would typically do in the situation. 
As I have said (§4.5.1), this thesis is not the place to try to show if a form of virtue ethics could 
be normative counterpart of the meta-normative theory of particularism, only that the two can 
be seen to have instructive parallels. Investigation of these parallels will be helpful in seeing how 
medical ethical training would change for the particularist world. 
6.3.2.1 Learning to act ethically 
Virtue ethics is more developed than any other potential normative particularist 
theory so I will start with learning to act virtuously:[W]hy should a proponent of virtue 
ethics deny the significance of such mother’s-knee rules as “Don’t lie”, “Keep 
promises”, “Help others”? Although it is a mistake (I have claimed) to define a virtuous 
agent simply as one disposed to act in accordance with deontologist’s rules, it is a very 
understandable mistake, given the very obvious connection between, for example, the 
exercise of the virtue of honesty and refraining from lying. Virtue ethicists want to 
emphasize the fact that, if children are taught to be honest, they must be taught to 
love and prize the truth, and that merely teaching them not to lie will not achieve this 
end. But they need not deny that, to achieve this end, teaching them not to lie is 
useful, or even indispensible. 
(original emphasis) Hursthouse 1999 p39 
In this passage Hursthouse distinguishes between learning rules for proper behaviour and 
learning to be someone who behaves properly. This chimes with particularism because 
particularists argue that a final closed set of moral rules is not possible and such a set is not 
required for moral action, so learning to behave morally is more than merely than learning a set 
of rules. 
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 The development of a moral character is a process which starts at the mother’s knee but 
continues throughout life. In the particularist world agents must distinguish between situations 
where a rule (“Do not lie”, “Give blood to a patient who will otherwise die”) counts and one 
where it does not (“A stole the book from B”, “The patient is a Jehovah’s witness”). This 
distinguishing between situations is itself holistic and other features of the situation might 
further change the moral value of the proposed action (returning the book, setting up a blood 
transfusion). An increasing supply of ever thicker rules will not provide a definitive moral 
decision algorithm.  
Teaching medical ethics to trainee professionals would be less about learning to apply the four 
principles and more about understanding the interaction between features of situations. The aim 
would be to equip those potential professionals with the moral grounding so that they could 
make decisions, rather than search for further guidance, in complex situations. In the current 
GMC Good Medical Practice in Action interactive web site (see above) the student can see 
several scenarios and choose one of three potential actions; if she chooses “wrongly” she is told 
(e.g.) “This would not be in line with GMC guidance. Doctors must not [X]”. Although there 
might be more room for discussion in a classroom situation, this approach is one of learning the 
rules rather than learning to be a doctor who behaves properly. In the particularist world, there 
must be room for more explanation of why most of the profession think that Xing would be 
wrong. 
Dancy’s statement that particularist morality is in perfectly good shape is not to say that any 
action I decide to undertake is right because I have decided to undertake it. The student’s 
deciding to X in the above scenario does not make Xing right, but simply telling the student she 
is wrong does not give her sufficient moral understanding to choose an action properly in similar 
situations. It is reasonable to suppose that those wishing to enter medicine or a related field 
already have some mother’s knee understanding of morality; particularist medical ethics would 
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require a process of understanding the doctor-patient relationship by building on that 
framework. 
6.3.2.2 Continuing professional ethical development 
When moving into practice the doctor will inevitably start to meet more difficult situations than 
those envisaged in her training. Particularism indicates that there can be no look up table 
detailing which acts have positive moral value and which negative. Continuing training would 
require provision of advice and review of decisions.  
When seeking advice the doctor might again look to virtue ethics and find that the right action is 
to do what a virtuous agent would typically do in the situation and if we do not know what a 
virtuous agent would typically do as Hursthouse suggests by finding a virtuous agent and asking 
him. At first sight this does not seem particularly helpful, but in the context of a newly qualified 
doctor entering into practice such an agent could be provided by supplying a mentor who is 
more senior in the practice. In a particularist NHS mentors might be appointed to cover several 
General Practices.  
Returning to the question of who the patient is relying on to ensure the morality of their doctor, 
we see that the doctor is making her own decisions but is doing so under the influence of the 
teachers and her mentor. Such a mentor would have the dual role of guiding the doctor and 
reassuring the patient that there is some oversight of his care. 
6.3.2.3 Guidelines in particularist medical ethics 
Doctors need to be able to carry out their work without needing to have an academic interest in 
moral philosophy. In the generalist world systems to offer action guidance carry, embedded 
within them, thick ethical principles giving pro tanto duties for practicing professionals. One of 
the duties is the duty to keep their ethical training, part of the current standard of practice, up to 
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date. In the particularist world the concept of pro tanto duty does not play a role in ethical 
decision making. However it would be too demanding that doctors consider every aspect of 
every case before recommending a course of treatment. A patient with an infected finger 
requires antibiotics, if there are no medical reasons for not prescribing them it would be odd to 
think that the doctor should spend time and effort considering whether it is ethical to prescribe 
them. Whilst there may be many features involved in the ethical valence of the decision ({“that 
the patient is in pain”, “that antibiotics will combat the cause of the pain”...}) it might not take 
the particularist doctor long to decide that these features do, in fact, act in this case in the same 
way they acted in the case she saw yesterday of an infected toe. There is a temptation for her to 
start to make a generalisation that it is ethically right to give antibiotics to patients with infected 
extremities. This sort of generalisation holds no problems for particularism; Dancy accepts 
defeasible generalisations such as “In standard conditions, red ties look red” and “Ceteris paribus, 
lying is wrong-making” as reasons that “arrive switched on” (Dancy 2004 pp111-117). Such 
default reasons remain within the holism of reasons and can be switched off by any other reason 
in the right situation. Dancy attributes the idea of features which have “for the most part” ethical 
valences to (then unpublished) work by Lance and Little. In the particularist world, then, the 
guidelines I have argued are pro tanto duties with a fixed valence in generalist worlds, become 
holistic ceteris paribus (or default) reasons in particularist worlds. The emphasis for CPD for 
medical professionals in under particularism is concerned with understanding new or updated 
guidance in such a way that they can recognise situations where all other things are not the same. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The current structure of medical ethics is largely generalist in nature; this is hardly surprising as 
most of the development of medical ethics was done at a time when normative ethics was 
conducted as a debate between deontologists and consequentialists. This has led to deontological 
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systems of guidance and consequentialist view of resource allocation in the resource limited 
NHS (NICE). In a particularist world medical ethics training (including CPD) would be focussed 
on the development of trustworthy doctors. 
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7 Conclusion 
“Life is the art of drawing sufficient conclusions from insufficient premises.” Samuel Butler 
The hypothesis for this thesis was stated in §1.8  
Particularism implies that normative ethics is not necessary for ethical decision 
making. 
Particularists think that the accepted link between normative theory and ethical 
action is incorrect and should be abandoned. 
Current guidance in medical ethics is based on normative theories. 
If particularists are correct, a new understanding of the basis for medical ethics is 
needed. 
To investigate this hypothesis I have looked at the basis for particularism, particularly as 
described by Dancy in “Ethics Without Principles” (Dancy 2004). To paraphrase Dancy, 
particularism is a result of the notion that the features of situations which give rise to action do 
not have a fixed valence; sometimes the feature that there will be a lot of people there is a reason 
to go there, sometimes it is a reason to stay away. Features change their valence depending on 
other features of a particular situation; whether I want to party or study. Moral particularism 
argues that there is nothing special about moral reasons that would mean the features which give 
rise to moral judgement behave in a way different from non moral reasons. That it is a lie is 
sometimes a reason to refrain from saying it and sometimes a reason to say it. Dancy introduces 
the term “holism” for the proposition that all reasons are capable of changing their valence 
depending of the particular situation. Holism of reasons and particularism oppose the accepted 
generalism of most of Twentieth Century normative ethics which Feiser describes as a “search 
for an ideal litmus test of morally proper behaviour” (Fieser 2000, p138). Dancy says he is 
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especially concerned to oppose Rossian deontology which sees moral reasons as pro tanto duties 
which always act in with the same moral valence. 
The theme of this thesis is firmly in the field of practical and professional ethics. Generalism and 
particularism are meta-normativetheories, to try to understand how they can have an effect on 
action guidance in the real world I have extended the notion of thick and thin concepts to cover 
moral principles. I have taken a principle to be a statement such as “When the following features 
obtain {f1 ... fn}, Xing is the right action”. Thickness here is not a binary divide but a continuum 
from a fully thin principle of “always do that which, all things considered, is the best thing to 
do” in which the feature set is empty and the principle applies in all situations in all possible 
worlds, to a principle where the feature set is a full description of all features of the world in 
which Xing is right. Neither of these extremes is capable of providing meaningful action 
guidance in practical and professional ethics. Action guidance from generalist normative theories 
is possible when the feature set is sufficiently full {Xing will cause pleasure, the pleasure caused 
is not sadistic}.  
In more complex situation many morally relevant features may be present and the feature set will 
be correspondingly large, so that a statement of the principle which guides the agent to X will be 
correspondingly thick. In generalist ethics a feature which is morally relevant in one situation will 
always be morally relevant in another situation in which it appears and will always act in the same 
moral direction. Causing pleasure will always have a positive valence, being sadistic will always 
have a negative valence. Where many features are present it is necessary to balance the pro tanto 
duties for and against Xing to see if Xing is right. For the particularist, features which have a 
moral valence in one situation need not have the same (or any) moral valence in another. 
Particularists also see the complexity of situations, they do not deny that in real situations moral 
reasons might oppose each other and some balancing might be part of the action guidance, they 
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do deny that the fact that a feature was a reason in favour of Xing in one situation means that it 
will be a reason in favour of Xing in another where it occurs. 
Current medical ethics is based on generalist normative theory. I have argued that for this to be 
action guiding in complex situations it must be sufficiently thick, this thickness is often 
embedded in guidance documents ranging from text books on medical ethics to DoH 
publications and NICE recommendations. These documents form part of the normative ethical 
framework which guides medical professionals. Some of these documents deal explicitly with 
ethical issues (such as the DoH Guidance on Consent), while others have recommendations 
which contain implicit ethical features (such as the IR(ME)R regulations). 
I have taken trust to be a main feature of the doctor-patient relationship and thus of medical 
ethics. There is a perceived crisis in trust in the UK in the early Twenty First Century and the 
development of trustworthy systems is widely regarded as a prerequisite for the reestablishment 
of trust in politicians, media personnel, bankers, doctors and so on. Regulated open systems 
aimed at ensuring trustworthiness are to be introduced for banking and the newspapers at the 
time of writing.  
Medicine is ahead of this game and many guidance systems already in place contain the necessary 
ingredients for trustworthiness (for example, if my doctor follows the DoH guidance on 
consent, my autonomy will be protected). In this generalist system doctors are given basic 
training in the underlying theory, often in the form of the “four principles”, and application 
through GMC and DoH guidance documents. Continuing education (such as CPD) is the key to 
maintaining trustworthiness as the guidance evolves in the evolving health service. 
To consider how this would work in a particularist system I have looked at the differences in the 
decisions made by particularist and generalist doctors and the implications this would have on 
the doctor patient relationship, in particular on the trust relationship. I have extended the 
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Hooker/Dancy (Patty and Gerry) example to consider when the generalist and the particularist 
would be prepared to break NICE guidelines on prescribing. In parallel with Hooker’s claim it is 
reasonable to think the particularist is more willing to prescribe against NICE’s 
recommendations as she does not see them as carrying a pro tanto duty. In this situation the 
doctor is making the ethical decision directly; having read NICE’s document she sees it as not 
counting in this case. Rather than relying on a framework of trustworthiness, a patient will be 
trusting the doctor directly. I have cited two cases from my experience in early phase clinical 
trials to see how decisions are made by those I classify as particularist and those I classify as 
generalist. 
The doctor in the particularist world sees each situation, each interaction with a patient, 
holistically. The advice from the four principles, the GMC or DoH etc do not represent pro tanto 
duties for her; they may be default ceteris paribus reasons for particular courses of action, they will 
often be things she should consider when reflecting of what course of action to take, but in 
some situations she might decide they do not count.  
In both the particularist and the generalist world the ethical practice of medicine requires some 
understanding of the special relationship between doctor and patient and between the medical 
and associated professions and society. Training for professionals in medical ethics should equip 
individuals with the tools required to practice their profession. The emphasis in a particularist 
world would be on developing the moral character of these professionals so that they do not 
make moral mistakes when they believe a feature of a situation means that guidance such as, “for 
the most part it is not justified to give a patient an absorbed dose of X-radiation unless it will 
benefit that patient” does not count when writing a protocol for a clinical trial. 
I have suggested that this would mean a fundamental change in the way medical ethics is taught. 
The generalist reliance on principles and adherence to guidelines would be weakened and a new 
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emphasis on the career long development of moral character and understanding would be 
introduced. 
The hypothesis is then at least partially true; if particularism is correct then a change in emphasis 
in medical ethical training would be required, as would a new emphasis on the development of 
moral character. However codes of practice and guidelines would still be necessary to help 
professionals deal with the complexity of modern scientific medicine; the role of these codes 
would no longer give pro tanto duty, but rather put the emphasis on default ceteris paribus advice. 
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